monetary unions
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Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Anokye M. Adam ◽  
Emmanuel N. Gyamfi ◽  
Kwabena A. Kyei ◽  
Simiso Moyo ◽  
Ryan S. Gill

The desire to form monetary unions among regional blocs in Africa has necessitated the need to assess the degree of financial systems interdependencies in Africa economic blocs for their suitability to have harmonised economic policies of eventual monetary unions. In this regard, SADC has pursued policies to harmonise and integrate its financial system as a precursor to its intended monetary union. However, the ensuing risk among exchange rates of economies in SADC is presumed to rise during severe uncertainties. This study examines the degree of asymmetry and nonlinear directional causality between exchange rates in SADC in the frequency domain. We employ both the ensemble empirical mode decomposition (EEMD) and the Rényi effective transfer entropy techniques to investigate the multiscale information that might be disregarded and further quantify the directional flow of information. Analysis of the study is presented for four frequency-domains: high-, medium-, and low frequencies, representing short-, medium-, and long-terms, respectively, in addition to the residue (fundamental feature). We find a mixture of asymmetric and nonlinear bidirectional and unidirectional causality between exchange rates in SADC for the sampled period. The study reveals a significant positive information flow in the high frequency, but negative flow in the medium and low frequencies. In addition, we gauge a bidirectional significant negative information flow within all the 15 economies for the residue. This suggests a higher risk of uncertainties in exchange rates of SADC. Our findings for low probability events at multiscales have implications for the direction of the future of the SADC monetary union. This calls for further sustained policy harmonisation in the region.


Author(s):  
Aikaterini-Sotiria Argyriou ◽  
Mariia Lyzun ◽  
Ihor Lishchynskyy ◽  
Yevhen Savelyev ◽  
Vitalina Kuryliak ◽  
...  
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Author(s):  
Vojtěch Belling ◽  
Lukáš Kollert ◽  
Martin Vojta

Abstract The paper focuses on conditionality in imf programs for member states of monetary unions in light of the decision of the imf’s Executive Board on Program Design in Currency Unions (2018). Despite the growing importance of supranational institutions, the imf lacked until 2018 any explicit framework for imposing conditions on currency union bodies in cases where a member state of such a union requested an imf program. The aim of this paper is to assess the newly adopted imf approach to conditionality for currency union institutions based on the concept of “policy assurances” and to answer the question of whether the imf had authority to impose conditions on supranational institutions prior to the 2018 Board decision and whether the imf should in principle have such authority.


Author(s):  
Maria Eugénia Mata ◽  
Luís Catela Nunes ◽  
Mário Roldão
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2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Marco Meyer

Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-296
Author(s):  
Matthew Greenblatt
Keyword(s):  

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