Blockholders and corporate governance: evidence from China’s split-share-structure reform

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaolin Qian ◽  
Lewis Tam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Split Share Structure ◽  
Share Structure ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Proper empirical tests of the effect of blockholders’ monitoring incentives on corporate governance are scant in the literature because the relationship between ownership structure and enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms is bidirectional. This study aims to address the endogeneity issue by examining the effect of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity, using the split-share-structure (SSS) reform in China as an exogenous shock to blockholders’ monitoring incentives. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a logit model for estimating the change in executive turnover–performance sensitivity around the SSS reform. Sub-sample analysis is conducted to examine whether the impact of SSS reform on the turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms with more contestable blockholders who might consider stock liquidity, risk sharing and diversification in their monitoring/trading decisions. Findings Top executive turnover, defined as CEO or board chair turnover, becomes less sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform, mainly for firms with contestable blockholders prior to the reform. Stock liquidity and blockholders’ demand for diversification can explain the impact of contestable blockholding. Moreover, blockholding is sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform but not before it. Originality/value With few exceptions, most studies in the blockholding literature focus on the effect of blockholder monitoring on firm value. Examining an exogenous shock to blockholding, this paper provides a set of new evidence for the impact of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity. The results call for more evidence of the impact of blockholding on executive turnover from other markets.

Does executive directors from controlling shareholders improve corporate governance?

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 546-569
Author(s):  
Sun Guangguo ◽  
Sun Ruiqi ◽  
Li Hezun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Firm Management ◽  
Split Share Structure Reform ◽  
Split Share Structure ◽  
Share Structure

Purpose The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement. Design/methodology/approach In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management. Findings The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team. Originality/value As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

Corporate governance, financial crises and bank performance: lessons from top Russian banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 798-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurlan Orazalin ◽  
Monowar Mahmood ◽  
Keun Jung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of different dimensions of corporate governance practices such as board characteristics, ownership structure, corporate disclosure and CEO education on the operating performance of Russian banks before, during and after financial crises. Based on the findings, it proposes some policy measures for improved governance practices to protect banks from future financial crisis or economic downturns. Design/methodology/approach The study comprises data from the largest publicly traded Russian banks listed on the Russian Stock Exchange RST for the period. Operating performance data were collected from financial statements, while corporate governance mechanisms were collected from annual reports available on the banks’ websites. Because panel data were used, the panel regression model was used to control unobserved time-constant heterogeneity. Findings The findings revealed a positive impact of corporate governance on bank performance before and after the financial crisis. The financial crisis enforced Russian banks to improve their corporate governance practices, resulting in better operating performance after the crisis. Surprisingly, the results for the during-crisis period show that better governance did not yield higher operating performance in Russian banks. Originality/value This is one of the first studies to provide empirical results regarding the relationship between corporate governance practices and bank performance in Russia across different financial crisis periods. The findings revealed the uniqueness of corporate governance scenarios of Russia which could provide important guidelines for other transition economies and emerging markets.

Corporate governance practices and capital structure decisions: the moderating effect of gender diversity

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 939-964
Author(s):  
Mohammad A.A Zaid ◽  
Man Wang ◽  
Sara T.F. Abuhijleh ◽  
Ayman Issa ◽  
Mohammed W.A. Saleh ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Motivated by the agency theory, this study aims to empirically examine the nexus between board attributes and a firm’s financing decisions of non-financial listed firms in Palestine and how the previous relationship is moderated and shaped by the level of gender diversity. Design/methodology/approach Multiple regression analysis on a panel data was used. Further, we applied three different approaches of static panel data “pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect.” Fixed-effects estimator was selected as the optimal and most appropriate model. In addition, to control for the potential endogeneity problem and to profoundly analyze the study data, the authors perform the one-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Dynamic panel GMM specification was superior in generating robust findings. Findings The findings clearly unveil that all explanatory variables in the study model have a significant influence on the firm’s financing decisions. Moreover, the results report that the impact of board size and board independence are more positive under conditions of a high level of gender diversity, whereas the influence of CEO duality on the firm’s leverage level turned from negative to positive. In a nutshell, gender diversity moderates the effect of board structure on a firm’s financing decisions. Research limitations/implications This study was restricted to one institutional context (Palestine); therefore, the results reflect the attributes of the Palestinian business environment. In this vein, it is possible to generate different findings in other countries, particularly in developed markets. Practical implications The findings of this study can draw responsible parties and policymakers’ attention in developing countries to introduce and contextualize new mechanisms that can lead to better monitoring process and help firms in attracting better resources and establishing an optimal capital structure. For instance, entities should mandate a minimum quota for the proportion of women incorporation in boardrooms. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence on the moderating role of gender diversity on the effect of board structure on firm’s financing decisions, something that was predominantly neglected by the earlier studies and has not yet examined by ancestors. Thereby, to protrude nuanced understanding of this novel and unprecedented idea, this study thoroughly bridges this research gap and contributes practically and theoretically to the existing corporate governance–capital structure literature.

Do disclosure and transparency affect bank’s financial performance?

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1344-1361
Author(s):  
Isaiah Oino
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Portfolios ◽  
Cent Level ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of transparency and disclosure on the financial performance of financial institutions. The emphasis is on assessing transparency and disclosure; auditing and compliance; risk management as indicators of corporate governance; and understanding how these parameters affect bank profitability, liquidity and the quality of loan portfolios. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 20 financial institutions was selected, with ten respondents from each, yielding a total sample size of 200. Principal component analysis (PCA), with inbuilt ability to check for composite reliability, was used to obtain composite indices for the corporate governance indicators as well as the indicators of financial performance, based on a set of questions framed for each institution. Findings The analysis demonstrates that greater disclosure and transparency, improved auditing and compliance and better risk management positively affect the financial performance of financial institutions. In terms of significance, the results show that as the level of disclosure and transparency in managerial affairs increases, the performance of financial institutions – as measured in terms of the quality of loan portfolios, liquidity and profitability – increases by 0.3046, with the effect being statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Furthermore, as the level of auditing and the degree of compliance with banking regulations increases, the financial performance of banks improves by 0.3309. Research limitations/implications This paper did not consider time series because corporate governance does not change periodically. Practical implications This paper demonstrates the importance of disclosure and transparency in managerial affairs because the performance of financial institutions, as measured in terms of loan portfolios, liquidity and profitability, increases by 0.4 when transparency and disclosure improve, with this effect being statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Originality/value The use of primary data in assessing the impact of corporate governance on financial performance, instead of secondary data, is the primary novelty of this study. Moreover, PCA is used to assess the weight of the various parameters.

The effect of the adoption of an alternative corporate governance system on firms’ performances

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini ◽  
Bruno S. Sergi ◽  
Emiliano Sironi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Propensity Score ◽  
Performance Outcomes ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Alternative System ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Board System

Purpose – Alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs) have attracted a significant bulk of research recently. While the connection between the adoption of an alternative system (one tier board or two tier board system) and firms’ performances has not been fully analysed yet, the purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies which have turned into an alternative board system have eventually improved their performance over time. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of more than 15,000 Italian unlisted joint stock companies, the authors compare performance outcomes in 2009 of firms adopting alternative systems with performances of firms that maintained the system in force before the 2003 Corporate Law Reform (defined as “traditional”). Because of the choice of an alternative system (one tier or two tier board) instead of a traditional one is not random, the authors reduce selection bias implementing matching methods and comparing firms that are close in terms of propensity score measured in 2003 (the year before the new CGSs have been introduced by a corporate law reform). Findings – The authors do not find evidence of a significant improvement of performances in 2009 concerning those firms that have adopted a one tier or two tier board systems with respect to those which maintained a traditional one. Originality/value – The novelty of the study concerns the application of propensity score matching for the evaluation of the impact of the change of the CGS that is possible in presence of two conditions that are all verified in our setting: first, to have a country where corporate law allows for choosing among different systems; in this case Italy is a good laboratory, because it allows for the choice among three different systems; and second, to have the opportunity to evaluate the effect of the change in light of a relatively recent “pre-treatment” condition; this is made possible by the fact that before the 2003 Reform of corporate law all the companies had a traditional system.

Is internal and external mechanism of governance enriching the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sundas Sohail ◽  
Farhat Rasul ◽  
Ummara Fatima
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Random Effect Model ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore how governance mechanisms (internal and external) enhance the performance of the return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DP) of the banks of Pakistan. The study incorporates not only the internal factors of governance (board size, out-ratio, annual general meeting, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, block holder stock ownership and financial transparency) but also the external factors (legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, and the market for corporate control). Design/methodology/approach The sample size of the study consists of 30 banks (public, private and specialized) listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2008-2014. The panel data techniques (fixed or random effect model) have been used for the empirical analysis after verification by Hausman (1978) test. Findings The results revealed that not only do the internal mechanisms of governance enhance the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan but external governance also plays a substantial role in enriching the performance. The findings conclude that for a good governance structure, both internal and external mechanisms are equally important, to accelerate the performance of the banking sector. Research limitations/implications Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can also be checked by adding some more variables (ownership i.e. foreign, female and family as internal and auditor as external), but they are not added in this work due to data unavailability. Practical implications The study contributes to the literature and could be useful for the policy makers who need to force banks to mandate codes of governance through which they can create an efficient board structure and augment the performance. The investments from different forms of ownership can be accelerated if they follow the codes properly. Social implications The study facilitates the bankers in incorporating sound codes of corporate governance to enhance the performance of the banks. Originality/value This work is unique as no one has explored the impact of external mechanism of governance on the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

Board structure changes after accounting fraud: the case of Schneider Electric

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedicte Millet-Reyes ◽  
Nancy Uddin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Multinational Corporation ◽  
Business Case ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Accounting Fraud ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Theoretical basis The impact of corporate governance on internal controls and quality of financial disclosures. Research methodology Analysis of a real financial fraud event for a non-US multinational corporation. The case relies on accessing and analyzing annual reports for the firm, both before and after the fraud. Additional information on industry governance characteristics are provided in the case itself so that students can compare the firm to the industry. Case overview/synopsis This business case is centered on the analysis of Schneider Electric, a French multinational corporation, which had to restate their financial statements in 2011 because of accounting fraud. Following this event, Schneider undertook major changes in their board structure to improve internal control mechanisms. This pedagogical business case familiarizes students with international differences in ownership and board structure and emphasizes potential corporate governance changes after financial statement fraud. Complexity academic level Managerial finance, corporate finance, international finance, auditing. This case is more appropriate for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses.

Audit committee characteristics and the moderating effect of Malaysian code of corporate governance on IPO liquidity

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amal Mohammed Al-Masawa ◽  
Rasidah Mohd-Rashid ◽  
Hamdan Amer Al-Jaifi ◽  
Shaker Dahan Al-Duais
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This study aims to investigate the link between audit committee characteristics and the liquidity of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Malaysia, which is an emerging economy in Southeast Asia. Another purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the revised Malaysian code of corporate governance (MCCG) on the link between audit committee characteristics and IPO liquidity. Design/methodology/approach The final sample consists of 304 Malaysian IPOs listed in 2002–2017. This study uses ordinary least squares regression method to analyse the data. To confirm this study’s findings, a hierarchical or four-stage regression analysis is used to compare the t-values of the main and moderate regression models. Findings The findings show that audit committee characteristics (size and director independence) have a positive and significant relationship with IPO liquidity. Also, the revised MCCG positively moderates the relationship between audit committee characteristics and IPO liquidity. Research limitations/implications This study’s findings indicate that companies with higher audit committee independence have a more effective monitoring mechanism that mitigates information asymmetry, thus reducing adverse selection issues during share trading. Practical implications Policymakers could use the results of this study in developing policies for IPO liquidity improvements. Additionally, the findings are useful for traders and investors in their investment decision-making. For companies, the findings highlight the crucial role of the audit committee as part of the control system that monitors corporate governance. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this work is a pioneering study in the context of a developing country, specifically Malaysia that investigates the impact of audit committee characteristics on IPO liquidity. Previously, the link between corporate governance and IPO liquidity had not been investigated in Malaysia. This study also contributes to the IPO literature by providing empirical evidence regarding the moderating effect of the revised MCCG on the relationship between audit committee characteristics and IPO liquidity.

CEO behavior and sustainability performance: the moderating role of corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amel Kouaib ◽  
Asma Bouzouitina ◽  
Anis Jarboui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Real Estate ◽  
Corporate Sustainability ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sustainability Performance ◽  
Corporate Sustainability Performance ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper explores how the tension between a firm's CEO overconfidence feature and externally observable hubris attribute may determine the level of corporate sustainability performance. This work also contemplates the impact of the moderator “corporate governance practices.”Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of 658 firm-year-observations using a sample of European real estate firms indexed on Stoxx Europe 600 Index from 2006 to 2019. To test the developed hypotheses, feasible generalized least square (FGLS) regression is applied.FindingsFindings suggest that a good corporate governance score strengthens the positive effect of the psychological bias (CEO overconfidence) on corporate sustainability performance while it fails to attenuate the negative effect of the cognitive bias (CEO hubris).Research limitations/implicationsThe research provides an overview of the impact of CEO personality traits on the corporate sustainability performance level in the European real estate sup-sector. As corporate governance can have a major impact to control these traits, the authors recommend European real estate companies to improve their corporate governance practices.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the existent literature this gap with two empirical novelties: (1) providing a novel insight into sustainability involvement using a sample of European real estate sup-sector and (2) investigating the moderating effect on the link between CEO psychological and cognitive biases and sustainability performance. This study provides empirical evidence that entrenchment problems arising from CEO hubris would not be mitigated by a good corporate governance practice.

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