intentional explanations
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2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Richard Schoenherr ◽  
Robert Thomson

Explanations are central to understanding the causal relationships between entities within the environment. Instead of examining basic heuristics and schemata that inform the acceptance or rejection of scientific explanations, recent studies have predominantly examined complex explanatory models. In the present study, we examined which essential features of explanatory schemata can account for phenomena that are attributed to domain-specific knowledge. In two experiments, participants judged the validity of logical syllogisms and reported confidence in their response. In addition to validity of the explanations, we manipulated whether scientists or people explained an animate or inanimate phenomenon using mechanistic (e.g., force, cause) or intentional explanatory terms (e.g., believes, wants). Results indicate that intentional explanations were generally considered to be less valid than mechanistic explanations and that ‘scientists’ were relatively more reliable sources of information of inanimate phenomena whereas ‘people’ were relatively more reliable sources of information of animate phenomena. Moreover, after controlling for participants’ performance, we found that they expressed greater overconfidence for valid intentional and invalid mechanistic explanations suggesting that the effect of belief-bias is greater in these conditions.


Author(s):  
Piotr Tomasz Makowski

AbstractThe paper explores the topic of organizational routines from a philosophical vantage point to see how the philosophy of action may help improve its understanding in organizational research. The main goal is to show the distinctive complexity of the intentional picture of routines. In this respect, the paper clarifies the interrelations between psychological habits and routines and describes similarities and differences between them. It also highlights the special place of mindfulness as a psycho-cognitive mechanism of action meta-control in intentional explanations of routine complexity.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Tomasz Makowski

The paper explores the topic of organizational routines from a philosophical vantage point to see how the philosophy of action may help improve its understanding in organizational research. The main goal is to show the distinctive complexity of the intentional picture of routines. In this respect, the paper clarifies the interrelations between psychological habits and routines and describes similarities and differences between them. It also highlights the special place of mindfulness as a psycho-cognitive mechanism of action meta-control in intentional explanations of routine complexity.


Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-341
Author(s):  
VÍCTOR M. VERDEJO

I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Gittel

AbstractAlthough literary critics continue to make programmatic claims about not only describing but also explaining literary change, and numerous textbooks and individual studies in literary history insinuate or claim to explain literary change, explanations of literary change are as of yet insufficiently reflected in the field’s methodology. Is it at all possible to provide explanations in literary history, where no strict laws have been discovered yet? If yes, what do these explanations look like and in which circumstances are they valid? Understanding literary change as the variance in a specific genre’s instantiation over time, this paper works from the point of departure of explanatory pluralism, the assumption that scientific explanations are to a certain degree discipline-specific and that various different types of explanations exist. The paper aims at an interpenetration of theory and practice and therefore analyzes different types of explanations through a concrete example of literary change. In particular, it focuses on the boom of fictional essay writing that occurred during the first third of the 20th century in German-speaking countries, thus analyzing the two trends of the fictionalization of the essay and the insertion of essayistic passages into fictional texts (e. g., the essayistic novel). The paper examines causal, statistical, intentional, functional, teleological and structur­al explanations for this literary change.Causal explanations, it is argued, cannot be employed as long as no general laws for literary change have been identified. However, it is possible to identify certain causal factors for literary change through the interplay of biographic and intertextual studies, which can be further validated by statistical approaches. Intentional explanations of literary change can generally be created through the time-consuming process of collecting explanations for the writing of single works, but they face the problem that author’s intentions, as reported in self-commen­taries or poetological texts, are often too unspecific or too specific for the work being explained. Functional explanations face two difficulties. First, literature rarely solves social problems, and therefore the benefit that functional explanations presuppose can usually only consist in the thematization of social problems. Second, the causal feedback mechanism that underlies functional explanations presupposes a mechanism for social selection amongst works of literature that promotes works that have social benefit. However, only a very idealized literature market could provide for social selection along these lines. Teleological explanations, which ascribe inherent development trends to genres, are not only dubious from the perspective of the philosophy of science, but fail to explain why these trends manifest themselves in specific historical situations. Structural explana­tions identify underlying ›deep structures‹ of text corpora that might correspond to social or ideational structures. These explanations, however, are also question­able, because they usually don’t provide information about the causal mechanisms that may lead to this correspondence.Two consequences, this paper argues, can be drawn from the analysis of various types of explanation of literary change. Concluding that full-fledged explanations of literary change are either very time-consuming and laborious (statistical and additive intentional explanations), or only employable under specific conditions and idealizing background assumptions (functional explanations), it suggests the follow­ing. First, literary scholars could revise their practice of answering ›why‹ questions in literary history and abstain from explaining literary change except in those cases when they elaborated full-fledged explanations. Second, alternatively, they could continue their existing practice but refrain from describing it as ›explaining‹ literary change. Instead, they could describe their activity in less demanding terms, e. g. as ›the search for overarching narratives‹, which nevertheless is of value in terms of didactics, knowledge synthesis, or the reduction of complexity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-562
Author(s):  
Hudson Meadwell

Action is a central category in the social sciences. It is also commonplace to assume that the social world has a causal structure. Yet standard ways of specifying causal relations in social science lack explanatory force when the subject matter is intentional action. The present article considers this problem. The metaphysics of action are distinguished from the metaphysics of intentional action, and it is argued that the former forces an implausible unity on the actions of inanimate nature and of rational agents. Agency in the metaphysics of action adds nothing to state-variable causation. Agency in the metaphysics of intentional action, in contrast, is argued to have a different structure, not reducible to state-variable causation. Work on endogenous choice in social science suggests that the concept of agency that is on view in literature on selection effects and social generation implies the metaphysics of intentional action. Recent research in the philosophy of action is considered in order to specify the structure of intentional action and the force of intentional explanations.


Episteme ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pete Mandik

ABSTRACTIn this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.


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