Problems of Standard Model, Review

It is assumed that standard model is the most successful theory of particle physics but it is not perfect. In this paper, I am interested to flash the published results of various proposals of theoretical physicists in various modes of Standard Model and beyond. There are no specifications theory to declare new model to till date, although some ideas that would modify the standard model in many ways helps to understand the existing results.

5. Mysteries of the quantum

This chapter introduces the central mysteries of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory that lies at the heart of modern physics, but there is no agreement on how to understand it. Simple experiments with light demonstrate why: in understanding those experiments, we have to shift inconsistently back and forth between thinking of the theory as assigning indefinite, delocalized, but known properties to a system, and assigning definite, localized, but unknown properties (this is called the ‘problem of measurement’). Furthermore, when we break a system into subsystems, the state of the system is not determined by the states of the subsystem (this is called ‘entanglement’), and simple arguments seem to tell us that the physical properties of entangled subsystems can influence one another non-locally—faster than light. These three mysteries—measurement, entanglement, non-locality—need to be addressed by any attempt to make sense of quantum theory.

A Concept of Power as the Basis of Jurisdiction

This chapter takes up the first, conceptual step to develop a successful theory of jurisdiction. Based on how jurisdiction is described in views analysed in Chapter 3, but also in the literature on extraterritorial obligations in the area of economic and social rights, it shows that jurisdiction is often described by reference to a concept of power. I also show that it is common for courts and commentators to use terms such as power, control, or influence interchangeably. Following on from these insights, the main argument of the chapter is that the concept of power is rightly placed at the core of jurisdiction. However, this is only true for a clearly defined concept of power best understood as an ability. Based on this understanding, I show that power should be distinguished from influence, (use of) force, and control, respectively. These distinctions allow us to capture the difference between power, its exercise, the means through which it is manifested, and the outcome of the exercise of a given power.

The need for a theory

The present chapter argues that the problem of animal consciousness can’t be tackled directly, without commitment to any particular theory of consciousness. In the course of doing so, it discusses evidence of the existence of unconscious perceptual states, as well as one recent effort to put the emergence of consciousness into phylogenetic context. Finally, it outlines the constraints that a successful theory of consciousness should meet.

Is the atonement necessary or fitting?

In her impressive Atonement, Eleonore Stump claims that her novel Marian theory of the atonement meets a desideratum for a successful theory that Aquinas's theory does not, namely, showing that Christ's passion and death are essential to the solution to the problem of human sin. Here I suggest reasons to side with Aquinas, who says that Christ's suffering and death are not necessary, but merely a fitting way of solving the problem. If the fittingness of Christ's passion and death is a good enough justification for it, we lose a motivation for adopting the Marian theory over the Thomistic one.

Some Special Elements and Pseudo Inverse Functions in Groupoids

In this paper, we consider a theory of elements u of a groupoid ( X , * ) that are associated with certain functions u ^ : X → X , pseudo-inverse functions, which are generalizations of the inverses associated with units of groupoids with identity elements. If classifying the elements u as special of one of twelve types, then it is possible to do a rather detailed analysis of certain cases, leftoids, rightoids and linear groupoids included, which demonstrates that it is possible to develop a successful theory and that a good deal of information has already been obtained with much more possible in the future.

On the limitations of a unitary model of the proof process

In defense of their “explanatory” theory of the proof process, Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo maintain that a successful theory of this kind should correspond to the way that jurors actually reason, to the structure of American trials, and to typical jury instructions. They also demand that such a theory should be normatively defensible. This response suggests that using a single theory to cover such disparate ground obscures more than it clarifies, given the important gaps between psychological, doctrinal, and normative aspects of the fact-finding process.

Well-Being

Well-being is what makes life valuable or good for the individual whose life it is. It is the all-inclusive category of personal value. This chapter evaluates the leading accounts: hedonism (pleasure is the measure of well-being), perfectionism (development of human capacities is the measure), objective lists (numerous objective goods make up a good life), and desire satisfaction. Fatal objections are raised to the first three, and an idealized desire satisfaction account is defended against objections typically raised by others to this kind of theory. The successful theory must capture our concept, unify and explain why various things are good for individual persons, and show why we are rationally motivated to pursue well-being.

Knowledge, Indian views of

Classical Indian epistemology centres on a complex of terms for knowledge, knower and the known or knowable, including pramāṇa, ‘means to knowledge’ or ‘source of knowledge’. Views about perception, inference, testimony and a few additional candidate sources are the topics of core proposals of competing epistemological theories. Certain types of scepticism are also addressed, but explaining how it is possible that we know anything has been less central than other issues. Debates about knowledge – and doubt as well – are often caught up in larger war plans concerning the nature of awareness. The various classical schools typically bring views about awareness with them to the epistemological arena, but a neutral, common touchstone for and important constraint on all pramāṇa theorizing is what is called speech behaviour, vyavahāra, reflecting, it is presumed, bits of everyday knowledge. Verbalizations of perception, for example, ‘That is a pot’, of inference, for example, ‘There is fire on yonder mountain’ (made on the basis of the sight of smoke and an understanding of the general rule that wherever there is smoke, there is fire), of information acquired through testimony, and so on, are the givens for which a successful theory has to account. Principal candidate sources proposed in addition to perception and inference are testimony, analogy, circumstantial implication and negative perception. Mystical experience as a pramāṇa for spiritual matters is viewed as a variety of perception by its advocates, and scripture as a variety of testimony. With stock examples of bits of knowledge agreed upon, disagreement typically centres on what the source is for a particular example and whether admission of any source in addition to perception and inference is ever required. Or, in some cases, a stock example is slightly modified, better to align with a stance taken on a putatively additional pramāṇa. With regard to what the sources make known, some argue that each pramāṇa works within a range of possibilities unique to itself, with no overlap. Thus what is known by perception cannot be known by inference. Others dispute such contentions, although at least a few such restrictions on individual knowledge sources are usually recognized. Buddhists and some others appear to be motivated to deny pramāṇa status to testimony because appeal to testimony is used to justify what they see as objectionable religious theses. Similarly, the Cārvāka materialist denies inference, apparently out of fear of its power to prove the existence of spiritual entities such as God or the soul. The Buddhist Nāgārjuna and others challenge the pramāṇa programmes proffered by epistemologists of all stripes, and provoke what may be called meta-epistemological responses that bring out connections between pramāṇa proposals and a logic of presumption. In particular, the Nyāya response to Nāgārjuna and company is by any light an admirable effort of philosophy.