Trust, Reciprocity and Religion in a University Setting: An Experimental Approach

A distinctive feature of economics that sets it apart from other fields in social sciences is that we base it on the belief that it can explain most behavioural actions by assuming that all consumers are rational and have well-defined preferences. If a decision is difficult to 'rationalise,' it is considered as an anomaly. By using various games such as “ultimatum” games and “public goods” games, the paper experimentally tries to observe the effects of bias and discrimination on the economic decisions of individuals with opponents of distinct ethnic and gender affiliation and uses the "dictator game," to detect a systematic mistrust toward players of different religious origins. By this we tried to identify whether strategies differed based on religious affiliations and gender identities. While standard economic theory claims that individuals are rational actors and will always act out of self-interest, games played with our respondents showed exciting results.

Looking Like a Million Dollars: Does Attractiveness Priming Increase Altruistic Behavior in Experimental Games?

The emergence of altruistic behavior constitutes one of the most widely studied problems in evolutionary biology and behavioral science. Multiple explanations have been proposed, most importantly including kin selection, reciprocity, and costly signaling in sexual selection. In order to test the latter, this study investigated whether people behave more altruistically when primed by photographs of attractive faces and whether more or less altruistic people differ in the number of sexual and romantic partners. Participants in the general population (N = 158, 84 F, 74 M) first rated the attractiveness of photographs of 20 faces of the opposite (sexually preferred) sex and then played the Dictator and Ultimatum Games (DG and UG). The photograph rating acted as priming; half the participants received photographs of people rated as more attractive than average in an earlier study, and the other half received photographs previously rated as less attractive. The attractiveness-primed participants, especially men, were expected to behave more altruistically—signaling that they are desirable, resource-possessing partners. We also expected altruists to self-report more sexual and romantic partners. The observed difference between altruistic behaviors in the attractiveness- and unattractiveness-primed groups occurred in UG offers, however, in the opposite than expected direction in women. The number of sexual partners was positively correlated to minimum acceptable offers (MAOs) in the UG, in line with expectations based on the theory of costly signaling.

Comparing mind perception in strategic exchanges: human-agent negotiation, dictator and ultimatum games

Recent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.

Know Your Neighbor: The Impact of Social Context on Fairness Behavior

Laboratory experiments offer an opportunity to isolate human behaviors with a level of precision that is often difficult to obtain using other (survey-based) methods. Yet, experimental tasks are often stripped of any social context, implying that inferences may not directly map to real world contexts. We randomly allocate 632 individuals (grouped randomly into 316 dyads) from small villages in Sierra Leone to four versions of the ultimatum game. In addition to the classic ultimatum game, where both the sender and receiver are anonymous, we reveal the identity of the sender, the receiver or both. This design allows us to explore how fairness behavior is affected by social context in a natural setting where players are drawn from populations that are well-acquainted. We find that average offers increase when the receiver's identity is revealed, suggesting that anonymous ultimatum games underestimate expected fair offers. This study suggest that researchers wishing to relate laboratory behavior to contexts in which the participants are well-acquainted should consider revealing the identities of the players during game play.

Investment performance and emotions: an international study

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to expand the peer effect analysis to investments in the stock market, where neither direct competition nor interaction with other investors exists. Design/methodology/approach A total of 772 subjects dwelling in six countries completed a questionnaire about their satisfaction with the performance of their hypothetical investment in the stock market. They were informed about the performance of the local stock market and the performance of their peer group, referred to in the questionnaire as their “friends.” Findings Only 5 per cent of subjects are indifferent to their friends’ investment performance, as advocates by expected utility paradigm. Most subjects are happier when their friends earn lower rather than higher returns. On average, subjects are better off losing rather than gaining money as long as their friends lose more money, which violates the univariate monotonicity axiom. A negligible number of subjects exhibit a consistent favorable response, which is a necessary condition for pure economic altruism. Hostility is greater in less-wealthy countries. No link is found with regard to economic inequality. Originality/value This paper shows that when a conflict between absolute wealth and relative wealth arises, the latter dominates, even when the comparison is not with an opponent or a colleague but with the subject’s friends. The astonishing result is that subjects prefer having less wealth as long as their friends lose more, despite no direct competition between subjects as in ultimatum games and despite the performance being equal to market performance.