An Architectural Dialogue with the Eleatic Stranger

<p>Reports throughout New Zealand have highlighted a chronic and growing problem in our urban centres – the effects of alcohol abuse and binge drinking leave our youth vulnerable and unprotected. The results can sometimes be catastrophic. Makeshift paramedic tents have recently been erected in Wellington to provide aid and retreat, but these are temporary structures and only available two nights per week. The vulnerability of New Zealand’s youth occurs not only on nights with too much alcohol, but also in response to the daily stresses brought on by contemporary urban life. New Zealand youth suicide rates are the highest out of 30 OECD nations and more than twice the OECD average (Chapman). Likewise the secularization of contemporary urban society has resulted in the loss of spiritual retreats previously found within churches and religious centres. This thesis examines the need for a permanent urban retreat for all those who are temporarily vulnerable. The thesis investigates how architectural form can provide a new approach to urban retreat by critically engaging analogous theories found in the writings of Plato and Louis Kahn. Both Plato’s theory of Forms (discussed in Plato’s “Dialogues”) and Louis Kahn’s 1961 essay “Form and Design” are centred on the idea of achieving an enlightened state of mind, freeing the mind from the physical realm. Plato’s theory of Forms posits that the universe is separated into two realms: an intelligible realm and a sensible realm. All objects that exist in the sensible realm – perceivable to us by our senses – are merely imperfect shadows of their essences or Forms. By understanding this, we can free our minds from the distractions of life which so often lead to stress and despair. Plato’s theory of Forms has many parallels with the architectural theory of Louis Kahn, as evidenced in Kahn’s “Form and Design”. Kahn describes the ‘measurable’ and ‘immeasurable’ realms, which are analogous to Plato’s sensible and intelligible realms. This thesis critically engages these analogous theories of Plato and Kahn – achieving an enlightened state of mind, freeing the mind from the physical realm – to establish how architectural form can provide urban retreat for those who are temporarily vulnerable. The site for the design research investigation is the nameless alleyway in the Courtenay Place precinct which separates Wellington’s historic St James Theatre from The Mermaid bar and brothel – a site which symbolizes the conflicting stimuli to which our urban residents are now continually exposed.</p>

An Architectural Dialogue with the Eleatic Stranger

<p>Reports throughout New Zealand have highlighted a chronic and growing problem in our urban centres – the effects of alcohol abuse and binge drinking leave our youth vulnerable and unprotected. The results can sometimes be catastrophic. Makeshift paramedic tents have recently been erected in Wellington to provide aid and retreat, but these are temporary structures and only available two nights per week. The vulnerability of New Zealand’s youth occurs not only on nights with too much alcohol, but also in response to the daily stresses brought on by contemporary urban life. New Zealand youth suicide rates are the highest out of 30 OECD nations and more than twice the OECD average (Chapman). Likewise the secularization of contemporary urban society has resulted in the loss of spiritual retreats previously found within churches and religious centres. This thesis examines the need for a permanent urban retreat for all those who are temporarily vulnerable. The thesis investigates how architectural form can provide a new approach to urban retreat by critically engaging analogous theories found in the writings of Plato and Louis Kahn. Both Plato’s theory of Forms (discussed in Plato’s “Dialogues”) and Louis Kahn’s 1961 essay “Form and Design” are centred on the idea of achieving an enlightened state of mind, freeing the mind from the physical realm. Plato’s theory of Forms posits that the universe is separated into two realms: an intelligible realm and a sensible realm. All objects that exist in the sensible realm – perceivable to us by our senses – are merely imperfect shadows of their essences or Forms. By understanding this, we can free our minds from the distractions of life which so often lead to stress and despair. Plato’s theory of Forms has many parallels with the architectural theory of Louis Kahn, as evidenced in Kahn’s “Form and Design”. Kahn describes the ‘measurable’ and ‘immeasurable’ realms, which are analogous to Plato’s sensible and intelligible realms. This thesis critically engages these analogous theories of Plato and Kahn – achieving an enlightened state of mind, freeing the mind from the physical realm – to establish how architectural form can provide urban retreat for those who are temporarily vulnerable. The site for the design research investigation is the nameless alleyway in the Courtenay Place precinct which separates Wellington’s historic St James Theatre from The Mermaid bar and brothel – a site which symbolizes the conflicting stimuli to which our urban residents are now continually exposed.</p>

State Violence and Weaving: implications of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata for Plato’s Statesman

This paper uses Aristophanes' Lysistrata to draw out the central violent tension of the weaving paradigm in Plato's Statesman. In the Lysistrata, weaving is offered as a metaphor for a tyrannical refashioning of the polis. In strikingly similar terms, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman proposes weaving as a metaphor for the best form of government. What is laughed off in the play, the characters of Plato's dialogue seem to take seriously. Through a comparative reading, I argue that the interpretations of the Statesman that take weaving as a paradigm for the best government of state, not only miss the comedy in the Stranger's discussion of statesmanship, but also the tragic allusions to tyranny. Furthermore, by drawing out the dialogue’s resonance with comedy, I conclude that the weaving paradigm succeeds in giving us a means for identifying tyranny in the Statesman; even when tyranny appears dressed up in a political science ostensibly formulated with the best of intentions.

Dialéctica y refutación en el Sofista de Platón

The dialectic exhibited in Plato’s dialogues assumes different characters throughout the corpus. Nevertheless, it remains always linked to refutation. In this way, like dialectic, refutation assumes different characteristics. The aim of this work is to show how refutation takes a key role in the Sophist, even with unique features: far from facing an opponent of flesh and blood as in Socratic dialogues, the Eleatic Stranger faces hypotheses, and instead of examining consistence within the opponent’s beliefs, he draws upon a radical mechanism that focuses in the conditions of possibility of the (opponent’s) discourse.

The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood

Plato’s late dialogue, the Sophist, divides clearly into two very different parts. In the Outer Parts (216–236d; 264b9–end), the main speaker, a nameless visitor from Elea in Italy (hereafter ES, for Eleatic Stranger) embarks on a discourse ostensibly designed to say what a sophist is. Using the so-called Method of Division, the ES offers no fewer than seven accounts of what the sophist is. Interrupting the seventh attempt, the Middle Part (236d9–264b8) provides a striking contrast. There the ES undertakes a lengthy discussion sparked by problems arising from defining a sophist as a maker of images and purveyor of false beliefs. This chapter focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part: the Late-learners’ problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false statement. It looks at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic troublemaking; and how the ES offers a definitive solution to both. The Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues discussed.

The Groundwork for Dialectic in Statesman 277a-287b

In Plato’s Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger leads Socrates the Younger and their audience through an analysis of the statesman in the service of the interlocutors’ becoming “more capable in dialectic regarding all things” (285d7). In this way, the dialectical exercise in the text is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, as it yields a philosophically rigorous account of statesmanship and exhibits a method of dialectical inquiry. After the series of bifurcatory divisions in the Sophist and early Statesman, the Stranger changes to a non-bifurcatory method of dividing to account for the statesman, but does not explain the reason for this change. I argue that the change is prepared by the elements discussed in the digression from 277a2 to 287b2. Here the Stranger makes use of four concepts that are crucial for understanding this change: the notion of paradigm, the paradigms of care and the weaver, and the notion of due measure. I claim that the notion of paradigm clarifies the nature of dialectical inquiry, care and weaving act as paradigms appropriate to dialectical practice, and an account of due measure offers insight into the constitutive ratios that govern the structuring of kinds pursued through dialectical inquiry. I suggest that the non-bifurcatory method is intended to articulate knowledge in the strictest sense, or knowledge of the forms, presenting a method of inquiry into being and its structure that will foster the turning of the soul from things to forms that Socrates describes in the Republic.

The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the Pseudos [1991]

Barbara Cassin’s “The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the ‘Pseudos’” (1991; translated by Samuel Galson), investigates Plato’s attempt in the Sophist to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. Cassin pinpoints the slippery operation of the pseudos through the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Yet Parmenides’ rejection of not-being allows the sophist to claim infallibility. Plato’s Eleatic Stranger shows that Parmenides’ rejection of not-being is self-refuting (thus the Stranger’s famous parricide is just as much Parmenides’ suicide). Further, although the Stranger ultimately fails to find a criterion for truth or falsity, he nevertheless establishes a place for the pseudos in the distinction between logos tinos (speech of something) and logos peri tinos (speech about something). Ultimately, Cassin argues that reality of pseudos is a condition for the possibility of language, and indeed involves the very materiality and breadth of language.

Colloquium 5 Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato’s Critique of ‘Platonism’ in the Sophist and Statesman

The Eleatic Stranger plays a central role in all reconstructions of Plato’s “Platonism.” This paper is a study of the literary form of the Sophist and Statesman and its significance for interpreting the Eleatic’s account of the nature of philosophy. I argue that the Eleatic dialogues are best understood through a comparison with the source-texts in the Odyssey that Plato used in their composition. I show that the literary form of the Sophist is a straightforward reworking of the encounter of Odysseus and his crewmen with Polyphemus the Cyclops; and that the form of the Statesman is a somewhat more complex reworking of the narrative in which Odysseus and those loyal to him oppose Antinoös, leader of the Ithacan suitors. The comparison reveals that the Eleatic Stranger is no way Plato’s spokesman. On the contrary: by casting the Stranger in the role of Polyphemus and the Cyclopean Antinoös, Plato intends the Sophist and Statesman to be read as an explicit critique of the metaphysical and political doctrines that have since come to be identified as Platonism. In Plato’s characterization, the Eleatic Stranger is neither a philosopher nor a sophist. He is an intellectual—the sort of person who professes to be a philosopher and is often mistaken for one.

Colloquium 4 Strange Encounters: Theaetetus, Theodorus, Socrates, and the Eleatic Stranger

This paper examines Plato’s Sophist with particular attention to the cast of characters and the most curious and complicated dramatic situation in which Plato places this dialogue: the dramatic proximity of surrounding dialogues and the impending trial, conviction, and death of Socrates. I use these considerations as a propaedeutic to the raising of questions about how these features of the dialogue might affect our interpretation of the actual positions espoused in the Sophist. One clear effect of these considerations will be to destabilize the commonly held view that in this dialogue Plato is “replacing” Socrates and Socratic aporia and questioning with the more didactic, formalistic, and doctrinal conception of philosophy espoused by the Eleatic Stranger.

EL EXTRANJERO DE ELEA, 'COMPAÑERO' DE LOS PARMENÍDEOS...DESDE 1561

In 1561 J.Cornarius proposed his own version of some passages of Plato's Sophist In this version Theodorus presents the Eleatic Stranger as "a companion (hetairos) of Parmenideans and Zenonians" (216a). Since then, this cliché is accepted by all translations. However, when the possibility of justifying the existence of images and appearances is considered, the Stranger himself proposes 'testing' Parmenides' thesis. His remarks are rather those of an adversary than of a friend or companion of Parmenides. In fact, in spite of Theodorus' presentation, the Stranger, albeit citizen of Elea, does not seem to share the theses of the 'Eleatics'. These anomalies invited us to question the character of 'companion' of the 'Parmenideans' credited to the Stranger. The questioning is possible if we exploit some valuable greek manuscripts of Plato's Sophist, neglected by J.Burnet, like Vindobonensis 21 (Y). This manuscript, among others, has the lecture heteros, 'different', instead of hetairon, 'companion'. This manuscript permits to maintain the formula tôn hetairôn, transmitted by all the manuscripts after the first hetairon, and removed in modern editions. The translation we propose is: the Eleatic Stranger is "different (heteros) of the companions (tôn hetairôn) of Parmenides and Zenon".