Plato’s Philosophy of Language

Ideas in and problems of philosophy of language surface frequently in Plato’s dialogues. Some passages briefly formulate, or presuppose, views about names, signification, truth, or falsehood; others are extended discussions of important themes of philosophy of language. This chapter focuses on three topics. The first is the linguistic dimension of the theory of Forms; the second is the discussion of names in the Cratylus, Plato’s only dialogue almost completely dedicated to linguistic themes; the third is the examination of semantic and ontological issues in the Sophist, whose linguistic section (259d9‒264b10) presents Plato’s most mature reflections on statements, truth, and falsehood.

Plato’s Metaphysics

This chapter examines Plato’s metaphysics by narrowing the topic to Plato’s ontology itself in order to locate his metaphysical theorizing within his own immediate tradition. For, unlike metaphysics as such, ontology—understood as the rational investigation of what there is or of being—is a branch of study for which Plato could find obvious precursors in his philosophical predecessors, perhaps most notably, the Eleatic philosopher, Parmenides, in whose Way of Truth one finds an account of a subject identified only as “being” (in Greek: to eon), which attributes to being many of the characteristics that Plato would subsequently ascribe to Forms. In Plato’s works, Forms themselves are identified most generally as “the beings” (in Greek: ta onta, or at least in many places apparently equivalently: ousiai). The chapter focuses on Plato’s place in this tradition.

The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood

Plato’s late dialogue, the Sophist, divides clearly into two very different parts. In the Outer Parts (216–236d; 264b9–end), the main speaker, a nameless visitor from Elea in Italy (hereafter ES, for Eleatic Stranger) embarks on a discourse ostensibly designed to say what a sophist is. Using the so-called Method of Division, the ES offers no fewer than seven accounts of what the sophist is. Interrupting the seventh attempt, the Middle Part (236d9–264b8) provides a striking contrast. There the ES undertakes a lengthy discussion sparked by problems arising from defining a sophist as a maker of images and purveyor of false beliefs. This chapter focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part: the Late-learners’ problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false statement. It looks at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic troublemaking; and how the ES offers a definitive solution to both. The Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues discussed.

The Republic

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Republic. The Republic is among Plato’s most complex works. From its title, the first-time reader will expect a dialogue about political theory, yet the work starts from the perspective of the individual, coming to focus on the question of how, if at all, justice contributes to an agent’s happiness. Only after this question has been fully set out does the work evolve into an investigation of politics—of the ideal state and of the institutions that sustain it, especially those having to do with education. But the interest in individual justice and happiness is never left behind. Rather, the work weaves in and out of the two perspectives, individual and political, right through to its conclusion. All this may leave one wondering about the unity of the work. The chapter shows that, despite the enormous range of topics discussed, the Republic fits together as a coherent whole.

Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. These dialogues, in which Plato depicts the weeks leading up to Socrates’s last day, are replete with various philosophical explorations. Among those explorations is the question of how to live our lives. On the one hand, Socrates is clear and straightforward. We should live the examined life—making logoi and examining ourselves and others in order to determine whether we are as wise as we think we are, and we should live the virtuous life. This is how Socrates lives his life. On the other hand, the examined life undercuts, or at least should undercut, the confidence with which he seeks to live the virtuous life. It may help bring some stability to the general principles by which he lives his life, but it can do so only defeasibly and without certainty.

Plato in his Time and Place

This chapter attempts to situate Plato’s philosophizing and literary production in its historical context. The evidence external to the dialogues that such an enterprise can rely on is either scrappy or suspect, or both. Thus, what is offered here is a series of snapshots that follow a chronological sequence, from Plato’s relationship with Socrates and the Athens that executed him; through his momentous first visit to Italy and Sicily and its impact on his thinking about politics and philosophy; to the founding of the Academy, Plato’s rivalry with Isocrates, and the birth of the theory of Forms; and ending with the worlds of the late dialogues.

Plato’s Laws

This chapter presents a an overview of the themes and topics of Plato’s Laws and then focusses on the grand hierarchy of divine and human goods identified in book I (631b-d) as the reference point of all proper legislation. The hierarchy rests on a conception of virtue distinct from what we find in other Platonic dialogues. It ranks courage last among the virtues and describes justice as a blend of moderation with wisdom and courage. This chapter argues that courage is ranked last because it is a natural or non-rational trait of fearlessness, analogous to the “ordinary” trait of moderation (self-restraint in the face of pleasure) that is presented as a trifling virtue in books III and IV. Justice, as conceived of in the Laws, requires combining these two traits and informing them with wisdom. The chapter concludes by noting that the leading role played by wisdom in Plato’s hierarchy of goods prefigures Aristotle’s conception of the highest good.

Plato’s Politics

The dialogues that are most obviously important for Plato’s political philosophy include: the Apology, the Crito, the Gorgias, the Laws, the Republic, and the Statesman. Further, there are many questions of political philosophy that Plato discusses in his dialogues. These topics include, among others: (1) the ultimate ends of the city’s laws and institutions; (2) who should rule, the forms of constitution, and their ranking; (3) what institutions and offices there should be; (4) the nature and extent of citizens’ obligation to obey the laws; (5) the proper criterion of citizenship; (6) the political and social status of women; (7) the purposes of punishment; (8) private property; and (9) slavery. This chapter attempts to provide an overall picture of Plato’s political philosophy, focusing on three moments: the “Socratic” dialogues, including the Apology and the Crito; the great middle-period work, the Republic, along with the Phaedo; and finally, two works from Plato’s last period, the Statesman and the Laws.

The Meno

This chapter examines various aspects of two central themes of the Meno, how knowledge (epistēmē) is related to true belief, and how it is acquired. This chapter argues that the Meno’s definition of knowledge as true belief ‘tied down with a reasoning out of the cause’, is best understood as a characterisation of a form of knowledge constituted by understanding, rather than by justified true belief. It argues that the best way to construe Meno’s paradox as a serious threat to the possibility of acquiring knowledge is to take it to be concerned with inquiry as the search for understanding something for oneself. The chapter advances a new version of the unjustly neglected interpretation of Plato’s response as principally cast in terms of recollection and recognition, as against the dominant interpretation, which sees it as principally cast in terms of the use of true beliefs as the way to knowledge. In the last section the chapter considers knowledge and true belief in the final part of the Meno, arguing that what Socrates says about their relationship here cannot be reconciled with his earlier account: this confirms the view that the arguments of the final section are not intended to be taken at face value.

The Timaeus on the Principles of Cosmology

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Timaeus. The Timaeus, like the Republic, emphasizes the need to grasp the proper principle of our disciplines of study. As Timaeus says in his opening speech, “Now in every subject it is of utmost importance to begin (arxasthai) according to the natural principle (arkhê)” (29b2–3). But what is the natural principle of cosmology? Timaeus’s cosmology concerns the coming-into-being of the cosmos, down to and including the nature of man. Thus, the question becomes: What is the natural principle of the study of the coming-into-being of the cosmos? It is shown that the principle is a principle of coming-into-being, not of being. Timaeus accepts that there may be more fundamental principles of everything, but cosmology, as he understands it, does not provide the appropriate method for approaching such ultimate principles. The subject of cosmology is the world as it has come into being, and its method one that is appropriate to this subject-matter. Cosmology, as Timaeus understands it, is not concerned with the principle of absolutely everything. Cosmology is not concerned with being as such, its ultimate principle is not the ultimate principle of being, and its method is not that of dialectic, in the Republic’s sense.