ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF WITTGENSTEIN’S MANUSCRIPTS FROM 1929–1933

The article treats Ludwig Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts where he formulates the problem of impossibility of “phenomenological language” defined by him as the “description of immediate sensual perception without any hypothetical supplementation.” One may find this phase of his philosophy (1929–1933) a bit paradoxical because the philosopher claims this phase, from the very beginning, to have been overcome; we deal here with philosophical self-criticism. The Lewis Carroll’s paradox is considered in terms of analogy to this criticized project of “phenomenological language”—the paradox of a ridiculously exact map which coincides with the mapped area. We open up new possibilities for comparison between the Wittgensteinian project of the “primal language” and Husserlian, Heideggerian and Finkian projects of “phenomenological language.”

A relação matrimonial na atualidade. Provocações para uma reflexão

Síntese: O matrimônio, na atualidade, como em outros períodos da história, deixa transparecer suas alegrias e desafios. O presente artigo, por meio do tema proposto, visa apresentar um caminho reflexivo com o intuito de colocar em discussão algumas realidades que julgamos importantes na reflexão sobre o matrimônio. Para analisar essa temática, o artigo está dividido em cinco partes. A primeira apresenta como o matrimônio era vivido e pensado no Antigo e no Novo Testamento. A segunda mostra que o amor é o vínculo que dá sentido ao matrimônio. A terceira procura responder à pergunta: como pensar teologicamente a sacramentalidade do matrimônio? Já a quarta parte aborda o conteúdo de uma antropologia conjugal e o significado teológico e filosófico do corpo como linguagem fenomenológica de comunicação interpessoal. Por último, a quinta parte descreve as possibilidades de uma fenomenologia do amor, focando suas ambivalências por meio da relação conjugal que se constrói no tempo, expressando a relação conjugal como narratividade relacionada às exigências das normas e princípios éticos.Palavras-chave: Matrimônio. Amor. Antropologia conjugal. Corpo. Fenomenologia.Abstract: The marriage, today, as in other periods of history, reveals its joys and challenges. This article, through the proposed theme, aims to present a reflective road in order to put into discussion some realities that we deem important in reflection on marriage. To examine this issue, the article is divided into five parts. The first presents how marriage was lived and thought in the Old and New Testament. The second shows that love is the bond that gives meaning to marriage. The third seeks to answer the question: how to think theologically the sacramental nature of marriage? The fourth part deals with the contents of a marital anthropology and the theological and philosophical meaning of the body as a phenomenological language of interpersonal communication. Finally, the fifth part describes the possibilities of a phenomenology of love by focusing its ambivalences through the marital relationship that is built on time, expressing the marital relationship as a narrativity related to the requirements of the norms and ethical principles. Keywords: Marriage. Love. Marriage anthropology. Body. Phenomenology.

Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’

In the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In §1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking.After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the word ‘I’ has two distinct uses: a subject-use and an object-use. The purpose of Wittgenstein's suggestion has, however, been widely misunderstood. I unpack it in §2, explaining how the subject-use connects with a phenomenological language, and so again tempts us into solipsism. In §§3–4, I consider various stages of Wittgenstein's engagement with this kind of solipsism, culminating in a rejection of solipsism (and of subject-uses of ‘I’) via reflections on private languages.

“Seeing the World with Fresh Eyes”

In this article, I draw on Gurdjieff’s philosophy to initiate a phenomenology of aesthetic experience, which I define as any intense emotional engagement that one feels in encountering or creating an artistic work, whether a painting, poem, song, dance, sculpture, or something else. To consider how aesthetic experience might be understood in a Gurdjieffian framework, I begin with an overview of phenomenology, emphasizing the phenomenological concepts of lifeworld and natural attitude, about which Gurdjieff said much, though not using phenomenological language. I then discuss Gurdjieff’s “psychology of human beings” as it might be interpreted phenomenologically, emphasizing three major claims: first, that, human beings are “asleep”; second, that they are “machines”; and, third, that they are “three-centered beings.” I draw on the last claim—human “three-centeredness”—to highlight how aesthetic experiences might be interpreted via Gurdjieff’s philosophy. Drawing on accounts from British philosopher and Gurdjieff associate J. G. Bennett, I end by considering how a Gurdjieffian perspective understands the role of the artistic work in contributing to aesthetic experience.