‘Give them air quickly – don’t let them out’: Sentencing for manslaughter involving multiple offenders and victims

Sentencing for multiple offences poses many challenges and becomes even more complex when the crimes resulted in fatalities. This article uses the sentences imposed following convictions in the Essex lorry case to pose some general questions about the sentencing of multiple victim manslaughters. The four principal offenders were convicted of 39 counts of unlawful act manslaughter and conspiracy to facilitate unlawful immigration into the UK. The analysis identifies several ways in which the sentences ultimately imposed failed to adequately distinguish between offenders of very different levels of culpability. First, all four principal offenders were assigned to the same level of culpability in the manslaughter guideline. Second, although the court could have distinguished the offenders to reflect their different culpability levels, the same Starting Point sentence was imposed on all offenders. Third, the sentencing uplifts to reflect the multiple counts were similar across offenders of very different culpabilities. Fourth, the differential additional punishments for the conspiracy conviction — which would have separated the offenders’ time in custody further — were washed out by being made concurrent. As a result of these decisions, the final sentences failed to adequately distinguish between offenders of very different culpabilities. The article concludes with some lessons for sentencing in these cases, specifically with respect to the Sentencing Council’s guidelines.

Retractions among Indian Scientific Authors: Multiple Offenders

The study identifies repeated offenders of scientific misconduct among authors affiliated to Indian institutions. To do so, we searched the SCOPUS database for retraction notices of articles written or co-written by such authors. Among them, we identified those who authored or co-authored more than one retracted article. The number of such authors is worrying: About one in ten authors whose at least one article was retracted had more than one retracted publication. Among these multiple offenders, we detected two collaboration networks, linked to two institutions. The retraction notices for one group were mainly due to plagiarism while for the other mainly due to self-plagiarism.

Toward a Theoretical and Practical Model for Multiple-Offense Sentencing

This chapter examines the conflicting positions regarding the sentencing of multiple offenders and proposes a theoretical and practical model for multiple-offense sentencing within the framework of desert theory. It begins with a discussion of desert theory and its two major dimensions of offense seriousness: the harm caused and the culpability of the offender. It then describes several sentencing practices in an attempt to better understand the way that bulk discounts operate. It also explores a number of normative propositions that support the concept of a discount in multiple-offense sentencing, focusing on the absence of normative breaks and overall proportionality based on living standard analysis. Finally, it considers two empirically derived propositions: first, that there is a considerable degree of connectedness between the offenses comprising a multiple-offense case, and second, that there is a continuum in criminal conduct.

Multiple Offenders and the Question of Desert

This chapter advances the proposition that while multiple offenders are more culpable than single-crime offenders and should thus be treated differently, multiple offenders should not be punished to such an extent that the state ends up treating an offender who has committed multiple offenses more harshly or in the same way as those who have committed more serious offenses, given the message each punishment communicates about the character defects about the recipient of the punishment. Following this principle would likely result in a presumption in favor of concurrent sentencing or at least “bulk discounts,” where even if an offender is guilty of committing multiple offenses, the punishment for each additional offense is smaller than that for the first offense. This chapter further argues that the practice of bulk discounts for multiple offenders is consistent with the practice of imposing the recidivist premium on those who, after having been convicted and punished, continue to reoffend.

Parsimony and the Sentencing of Multiple Offenders

This chapter examines the principle of parsimony (PP) as it applies to the sentencing of multiple offenders. It first explains what the PP means and challenges its basic assumptions as an independent, substantive sentencing principle. It then recasts the PP as a second-order principle, that is, as a principle designed to help us better ensure that the traditional aims of sentencing are more fully realized. It also distinguishes crime reduction and retributivism versions of the PP as a second-order principle and considers how they might be integrated into a mixed theory of sentencing. Finally, it explores whether and to what extent the PP as a second-order principle is useful in thinking about multiple-offense sentencing. It argues that the PP might play a role in determining sentence ranges for crime types, as well as in formulating broader penal and social policies.

Retributivism and Totality Can Bulk Discounts for Multiple Offending Fit the Crime?

This chapter examines how multiple offenders seem to pose a problem for broadly retributive principles of sentencing, focusing on the proper place and exercise of discretion to show why such problems are only apparent. It begins with a discussion of the issue of multiple offending and the discretion it seems to give sentencers as well as the bulk-discount principle that appears to guide decisions. It then considers two ways in which bulk discounts may appear to conflict with retributive sentencing theory, the fittingness problem and the selection problem. It also analyzes the key guiding thought within retributive approaches to criminal justice and distinguishes between two types of retributivism, moralistic and legalistic. The chapter concludes with the argument that retributivism is compatible with common approaches to multiple-offense sentencing.