Platone e il vegetarianismo nel Timeo

L’articolo analizza la descrizione della natura delle piante e la tacita giustificazione del vegetarianismo fornite da Platone nel Timeo. Tale pratica alimentare sembra assumere un’utilità esclusivamente fisiologica: potrebbe darsi che Platone si fosse opposto a quanti professavano il vegetarianismo in qualità di mezzo necessario per purificare l’anima e per raggiungere la felicità, come gli orfici, i pitagorici, Empedocle ma anche il suo discepolo Senocrate. Attraverso il particolare valore attribuito a una dieta vegetariana, Platone priva di validità la pretesa degli altri filosofi: solo lo studio delle idee permette di ottenere la felicità. Abstract. The aim of this paper is to analyse Plato’s description of plants and his tacit justification of vegetarianism in the Timaeus. This practice seems to possess exclusively a physiological relevance: I argue that Plato is opposing the idea of vegetarianism as a superior way to purify one’s soul and achieve happiness, how it was being professed by the Orphics, the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, and even by his disciple Xenocrates. In the Timaeus, with the justification of vegetarianism only for physiological purposes, Plato is discrediting other philosophers’ conception of vegetarianism and perfect life: only the study of the noetic world grants ultimate happiness.

The Use and Meaning of the Past in Plato

This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of writing proposed by Plato in Phaedrus and especially the conception of philosophical writing as a maieutic game. The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy. On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between Plato and "the facts". 1) If we compare the Apology of Socrates with other sources, we discover a series of important “games” that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes. 2) The famous passage of Phaedo 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics. 3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of their contri-bution is overall negative. 4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the Sophist, there is a "sophist of noble stock", an educator who can only be Socrates. 5) Plato in the Sophist shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals, before the Philebus and the Timaeus, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his philosophy In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex reality.

A New Interpretation of the Noble Lie

“Could we contrive one noble lie?” implies there is one noble lie (Republic 414b). The Autochthony Claim (asserting the Best City’s citizens are equally brothers) and the Hierarchical Claim (asserting brother justifiably rules over brother) follow. The article argues the former is the “one” noble lie. It argues the claims are both normative and descriptive propositions; both descriptively true about worldly polities in Plato’s day and historically. While the Hierarchical Claim is normatively true of the Best City, the Autochthony Claim is normatively false. The article offers a tentative explanation why jointly they comprise a foundational myth of political life.

Semblables inférieures : quels lieux pour les femmes dans la cité juste de Platon ?

What place can women have in Plato’s just city? In opposition to the two main antagonistic positions on this topic - some consider Plato a promoter of gender equality as he allows women to have political office, while others put the stress on the fact that Plato keeps them in a subordinate status - this article makes a new claim: these two positions must be held together because of the nature of the rationality at work in Plato’s political philosophy, as a combination of emancipatory theoretical elements, and the taking into account of the constraints of history.

Plotinus on Care of Self and Soul

Plotinus’ philosophical project includes an important Socratic element. Plotinus is namely interested in both self-knowledge and care of soul and self. In this study I examine how through his interpretation of three passages from Plato (Timaeus 35 a, Phaedrus 246 band Theatetus 176 a-b), Plotinus develops an account of the role of care in his ethics. Care in Plotinus’ ethical thought takes three forms. First of all, care is involved in maintaining the unity of the embodied self. Secondly, situated in a providential universe, our souls – as sisters to the world soul - take part in the providential order by caring for ‘lower’ realities. Finally, Plotinus develops an ethics of going beyond virtue, a process which involves care for the higher, potentially divine, self.

The Ages of Socrates in Plato's Symposium

Plato’s Symposium has no less than three dramatic dates: its narrative frame is placed in 401 BCE; Agathon’s dinner party is envisaged as having occurred in 416; finally, Plato makes Socrates meet Diotima in 440 BCE. I will argue that the multi-level chronology of the Symposium should be approached along the lines of Socrates’ intellectual history as placed against the background of Greek ideas of age classes (also exploited in the Republic). As a result, the Symposiumfunctions as a retrospective of Socrates’ life, which uses the traditional concept of ages of man to create a paradigm of philosophical life.

Plato on Divinization and the Divinity of the Rational Part of the Soul

Three distinct reasons that Plato calls the rational part of the soul “divine” are analyzed: (1) its metaphysical kinship with the Forms, (2) its epistemological ability to know the Forms, and (3) its ethical capacity to live by them. Supposing these three divine aspects of the rational part are unified in the life of each person, they naturally suggest a process of divinization or “becoming like god” according to which a person (specifically, a philosopher), by (3) living more virtuously, which requires (2) increasingly better knowledge of the Forms, gradually (1) becomes united with them. This process of divinization is in fact found throughout the middle and late dialogues, including the Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and the Laws. This synoptic view of the Platonic idea(l) of divinization provides a standard according to which misplaced emphasis, flaws, and tension created by other interpretations are criticized and corrected.