Genomic stability among O3:K6 V. parahaemolyticus pandemic strains isolated between 1996 to 2012 in American countries

Background The V. parahaemolyticus pandemic clone, results in the development of gastrointestinal illness in humans. Toxigenic strains of this species are frequently isolated from aquatic habitats and organisms such as mollusks and crustaceans. Reports on the isolation of the pandemic clone started in 1996, when a new O3:K6 clone was identified in Asia, that rapidly spread worldwide, becoming the predominant clone isolated from clinical cases. In this study whole genome sequencing was accomplished with an Illumina MiniSeq platform, upon six novel V. parahaemolyticus strains, that have been isolated in Mexico since 1998 and three representative genomes of strains that were isolated from reported outbreaks in other American countries, and were deposited in the GenBank. These nine genomes were compared against the reference sequence of the O3:K6 pandemic strain (RIMD 2210633), which was isolated in 1996, to determine sequence differences within American isolates and between years of isolation. Results The results indicated that strains that were isolated at different times and from different countries, were highly genetically similar, among them as well as to the reference strain RIMD 2210633, indicating a high level of genetic stability among the strains from American countries between 1996 to 2012, without significant genetic changes relative to the reference strain RIMD 2210633, which was isolated in 1996 and was considered to be representative of a novel O3:K6 pandemic strain. Conclusions The genomes of V. parahaemolyticus strains isolated from clinical and environmental sources in Mexico and other American countries, presented common characteristics that have been reported for RIMD 2210633 O3:K6 pandemic strain. The major variations that were registered in this study corresponded to genes non associated to virulence factors, which could be the result of adaptations to different environmental conditions. Nevertheless, results do not show a clear pattern with the year or locality where the strains were isolated, which is an indication of a genomic stability of the studied strains.

Pseudomonas syringae pv. actinidiae (bacterial canker of kiwifruit).

Bacterial canker of kiwifruit, caused by Pseudomonas syringae pv. actinidiae (Psa), is a serious threat to kiwifruit production worldwide. At least four related but genetically distinct lineages of Psa are currently known, and more are likely to exist. In 2008, a particularly virulent strain emerged in Italy and spread rapidly to all main global kiwifruit production areas. This strain is variously referred to as the pandemic strain, PsaV or Biovar 3. Different Actinidia species and cultivars show varying susceptibility to Psa, and breeding resistant or tolerant kiwifruit varieties is highly important to the industry. Like all pathovars of Pseudomonas syringae, Psa is present in infected plant material. Transfer of nursery material is a major source of long distance spread, while agronomic techniques such as pruning can contribute to spread within and between orchards. The pathogen can be dispersed in aerosols and can be carried between trees and adjacent orchards in wind-driven rain. Psa is listed on the EPPO Alert List.

RISE AND FALL IN SARS-COV-2 GLOBAL PANDEMIC STRAIN RATE–AN OVERVIEW

After its discovery in Hubei in China in December 2019, the deadly rise of modern coronavirus (COVID-19 or 2019-nCoV) has spread globally. SARS-CoV-2 disease COVID-19 has quickly spread worldwide, posing a serious threat to health and the economy. As of 25th January 2021, more than 100 million confirmed cases of 2,165,581 deaths have been reported by WHO and Worldometer. Many of the cases reported are caused by infection from human to human and are the carriers of this lethal coronavirus. Due to its calamitous nature, the whole world was under lockdown restricting all sorts of movements and means of transportation in hampering the countries economic balance. Presently, the world's endeavor to create and develop a safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine is bearing the fruit. A handful of vaccines now have been authorized around the globe and many more remain in the development phase. In addition, social isolation and knowledge of hygiene (facial masks and sanitizers) are potential methods of controlling the further dissemination of global pandemics COVID-19. This research article presents a brief overview of the catastrophic effect caused by COVID-19 disease globally and particularly in different states of India. Additionally, the article also discusses the recent variant of SARS-CoV-2 and its vulnerable impact. Furthermore, the article investigates the currently available vaccines and those in their development phase for the treatment of COVID-19 disease. This investigatory literature may provide comprehensive details on COVID-19 disease from its inception to grow and later fall in its strain rate.

Preadaptation of pandemic GII.4 noroviruses in unsampled virus reservoirs years before emergence

The control of re-occurring pandemic pathogens requires understanding the origins of new pandemic variants and the factors that drive their global spread. This is especially important for GII.4 norovirus, where vaccines under development offer promise to prevent hundreds of millions of annual gastroenteritis cases. Previous studies have hypothesized that new GII.4 pandemic viruses arise when previously circulating pandemic or pre-pandemic variants undergo substitutions in antigenic regions that enable evasion of host population immunity, as described by conventional models of antigenic drift. In contrast, we show here that the acquisition of new genetic and antigenic characteristics cannot be the proximal driver of new pandemics. Pandemic GII.4 viruses diversify and spread over wide geographical areas over several years prior to simultaneous pandemic emergence of multiple lineages, indicating that the necessary sequence changes must have occurred before diversification, years prior to pandemic emergence. We confirm this result through serological assays of reconstructed ancestral virus capsids, demonstrating that by 2003, the ancestral 2012 pandemic strain had already acquired the antigenic characteristics that allowed it to evade prevailing population immunity against the previous 2009 pandemic variant. These results provide strong evidence that viral genetic changes are necessary but not sufficient for GII.4 pandemic spread. Instead, we suggest that it is changes in host population immunity that enable pandemic spread of an antigenically preadapted GII.4 variant. These results indicate that predicting future GII.4 pandemic variants will require surveillance of currently unsampled reservoir populations. Furthermore, a broadly acting GII.4 vaccine will be critical to prevent future pandemics.

Witnessing Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 through Comparative Phylogenomics: The Proximate Origin is Guangdong, not Wuhan

A new form of coronavirus called severe acute respiratory disease coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is currently causing a pandemic. A six-month evolutionary history of SARS-CoV-2 is witnessed by characterising the total genome of 821 samples using comparative phylogenomic approaches. Our analyses produced striking inclusive results that may guide scientists/professionals for the past/future of pandemic. Phylogenetic and time estimation analyses suggest the proximate origin of pandemic strain as Guangdong and the origin time as first half of September 2019, not Wuhan and December 2019, respectively. The viral genome experienced a substitution rate similar to other RNA viruses, but it is particularly high in some of the peptides encoding sequences such as leader protein, E gene, orf8, orf10, nsp10, N gene, S gene and M gene and nsp4, while low in nsp11, orf7a, 3C-like proteinase, nsp9, nsp8 and endoRNase. Most strikingly, the divergence rate of amino acid sequences is high proportional to nucleotide divergence. Additionally, specific non-synonymous mutations in nsp3 and nsp6 evolved under positive selection. The exponential growth rate (r), doubling time (Td) and R0 were estimated to be 47.43 per year, 5.39 days and 2.72, respectively. Comparison of synapomorphies distinguishing the SARS-CoV-2 and the candidate ancestor bat coronavirus indicates that mutation pattern in nsp3 and S gene enabled the new strain to invade human and become a pandemic strain. We arrive at the following main conclusions: (i) six months evolution of viral genome is nearly neutral, (ii) origin of pandemic is not Wuhan and predates formal reports, (iii) although viral population is ongoing an exponential growth, the doubling time is evolving towards shortening, and (iv) divergence rate of total genome is similar to other RNA viruses, but it is prominently high in some genes while low in some others and evolution in these genes should be closely monitored as their protein products intervening to pathogenicity, virulence and immune response.

Adamantan derivatives capable of inhibiting the reproduction of a Rimantadine resistant strain of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (Influenza A virus, Alphainfluenzavirus, Orthomyxoviridae)

Introduction. Adamantanthane-type drugs such as rimantadine and amantadine have long been used to treat diseases caused by influenza A virus. However, as a result of the mutations, influenza viruses have become resistant to aminoadamantans. The target for these drugs was the protein channel M2. Influenza A virus M2 viroporin in the protein shell forms fairly specific ion channels with a diameter of about 11 Å, specializing in transporting protons inside the viral particle (virion). Restoration of the antiviral properties of adamantanthane-type drugs consists in the selection of advanced functional groups bound by the carbocycle to find new sites of binding to the protein target M2.The рurpose of the study is to identify the antiviral properties of new adamantanum derivatives to the pandemic strain of influenza A virus in vitro.Material and methods. Compounds of aminoadamantans with amino acids and other organic molecules were obtained by classical peptide synthesis methods. The structure of the compound was tested by means of physical and chemical methods. Antiviral properties of synthetic compounds were studied in vitro on monolayer MDCK cells infected with pandemic strain of influenza A/California/07/2009 virus in two schemes of administration of investigated compounds and virus.Results. The reference strain of the influenza virus A/California/07/2009(H1N1) was sensitive to the compounds under test in varying degrees. The antiviral activity of the compounds was expressed in a 50% inhibitory concentration (IС50) ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 мкM, which is generally a good indicator for the Rimantadine/Amantadine resistant strain.Discussion. The values of the IС50 for compounds introduced two hours before contact with the virus were slightly higher than those for single-moment introduction of the substance and virus. The effect of increasing the inhibitory concentration in the prophylactic scheme of compounds was valid for all compounds of the experiment.Conclusion. The presented synthetic compounds are active against the variant of influenza A virus resistant to Rimantadine and Amantadine preparations. The obtained compounds can be used as model structures for creation of a new drug of direct action against advanced strains of influenza A virus.

Comparison of the Pathogenicity in Mice of A(H1N1)pdm09 Viruses Isolated between 2009 and 2015 in Japan

The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus emerged in 2009 and continues to circulate in human populations. Recent A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, that is, A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses circulating in the post-pandemic era, can cause more or less severe infections than those caused by the initial pandemic viruses. To evaluate the changes in pathogenicity of the A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses during their continued circulation in humans, we compared the nucleotide and amino acid sequences of ten A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses isolated in Japan between 2009 and 2015, and experimentally infected mice with each virus. The severity of infection caused by these Japanese isolates ranged from milder to more severe than that caused by the prototypic pandemic strain A/California/04/2009 (CA04/09); however, specific mutations responsible for their pathogenicity have not yet been identified.