Overseeing the external audit function: Evidence from audit committees’ reported activities

Recently, in response to calls for more transparency, many firms have begun reporting the activities undertaken by their audit committees in overseeing the work of the external auditor. We use a composite measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities for a sample of S&P 1500 firms and examine the extent to which these reported activities are associated with audit quality. We find that when firms’ audit committees report exerting strong oversight, they have higher audit quality as proxied by audit fees, discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, and restatements. We also find that the market reacts positively to reports indicating strong oversight, consistent with perceptions of higher audit quality. This study extends prior literature on audit committees by introducing a new comprehensive measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities and sheds light on how these activities map into audit quality.

MANDATORY JOINT AUDIT AND AUDIT QUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN BLUE CHIPS

This study investigates audit quality under joint and single audit regimes with a sample of large European firms. Both, the economic relevance of these companies, and the fact that the impact of joint audit on audit quality should be stronger when the audited company is a blue-chip firm motivate the study. If mandatory joint audit were positively associated with audit quality, French firms, under mandatory joint audit since 1966, should present higher audit quality compared to their European peers. The results do not indicate this to be the case. Specifically, similar levels of discretionary accruals are observed for French and other European firms. Furthermore, for the first time in the literature, evidence is reported indicating that French firms may even present lower audit quality than their European peers, when audit quality is measured by the likelihood of just beating earnings benchmarks. These results are expected to inform the ongoing debate in several countries about joint audits.

Is there any interaction between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management?

This research aims to investigate whether firms employ real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) as substitutes for each other when managing earnings to meet earnings benchmarks. It specifically looks at the sequential nature of both forms of earnings management. REM is proxied by an abnormal amount of operating cash developed by Dechow et al. (1998), while AEM is proxied by the discretionary accrual model by Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995). The data was obtained from the Economics and Business Data Center, Faculty of Economics and Business, Gadjah Mada University, focusing on manufacturing and mining companies during the period from 2005 to 2013, which resulted in 754 firm-years data. Using correlation tests and an empirical model developed by this research, which captures the interaction between REM and AEM, this research shows that firms use both forms of earnings management sequentially; managers more often engage in accrual-based earnings management if the earnings produced by real manipulations do not meet the earnings target. This finding is important as REM and AEM occur sequentially instead of simultaneously, and earnings performance is not only driven by accrual-based earnings management but also by real earnings management.

Non-GAAP Disclosures and CEO Pay Levels

We examine the association between CEO cash and equity compensation and non-GAAP disclosure practices in a responsive regulatory and opaque compensation reporting environment. Our empirical evidence, based on a sample of public companies in New Zealand, shows that CEO cash compensation is associated with the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP disclosures, whereas equity incentives are not. Our results document evidence of an increase in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures and a decrease in the provision and quality of reconciliation between non-GAAP measures and closely related GAAP measures around CEO cash compensation. In particular, managers use these disclosures when their GAAP earnings benchmarks are missed. A marginal decrease in opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures following the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) indicates little change in reporting behavior following adoption of IFRS. Our findings suggest that managers disclose non-GAAP measures with opportunistic intentions motivated by compensation and points to the need for regulators to set policy about clear reconciliation standards.

Do sin firms engage in real activities manipulation to meet earnings benchmarks?

Purpose Recent literature suggests that sin firms (firms in tobacco, gambling and alcohol industries) have lower institutional ownership, fewer analysts following, higher abnormal returns and higher financial reporting quality. This study aims to investigate empirically how sin firms engage in real activities manipulation (RAM) to meet earnings benchmarks in comparison to non-sin firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors examine two types of RAM, namely, Cutting discretionary expenditures including research and development (R&D), SG&A and advertising to boost earnings. Extending deep discount or lenient credit terms to boost sales and/or overproducing to decrease COGS to increase gross profit. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), the authors use abnormal discretionary expenditures as the proxy for expenditure reduction manipulation and abnormal production costs as the proxy for COGS manipulation. Findings The results for the abnormal discretionary expense model suggest that sin firms do not engage in RAM of advertising, R&D, SG&A expense to just meet earnings benchmarks. The results for the production costs model suggest that sin firms do not engage in COGS manipulation to just meet earnings benchmarks. The results are robust after controlling accrual-based earnings management (AEM). Overall, in this setting, these results suggest that managers of sin firms engage less in RAM to meet earnings benchmarks. Originality/value The findings are of interest to investors, auditors, regulators and academics with respect to financial statement analysis and earnings quality.

Management Earnings Forecasts and the Cost of Debt

Prior studies have indicated that earnings are useful for bond market investors and that beating earnings benchmarks is related to a firm’s lower cost of debt. This study examines whether management earnings forecasts are related to a firm’s cost of debt. Our results indicate that (a) positive forecast innovations (i.e., forecasted increases in earnings) are related to a firm’s lower bond yield spread after controlling for the effect of other earnings benchmarks and (b) the negative association between positive forecast innovations and bond yield spread is weaker for firms with high default risk than for those with low default risk. The results suggest that management earnings forecasts are useful for investors in the Japanese bond market and are consistent with the findings in the equity market. However, the usefulness of management earnings forecasts in the bond market depends on a firm’s level of default risk. Our results suggest that bond investors discount the management earnings forecasts of firms with high default risk because such forecasts are more likely to have an optimistic bias.

Long-Term Orientation and Earnings Management Strategies

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.

Motivations for Classification Shifting: A Systematic Review

The purpose of the current paper is to highlight the motivations that may encourage managements of firms to shift core expenses to special items in order to inflate core or operating earnings i.e. to practice classification shifting, which would have an effect on the decisions of financial statements' users. This was done through conducting a systematic review on the available literature about classification shifting. The most obvious findings to emerge from this study is that management may engage in classification shifting for the reason that it is less costly than other earnings management methods, the firm being in current or potential state of financial distress, the desire of the management of the firm to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, the ownership structure of the firm having some characteristics that encourage management to engage in such a practice, the firm performing in a weak corporate governance environment, or due to the fact that classification shifting is tough to be detected by external monitors compared to other earnings management methods.