Democracy Movement and Alternative Knowledge in Hong Kong

This chapter’s author discusses the role of social movement in producing alternative knowledge based on the case of the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong. This set of knowledge includes at least the definition of a problematic situation, the problem’s causes, and possible solutions. It is alternative/counter knowledge because it involves the unlearning of dominant discourses and the learning of counter-discourses. This learning is particularly intense when people are involved in social actions. Social movements as “repertoires of knowledge practices,” as suggested by della Porta and Pavan, foster the coordination of disconnected personal experiences and rationalities within a shared cognitive system to provide a common orientation for making claims and producing change. In this chapter, the author analyzes the mobilization period (March 2013–September 2014) of the Umbrella Movement to demonstrate how the movement affected public agenda setting, interpretation of law, and formulation of reform proposal.

Trapped in inactivity? Social assistance and labour supply in Austria

Financial incentives affect the labour supply decisions of households. However, the impact usually varies significantly across household types. Whilst there is a substantial amount of literature on the labour supply effects of tax reforms and in-work benefits, the impact of changes in social assistance benefits has received less attention. This paper analyses labour supply responses to changes in social assistance. We show that labour supply elasticities vary substantially across gender and household type. Women exhibit higher labour supply elasticities, both on the intensive and the extensive margins. Additionally, labour supply elasticities are typically higher for singles and for households with children. Using these results, we analyse the impact of the Austrian reform proposal “Neue Sozialhilfe” (New Social Assistance), which was introduced in 2019 and substantially cut social assistance benefits for migrants and families with children. The overall effects of the reform are especially strong for men and migrants. Migrants and couples with children, that is, the groups hardest hit by the reform’s social assistance reductions, show the strongest labour supply reactions to the New Social Assistance. Furthermore, we show that overall, the reform is expected to have a positive, but small, effect on the intensive margin of labour supply.

Residual Profit Allocation by Income

This chapter sets out our first detailed reform proposal: the Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPAI). This is one of a family of schemes based on separating multinational profit into ‘routine’ and ‘residual’ profit, a distinction that exists under the current system. The RPAI allocates the right to tax routine profit to the country where functions and activities take place. It allocates the right to tax residual profit to the market, or destination, country where sales are made to third parties. We evaluate the RPAI against our five criteria. We conclude that while it is far from perfect, it performs well against these criteria. Its superior performance stems primarily from allocating taxing rights for residual profit to the destination country, where there is a relatively immobile third party purchaser of goods and services sold by the company.

President Bolsonaro’s Promises and Actions on Corruption Control

Before the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, candidate Jair Bolsonaro offered a bold message on corruption control. Among his promises, Bolsonaro vowed to promote government transparency, dismiss any member of his team accused of corruption, and defend the country’s institutions of accountability. Bolsonaro also offered to support a once-popular legislative reform proposal known as the Ten Measures Against Corruption. However, it is worth cautioning that anticorruption as a rhetorical device has been a near-permanent feature of the Brazilian political landscape. In this article, we seek to compare Bolsonaro’s campaign promises with his early actions as president. The evidence shows that, months after the 2018 elections, President Bolsonaro has failed the anticorruption mandate on which he was elected.