scholarly journals The Presheaf of Conditional Expectations, a Bridge Between Probability and Intuitionistic Truth Value

Author(s):  
Jean-Pascal Laedermann

Research for a theory of quantum gravity has recently led to the use of presheaf topos. Quantum uncertainty is linked to the truth values of intuitionistic logic. This paper proposes transposing this model into a classic probability context, that of conditional mathematical expectations. A simulation of Brownian motion is offered for illustrative purposes.

Author(s):  
FRANCESC ESTEVA ◽  
PERE GARCIA-CALVÉS ◽  
LLUÍS GODO

Within the many-valued approach for approximate reasoning, the aim of this paper is two-fold. First, to extend truth-values lattices to cope with the imprecision due to possible incompleteness of the available information. This is done by considering two bilattices of truth-value intervals corresponding to the so-called weak and strong truth orderings. Based on the use of interval bilattices, the second aim is to introduce what we call partial many-valued logics. The (partial) models of such logics may assign intervals of truth-values to formulas, and so they stand for representations of incomplete states of knowledge. Finally, the relation between partial and complete semantical entailment is studied, and it is provedtheir equivalence for a family of formulas, including the so-called free well formed formulas.


1998 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1201-1217
Author(s):  
Norman Feldman

In this paper we consider the three-valued logic used by Kleene [6] in the theory of partial recursive functions. This logic has three truth values: true (T), false (F), and undefined (U). One interpretation of U is as follows: Suppose we have two partially recursive predicates P(x) and Q(x) and we want to know the truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) for a particular x0. If x0 is in the domain of definition of both P and Q, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is true if both P(x0) and Q(x0) are true, and false otherwise. But what if x0 is not in the domain of definition of P, but is in the domain of definition of Q? There are several choices, but the one chosen by Kleene is that if Q(X0) is false, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is also false and if Q(X0) is true, then P(x0) ∧ Q(X0) is undefined.What arises is the question about knowledge of whether or not x0 is in the domain of definition of P. Is there an effective procedure to determine this? If not, then we can interpret U as being unknown. If there is an effective procedure, then our decision for the truth value for P(x) ∧ Q(x) is based on the knowledge that is not in the domain of definition of P. In this case, U can be interpreted as undefined. In either case, we base our truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) on the truth value of Q(X0).


2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eros Corazza

After discussing some difficulties that contextualism and minimalism face, this paper presents a new account of the linguistic exploitation of context, situationalism. Unlike the former accounts, situationalism captures the idea that the main intuitions underlying the debate concern not the identity of propositions expressed but rather how truth-values are situation-dependent. The truth-value of an utterance depends on the situation in which the proposition expressed is evaluated. Hence, like in minimalism, the proposition expressed can be truth-evaluable without being enriched or expanded. Along with contextualism, it is argued that an utterance’s truth-value is context dependent. But, unlike contextualism and minimalism, situationalism embraces a form of relativism in so far as it maintains that semantic content must be evaluated vis-à-vis a given situation and, therefore, that a proposition cannot be said to be true/false eternally.


1989 ◽  
Vol 139 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 201-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Kiefer

Author(s):  
GUY DE TRÉ ◽  
RITA DE CALUWE

In database systems one often has to deal with constraints in order to compel the semantics of the stored data or to express some querying criteria. This is especially the case for multimedia database systems where information of different media types, as e.g. sound, video, images and texts, needs to be managed. A problem with the modelling of (the uncertainty about) the degree of satisfaction of a constraint, is the handling of missing information. In this paper, it is shown how extended possibilistic truth values can be employed to cope with this problem. The notion of an extended possibilistic truth value has been obtained from the assumption that the truth value, which expresses the degree of satisfaction of a constraint, can be undefined. This is for example the case if the constraint cannot be evaluated due to the non-applicability of (some of) its elements. An illustrative database definition and database querying example is presented and discussed.


Author(s):  
AARON M. GRIFFITH

Abstract This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.


2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 4557-4561
Author(s):  
Cheng Fa Lu

The chayidian mei P(almost not P) construction has two possible semantic truth-values, namely P and not P, for which reason the computer fails to identify the true value of its semantics by the conventional syntactic rules. Many methods with poor operability were deduced to identify the semantic truth-value, leaving many cases unable to be explained with these methods. This paper employs deductive method to demonstrate that the hearer identifies the semantic truth-value by comparing the occurrence possibilities of P and not P, providing an alternative for computer to automatically recognize the semantic truth-value of the construction.


1953 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-376
Author(s):  
Alan Rose

In 1930 Łukasiewicz (3) developed an ℵ0-valued prepositional calculus with two primitives called implication and negation. The truth-values were all rational numbers satisfying 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 1 being the designated truth-value. If the truth-values of P, Q, NP, CPQ are x, y, n(x), c(x, y) respectively, then


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dinges

ABSTRACTEpistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deflationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, first, that the bank cases are underspecified even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will fill in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case.


Author(s):  
Hans G. Herzberger

How many truth-values are there? Although this appears to be a very simple question, in my opinion it defies any very simple answer. Some of us have trouble making up our minds. Frege, who invented the term “truth-value”, declared that apart from Truth and Falsity “there are no further truth-values”; and yet Frege, who introduced many of us to semantic presuppositions, acknowledged truth-value gaps. Now how many values would that be? On one way of counting, True, False and Gap make three. To be sure it's not Frege's way of counting; but it's defensible. And we are left with the historical puzzle that Frege, who founded his semantics on the insistence that functions be everywhere defined—without any gaps—has come to be known as the author of the doctrine of semantic presuppositions and truth-value gaps.


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