scholarly journals How to Solve the Problem of Evil

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 442-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mooney ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.

scholarly journals Organic Unities

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Graham Floyd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Organic Unities ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Metaphysical Claim

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value.  It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts.  Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil.  I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil.  First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value.  Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil.  Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence.  As a result, both problems fail.

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

The Argument from Evil and God’s Contingent Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).

On Identifying the Problem of Evil and the Possibility of Its Theist Solution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Cognitive Level ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Existential Problem ◽  
Foundational Problem

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.

Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus is the sole focus of the inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).

The Good of Religion and Contingent Divine Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

This chapter considers whether God’s taking on a contingent ethics that makes God fully worthy of our allegiance revives the problem of evil. Isn’t it true that any such contingent ethics will entail that God will be motivated to prevent earthly evils? No: there is a gap between the familiar ethics that those who press the argument from evil rely upon and the contingent ethics that would make God worthy of allegiance, and thus God could be fully worthy of allegiance without being motivated to prevent the evils the presence of which is the basis for the argument from evil. This chapter also argues that this is true with respect to the ethics of the God of Christian theism: an absolutely perfect being’s taking on that ethics would make that being fully worthy of allegiance without entailing the motivation to prevent this world’s evils.

scholarly journals The “Whence” of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Viktor Ilievski
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Successful Strategy ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Plausible Answer ◽  
Argument From Evil

Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.

Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-325
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN T. RANCOURT
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractSceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic.

Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil

2019 ◽  
pp. 183-194
Author(s):  
Michael J. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
The Third ◽  
Organic Unities ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
State Of Affairs

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos’s contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos’s defense of G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos’s response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested,

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