On Necessary Gratuitous Evils

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Michael James Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Standard Position ◽  
State Of Affairs

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.

Computational Principles

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Mathematical Structure ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Probability Calculus ◽  
Logical Operators ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
State Of Affairs

Much of the usefulness of probability derives from its rich logical and mathematical structure. That structure comprises the probability calculus. The classical probability calculus is familiar and well understood, but it will turn out that the calculus of nomic probabilities differs from the classical probability calculus in some interesting and important respects. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the calculus of nomic probabilities, and at the same time to investigate the logical and mathematical structure of nomic generalizations. The mathematical theory of nomic probability is formulated in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds can be regarded as maximally specific possible ways things could have been. This notion can be filled out in various ways, but the details are not important for present purposes. I assume that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds, and I assume that the modal logic of necessary truth and necessary exemplification is a quantified version of S5. States of affairs are things like Mary’s baking pies, 2 being the square root of 4, Martha’s being smarter than John, and the like. For present purposes, a state of affairs can be identified with the set of all possible worlds at which it obtains. Thus if P is a state of affairs and w is a possible world, P obtains at w iff w∊P. Similarly, we can regard monadic properties as sets of ordered pairs ⧼w,x⧽ of possible worlds and possible objects. For example, the property of being red is the set of all pairs ⧼w,x⧽ such that w is a possible world and x is red at w. More generally, an n-place property will be taken to be a set of (n+l)-tuples ⧼w,x1...,xn⧽. Given any n-place concept α, the corresponding property of exemplifying a is the set of (n + l)-tuples ⧼w,x1,...,xn⧽ such that x1,...,xn exemplify α at the possible world w. States of affairs and properties can be constructed out of one another using logical operators like conjunction, negation, quantification, and so on.

Modal operators and functional completeness, II

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. Thomason
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Functional Completeness ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Propositional Modal Logic ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Fixed Frame ◽  
State Of Affairs

In the Kripke semantics for propositional modal logic, a frame W = (W, ≺) represents a set of “possible worlds” and a relation of “accessibility” between possible worlds. With respect to a fixed frame W, a proposition is represented by a subset of W (regarded as the set of worlds in which the proposition is true), and an n-ary connective (i.e. a way of forming a new proposition from an ordered n-tuple of given propositions) is represented by a function fw: (P(W))n → P(W). Finally a state of affairs (i.e. a consistent specification whether or not each proposition obtains) is represented by an ultrafilter over W. {To avoid possible confusion, the reader should forget that some people prefer the term “states of affairs” for our “possible worlds”.}In a broader sense, an n-ary connective is represented by an n-ary operatorf = {fw∣ W ∈ Fr}, where Fr is the class of all frames and each fw: (P(W))n → P(W). A connective is modal if it corresponds to a formula of propositional modal logic. A connective C is coherent if whether C(P1,…, Pn) is true in a possible world depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…,Pn are true in that world. (A modal combination of P1,…,Pn is the result of applying a modal connective to P1,…, Pn.) A connective C is strongly coherent if whether C(P1, …, Pn) obtains in a state of affairs depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…, Pn obtain in that state of affairs.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

C. S. Lewis & John Hick on Theodicy: Superficially Similar but Significantly Different

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Brian M. Williams
Keyword(s):  
John Hick ◽  
Broad Category ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Greater Good

In the April 2014 edition of The Journal of Inklings Studies, Mark S. M. Scott compared the theodicies of C. S. Lewis and John Hick, concluding that there are ‘significant structural and substantive affinities’ between the two. In my essay, I too analyze these theodicies but arrive at a different conclusion. I argue two points: First, I argue that Lewis’ and Hick’s theodicies bear merely superficial similarities. Second, and more importantly, I argue that they stand in significant opposition to one another at fundamental points. The purpose of this essay is to set Lewis’ views on suffering apart from Hick’s and to suggest that, in the end, perhaps Lewis’ theodicy should not be included in the broad category of ‘greater-good’ theodicies, and would therefore be immune to attacks leveled against Hick’s theodicy as well as the various attacks leveled against the greater-good approach in general. For those who reject the greater-good approach and who hold that gratuitous evil does not count against God’s moral perfection, Lewis’ theodicy could serve as a helpful starting point from which one could develop more thoroughly a non-greater-good theodicy.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

scholarly journals Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem

2008 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Holger Leerhoff
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Bradley’S Regress ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.

scholarly journals PURE TIME PREFERENCE IN INTERTEMPORAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Paul Kelleher
Keyword(s):  
Real Number ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Theoretical Question ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Decisive Objection

Abstract:Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the rate of pure time preference, i.e. the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different times. This article criticizes the standard philosophical account of pure time preference, arguing that it ascribes to economists a methodological commitment they need not accept. The article then evaluates three further objections to pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain circumstances. I close by articulating a final argument that, if sound, would constitute a decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics.

scholarly journals BADANIA BIOGRAFICZNE JAKO ŹRÓDŁO REFLEKSJI NAD PROCESAMI NAUCZANIA/UCZENIA SIĘ JĘZYKÓW OBCYCH

Neofilolog ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (42/1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Anna Jaroszewska
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Language ◽  
Language Learning ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Foreign Language Learning ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Successful Development ◽  
Learning And Teaching ◽  
Biographical Research ◽  
State Of Affairs

If reflection is the necessary condition for successful development of all participants of the process of foreign language teaching and learning, as well as for the evolution of the scientific discipline, as we may now call glottodidactics, it is worth looking for all possible examples of it. In the light of this, the author of this article develops the thesis that appropriately designed studies based on biographies may provide rich and useful material for reflection on foreign language learning and teaching. The author also attempts to explain why biographical research is so rarely used in Polish glottodidactic studies and if this state of affairs could be changed.

scholarly journals Kognitionsverber og kontrasten mellem indikativ- og infinitivkomplement

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Boye ◽  
Anders Andersen ◽  
Elisabeth Engberg-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Corpus Studies ◽  
State Of Affairs

Many Danish cognition verbs take both indicative and infinitive complements. We examine what the contrast between the two complement types codes. The literature offers two answers. One is that the contrast has to do with coreferentiality: if the cognition verb’s primary argument is coreferential with the primary argument of the complement, the complement tends to be infinitive; if not, the complement must be indicative. The other answer concerns the contrast between propositions and states-of-affairs: the indicative complement designates a proposition, the infinitive complement a state-of-affairs. Corpus studies support both answers. They also support an analysis of indicatives as proposition markers. But infinitives cannot – straightforwardly – be analysed as state-of-affairs markers.

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