Capital Allocation Efficiency, SOEs Reform and China’s Economic Growth

This paper studies the mechanism of how China’s state-owned enterprise (SOEs) reform can influences economic growth, and distinguishes the capital efficiency between state-owned and private enterprises. The results show that: 1) the capital allocation efficiency among state-owned enterprises is lower than private enterprise due to an insufficiently released productivity of state-owned enterprises; 2) although with a higher capital allocation efficiency, the improvement of technology progress of private enterprises at a much slower pace compared to its rapidly increasing share in China’s economy. In case of poor allocation with private sector, blindly reforming ownership of state-owned enterprises cannot effectively alleviate the problem of efficiency losses. State-owned enterprise reform can boost economic growth by increasing capital marginal output, improving capital dynamic allocation efficiency, promoting TFP growth and exerting external spillovers on other firms. At present, China is exploring the endogenous power of economic growth, improving the market institutions and promoting the state-owned enterprises reform with positive and steady pace. By properly re-allocation SOEs into the private sector, which has significant influence on improving economic efficiency and promoting sustained economic growth.

The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises

By exploring the composition of the Chinese Communisty Party’s Central Committee since the 1990s, we analyze why state-owned enterprises reform has fallen into a partial reform equilibrium. We argue that two hypotheses, the interest group hypothesis and the adaptive power-sharing hypothesis, should be combined to fully comprehend the partial reform equilibrium symptom.

International Differences in IFRS Policy Choice and the Persistence of Accounting Classification: The Case of China

This paper focuses on the application of IFRS standards in China. The research is mainly conducted on the basis of Kvaal and Nobes’s studies (2010) regarding the different ways that various countries apply IFRS and Nobes’s IFRS accounting classification system (2011). For companies that issued B shares, the use of IFRS in China lasted only until the 2006 ASBE (Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises) reform. The present study examines IFRS overt options in an attempt to 1) review the choices made by Chinese companies to discover – in light of the applicable PRC GAAP (Chinese Local Standards) requirement of that time – whether they were more or less likely to choose an option than the other countries analysed by Nobes & Kvaal; 2) rank China’s place within Nobes’s accounting classification system; and 3) rank China’ place, again in the Nobes’s model but also in light of a recent study based on BRICS (Note 1)countries (Sarquis, et al. 2014). The results of the statistical analysis confirm that Chinese financial statements display a “local” nature in their use of IFRS and that in its accounting tendencies, China belongs to the Continental European group rather than with the other BRICS countries.