Globalization, Trade Imbalances and Labor Market Adjustment

We study the role of global trade imbalances in shaping the adjustment dynamics in response to trade shocks. We build and estimate a general equilibrium, multi-country, multi-sector model of trade with two key ingredients: (a) Consumption-saving decisions in each country commanded by representative households, leading to endogenous trade imbalances; (b) labor market frictions across and within sectors, leading to unemployment dynamics and sluggish transitions to shocks. We use the estimated model to study the behavior of labor markets in response to globalization shocks, including shocks to technology, trade costs, and inter-temporal preferences (savings gluts). We find that modeling trade imbalances changes both qualitatively and quantitatively the short- and long-run implications of globalization shocks for labor reallocation and unemployment dynamics. In a series of empirical applications, we study the labor market effects of shocks accrued to the global economy, their implications for the gains from trade, and we revisit the "China Shock" through the lens of our model. We show that the US enjoys a 2.2 percent gain in response to globalization shocks. These gains would have been 73 percent larger in the absence of the global savings glut, but they would have been 40 percent smaller in a balanced-trade world.

Dealing fairly with trade imbalances in monetary unions

Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.