Counterfactual thinking and repetitive thought in social anxiety

Research suggests that those experiencing Social Anxiety (SA) symptoms are more likely to engage in repetitive thought (RT), including upward counterfactual thinking (U-CFT). Findings indicate that these cognitive patterns may lead to deleterious thoughts and emotions, particularly when U-CFT focuses on non-repeatable, uncontrollable situations and negative self-appraisals. The present dissertation consisted of two complementary studies. Study 1 attempted to 1) validate new measures of state and trait U-CFT, 2) examine the relationship between U-CFT and established measures of RT and mood, and 3) explore the relationship between SA symptoms and counterfactual thinking within a student population. Results indicated that the U-CFT-S (trait measure of U-CFT) and the Counterfactual Likelihood scales (state measure of U-CFT) evidenced sound psychometrics in terms of internal consistency, factor structure, and relationships with related questionnaires. Factor analyses revealed that the Maladaptive U-CFT-S scale clustered with negative mood, rumination, and learned helplessness, while the Adaptive U-CFT subscale clustered with measures of positive mood and self-efficacy. Finally, symptoms of SA correlated positively with state and trait U-CFT generation. Study 2 1) compared patterns of U-CFT and emotions such as guilt and self-blame between a diagnosed Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) group and a Healthy Control (HC) group 2) determined if disorder-specific content impacts U-CFT generation, and 3) piloted a brief, CBT-based, video intervention targeting maladaptive U-CFT. Results indicated that the SAD group evidenced higher amounts of U-CFT in response to the socially-based scenarios than the HC group and in response to social than non-social scenarios. The SAD group evidenced higher levels of unhelpful emotions (e.g., guilt) both pre- and post-CFT generation than HC participants. Finally, the CBT intervention was generally unsuccessful at reducing maladaptive U-CFT, but was more likely to be effective among SAD than HC participants. Implications of this dissertation include: 1) the benefit of including state- and trait-based measures of U-CFT in future research, 2) the importance of conceptualizing U-CFT as a multifaceted construct, 3) addressing that those with SAD are engaging in maladaptive U-CFT and experiencing consequent guilt and self-blame, and 4) the direction of creating more comprehensive, brief interventions aimed at targeting maladaptive U-CFT.

Counterfactual thinking and repetitive thought in social anxiety

Research suggests that those experiencing Social Anxiety (SA) symptoms are more likely to engage in repetitive thought (RT), including upward counterfactual thinking (U-CFT). Findings indicate that these cognitive patterns may lead to deleterious thoughts and emotions, particularly when U-CFT focuses on non-repeatable, uncontrollable situations and negative self-appraisals. The present dissertation consisted of two complementary studies. Study 1 attempted to 1) validate new measures of state and trait U-CFT, 2) examine the relationship between U-CFT and established measures of RT and mood, and 3) explore the relationship between SA symptoms and counterfactual thinking within a student population. Results indicated that the U-CFT-S (trait measure of U-CFT) and the Counterfactual Likelihood scales (state measure of U-CFT) evidenced sound psychometrics in terms of internal consistency, factor structure, and relationships with related questionnaires. Factor analyses revealed that the Maladaptive U-CFT-S scale clustered with negative mood, rumination, and learned helplessness, while the Adaptive U-CFT subscale clustered with measures of positive mood and self-efficacy. Finally, symptoms of SA correlated positively with state and trait U-CFT generation. Study 2 1) compared patterns of U-CFT and emotions such as guilt and self-blame between a diagnosed Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) group and a Healthy Control (HC) group 2) determined if disorder-specific content impacts U-CFT generation, and 3) piloted a brief, CBT-based, video intervention targeting maladaptive U-CFT. Results indicated that the SAD group evidenced higher amounts of U-CFT in response to the socially-based scenarios than the HC group and in response to social than non-social scenarios. The SAD group evidenced higher levels of unhelpful emotions (e.g., guilt) both pre- and post-CFT generation than HC participants. Finally, the CBT intervention was generally unsuccessful at reducing maladaptive U-CFT, but was more likely to be effective among SAD than HC participants. Implications of this dissertation include: 1) the benefit of including state- and trait-based measures of U-CFT in future research, 2) the importance of conceptualizing U-CFT as a multifaceted construct, 3) addressing that those with SAD are engaging in maladaptive U-CFT and experiencing consequent guilt and self-blame, and 4) the direction of creating more comprehensive, brief interventions aimed at targeting maladaptive U-CFT.

Future-Oriented Repetitive Thought: Pessimistic View of Future in Patients With Alzheimer Disease

Objective: In this study, we, for the first time, evaluated future-oriented repetitive thought in patients with Alzheimer disease (AD), that is, how they think and worry about the future. Methods: We administered the Future-Oriented Repetitive Thought scale to 34 patients with AD and 37 control participants. This scale assessed 3 categories of future-oriented repetitive thought: (1) pessimistic repetitive future thinking (eg, “I think about the possibility of losing people or things that are important to me”), (2) repetitive thinking about future goals (eg, “I make specific plans for how to get things that I want in life”), and (3) positive indulging about the future (eg, “When I picture good things happening in my future, it is as if they were actually happening to me now”). Results: Analysis demonstrated more pessimistic repetitive future thinking, but less repetitive thinking about future goals and positive indulging about the future, in patients with AD than in control participants. Conclusion: Our findings demonstrate a pessimistic view of future in patients with AD, which is possibly attributed to hopelessness and depression.

Age Differences in Negative, but Not Positive, Rumination

Objectives The main objective of this study was to determine whether there are age differences in positive and negative repetitive thought (ie, rumination). Method Young adults (ages 19–39; n = 114) and older adults (ages 60–85; n = 88) completed measures of negative and positive rumination. Bayesian analyses were used to determine whether age differences were present for both negative (young > old) and positive (old > young) rumination. Results There was extremely strong evidence for age differences in negative rumination, with lower scores in older adults. In contrast, the evidence was in favor of the null hypothesis for positive rumination. Discussion Age-related positivity is better characterized as decreased dwelling on the meaning of negative moods, rather than increased attention to positive ones.