Pure Nash Equilibria in Resource Graph Games

This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, a general class of strategic games succinctly representing the players’ private costs. These games are defined relative to a finite set of resources and the strategy set of each player corresponds to a set of subsets of resources. The cost of a resource is an arbitrary function of the load vector of a certain subset of resources. As our main result, we give complete characterizations of the cost functions guaranteeing the existence of pure Nash equilibria for weighted and unweighted players, respectively. For unweighted players, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist for any choice of the players’ strategy space if and only if the cost of each resource is an arbitrary function of the load of the resource itself and linear in the load of all other resources where the linear coefficients of mutual influence of different resources are symmetric. This implies in particular that for any other cost structure there is a resource graph game that does not have a pure Nash equilibrium. For weighted games where players have intrinsic weights and the cost of each resource depends on the aggregated weight of its users, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist if and only if the cost of a resource is linear in all resource loads, and the linear factors of mutual influence are symmetric, or there is no interaction among resources and the cost is an exponential function of the local resource load. We further discuss the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games showing that for unweighted games where pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, it is coNP-complete to decide for a given strategy profile whether it is a pure Nash equilibrium. For general resource graph games, we prove that the decision whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists is Σ p 2 -complete.

Two Influence Maximization Games on Graphs Made Temporal

To address the dynamic nature of real-world networks, we generalize competitive diffusion games and Voronoi games from static to temporal graphs, where edges may appear or disappear over time. This establishes a new direction of studies in the area of graph games, motivated by applications such as influence spreading. As a first step, we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria in competitive diffusion and Voronoi games on different temporal graph classes. Even when restricting our studies to temporal paths and cycles, this turns out to be a challenging undertaking, revealing significant differences between the two games in the temporal setting. Notably, both games are equivalent on static paths and cycles. Our two main technical results are (algorithmic) proofs for the existence of Nash equilibria in temporal competitive diffusion and temporal Voronoi games when the edges are restricted not to disappear over time.

On Satisficing in Quantitative Games

Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. Optimization is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization problem with the satisficing problem, where instead of searching for optimal solutions, the goal is to search for solutions that adhere to a given threshold bound.This work defines and investigates the satisficing problem on a two-player graph game with the discounted-sum cost model. We show that while the satisficing problem can be solved using numerical methods just like the optimization problem, this approach does not render compelling benefits over optimization. When the discount factor is, however, an integer, we present another approach to satisficing, which is purely based on automata methods. We show that this approach is algorithmically more performant – both theoretically and empirically – and demonstrates the broader applicability of satisficing over optimization.

On the Graceful Game

A graceful labeling of a graph G with m edges consists in labeling the vertices of G with distinct integers from 0 to m such that, when each edge is assigned the absolute difference of the labels of its endpoints, all induced edge labels are distinct. Rosa established two well known conjectures: all trees are graceful (1966) and all triangular cacti are graceful (1988). In order to contribute to both conjectures we study these problems in the context of graph games. The graceful game was introduced by Tuza in 2017 as a two-players game on a connected graph in which the players Alice and Bob take turns labeling the vertices with distinct integers from 0 to m. Alice’s goal is to gracefully label the graph as Bob’s goal is to prevent it from happening. In this work, we present the first results in this area by showing winning strategies for Alice and Bob in complete graphs, paths, cycles, complete bipartite graphs, caterpillars, prisms, wheels, helms, webs, gear graphs, hypercubes and some powers of paths.