Tuberculosis care quality in urban Nigeria: A cross-sectional study of adherence to screening and treatment initiation guidelines in multi-cadre networks of private health service providers

Nigeria has a high burden of tuberculosis (TB) and low case detection rates. Nigeria’s large private health sector footprint represents an untapped resource for combating the disease. To examine the quality of private sector contributions to TB, the USAID-funded Sustaining Health Outcomes through the Private Sector (SHOPS) Plus program evaluated adherence to national standards for management of presumptive and confirmed TB among the clinical facilities, laboratories, pharmacies, and drug shops it trained to deliver TB services. The study used a standardized patient (SP) survey methodology to measure case management protocol adherence among 837 private and 206 public providers in urban Lagos and Kano. It examined two different scenarios: a “textbook” case of presumptive TB and a treatment initiation case where SPs presented as referred patients with confirmed TB diagnoses. Private sector results were benchmarked against public sector results. A bottleneck analysis examined protocol adherence departures at key points along the case management sequence that providers were trained to follow. Except for laboratories, few providers met the criteria for fully correct management of presumptive TB, though more than 70% of providers correctly engaged in TB screening. In the treatment initiation case 18% of clinical providers demonstrated fully correct case management. Private and public providers’ adherence was not significantly different. Bottleneck analysis revealed that the most common deviations from correct management were failure to initiate sputum collection for presumptive patients and failure to conduct sufficiently thorough treatment initiation counseling for confirmed patients. This study found the quality of private providers’ TB case management to be comparable to public providers in Nigeria, as well as to providers in other high burden countries. Findings support continued efforts to include private providers in Nigeria’s national TB program. Though most providers fell short of desired quality, the bottleneck analysis points to specific issues that TB stakeholders can feasibly address with system- and provider-level interventions.

Recognizing and mediating bureaucratic barriers: increasing access to care through small and medium-sized private providers in Kenya

Background: Equitable access to health services can be constrained in countries where private practitioners make up a large portion of primary care providers. Expanding purchasing arrangements has helped many countries integrate private providers into government-supported payment schemes, reducing financial barriers to care. However, private providers often must go through an onerous accreditation process to enroll in these schemes. The difficulties of this process are exacerbated where health policy is changed often and low-level bureaucrats must navigate these shifts at their own discretion. This paper analyzes one initiative to increase private provider accreditation with social health insurance (SHI) in Kenya by creating an intermediary between providers and “street-level” SHI bureaucrats. Methods: This paper draws on 126 semi-structured interviews about SHI accreditation experience with private providers who were members of a franchise network in Kenya. It also draws on four focus group discussions conducted with franchise representatives who provided accreditation support to the providers and served as liaisons between the franchised providers and local SHI offices. There was a total of 20 participants across all four focus groups. Results: In a governance environment where regulations are weak and impermanent, street-level bureaucrats often created an accreditation process that was inconsistent and opaque. Support from the implementing organizations increased communication between SHI officials and providers, which clarified rules and increased providers’ confidence in the system. The intermediaries also reduced bureaucrats’ ability to apply regulations at will and helped to standardize the accreditation process for both providers and bureaucrats. Conclusions: We conclude that intermediary organizations can mitigate institutional weaknesses and facilitate process efficiency. However, intermediaries only have a temporary role to play where there is potential to: 1) directly increase private providers’ power in a complex regulatory system; 2) reform the system itself to be more responsive to the limitations of on-the-ground implementation.

Health Policy in Asia

The book assesses the policy actions of select Asian governments (China, India, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand) to address critical health system functions from a policy design perspective. The findings show that all governments in the region have made tremendous strides in focussing their attention on the core issues and, especially, the interactions among them. However, there is still insufficient appreciation of the usefulness of public hospitals and their efficient management. Similarly, some governments have not made sufficient efforts to establish an effective regulatory framework which is especially vital in systems with a large share of private providers and payers. A well-run public hospital system and an effective framework for regulating private providers are essential tools to support the governance, financing, and payment reforms underway in the six health systems studied in this book.

Marketisation of adult education in Sweden

The aim of this study is to analyse how formal adult education in Sweden is enacted locally. For this analysis, the data consist of a nationwide survey sent to Swedish municipalities, background data on municipalities from public statistics and interviews with representatives of 20 municipalities. Swedish formal adult education, which includes general, vocational and Swedish for immigrants courses, is a responsibility of the municipality, but courses are not necessarily organised internally by the municipality. The results show how adult education is enacted in different ways. There are systems for outsourcing courses to various other providers, typically private training companies. There are thus both private and public providers, but courses are paid for by the municipality, which is also responsible of quality assurance. The quality assurance is typically enacted with a focus on students, via surveys and statistics on outcomes, but quality measures also target providers. Swedish adult education is characterised by extensive marketisation with many private providers and a broad supply of courses, but the municipalities are experiencing quality problems among providers, and some municipalities are considering extending their internal provision. There is also a labour-market focus where training programmes to improve adults’ employability are prioritised.

‘You couldn’t have a heart and want to strike’: Mobilising workers in England’s social care sector

This article uses John Kelly’s mobilisation framework, with its foundational concept of injustice, to explore workers’ propensity towards unionism in England’s outsourced social care sector. Drawing on 60 interviews with union organisers and officers, care workers, support workers and care company managers, this research highlights the difficulties of union organising in the sector and explores theorisations of mobilising. The research contends that for mobilisation theory to provide insight into relationships between work and unionism, varieties of injustice and collectivism need to be contextualised. Paid care provision generates both employment-related injustices and care-related injustices, which lead to divergent collective identities and attitudes towards unions. An absence of a coherent entity for workers to attach blame to – within a context where private providers frequently remain reliant on state funding levels – affects whether injustice and collectivism progress to mobilisation and unionisation.

Recognizing and mediating bureaucratic barriers: increasing access to care through small and medium-sized private providers in Kenya

Background: Equitable access to health services can be constrained in countries where private practitioners make up a large portion of primary care providers. Expanding purchasing arrangements has helped many countries integrate private providers into government-supported payment schemes, reducing financial barriers to care. However, private providers often must go through an onerous accreditation process to enroll in these schemes. The difficulties of this process are exacerbated where health policy is changed often and low-level bureaucrats must navigate these shifts at their own discretion. This paper analyzes one initiative to increase private provider accreditation with social health insurance (SHI) in Kenya by creating an intermediary between providers and “street-level” SHI bureaucrats. Methods: This paper draws on 126 semi-structured interviews about SHI accreditation experience with private providers who were members of a franchise network in Kenya. It also draws on four focus group discussions conducted with franchise representatives who provided accreditation support to the providers and served as liaisons between the franchised providers and local SHI offices. There was a total of 20 participants across all four focus groups. Results: In a governance environment where regulations are weak and impermanent, street-level bureaucrats often created an accreditation process that was inconsistent and opaque. Support from the implementing organizations increased communication between SHI officials and providers, which clarified rules and increased providers’ confidence in the system. The intermediaries also reduced bureaucrats’ ability to apply regulations at will and helped to standardize the accreditation process for both providers and bureaucrats. Conclusions: We conclude that intermediary organizations can mitigate institutional weaknesses and facilitate process efficiency. However, intermediaries only have a temporary role to play where there is potential to: 1) directly increase private providers’ power in a complex regulatory system; 2) reform the system itself to be more responsive to the limitations of on-the-ground implementation.

Long Live Marketization for Local Public Spaces: A Study of Scandinavian Managers’ Satisfaction with Private Provider Performance

Continued critiques, evidence and newer reform trends have increasingly contested the use of market-centered models–the competition prescription–for urban public space maintenance as well as other local services. This article adopts a contextualized contingency perspective on the competition prescription and questions the contested status of market-centered models in a survey-based study of the current use of and satisfaction with private providers for maintenance of parks/greenspaces and road/streets in Scandinavian local governments. The study finds widespread use of and satisfaction with private providers. However, satisfaction depends on national context and multiple contingencies. The study challenges the contested status of market-centered models, highlights that different models serve different strategic objectives, and directs attention to discussions of context and key contingencies that define how well market-centered models perform.

Comparing the average cost of outpatient care of public and for-profit private providers in India

Introduction Understanding the cost of care associated with different kinds of healthcare providers is necessary for informing the policy debates in mixed health-systems like India’s. Existing studies reporting Out of Pocket Expenditure (OOPE) per episode of outpatient care in public and private providers in India do not provide a fair comparison because they have not taken into account the government subsidies received by public facilities. Public and private health insurance in India do not cover outpatient care and for-profit providers have to meet all their costs out of the payments they take from patients. Methods The average direct cost per acute episode of outpatient care was compared for public providers, for-profit formal providers and informal private providers in Chhattisgarh state of India. For public facilities, government subsidies for various inputs were taken into account. Resources used were apportioned using Activity Based Costing. Land provided free to public facilities was counted at market prices. The study used two datasets: a) household survey on outpatient utilisation and OOPE b) facility survey of public providers to find the input costs borne by government per outpatient-episode. Results The average cost per episode of outpatient care was Indian Rupees (INR) 400 for public providers, INR 586 for informal private providers and INR 2643 for formal for-profit providers and they managed 39.3, 37.9 and 22.9% of episodes respectively. The average cost for government and households put together was greater for using formal for-profit providers than the public providers. The disease profile of care handled by different types of providers was similar. Volume of patients and human-resources were key cost drivers in public facilities. Close to community providers involved less cost than others. Conclusions and recommendations The findings have implications for the desired mix of public and private providers in India’s health-system. Poor regulation of for-profit providers was an important structural cost driver. Purchasing outpatient care from private providers may not reduce average cost. Policies to strengthen public provisioning of curative primary care close to communities can help in reducing cost.