Happiness Measurability and Interpersonal Comparability

Simple ways to improve the accuracy and interpersonal and intertemporal comparability of happiness measurement include using happiness instead of life satisfaction (or other concepts), pinning down the dividing line of the zero amount of net happiness, using an interpersonally valid unit based on the just perceivable increment of happiness, and the complementary use of this method for small samples and the traditional methods for large samples.

An extended hierarchical ordered probit model robust to heteroskedastic vignette perceptions with an application to functional limitation assessment

To improve interpersonal comparability of self-reported measures, anchoring vignettes are increasingly collected in surveys and modeled as the hierarchical ordered probit (HOPIT) model. This paper—based on the idea of psychological distance—relaxes the assumption of vignette equivalence in the HOPIT by allowing for heteroscedasticity in respondents’ perceptions of vignettes. Particularly, we assume that respondents who are more similar to a vignette are more familiar with the condition described and therefore are capable of forming a more precise perception of the vignette. We show evidence in favor of this extended HOPIT through Monte Carlo simulations and an application concerning self-reported vision difficulty from the WHO Study on Global Aging and Adult Health (SAGE).

Calibrating QALYs to Respect Equality of Persons

Comparative valuation of different policy interventions often requires interpersonal comparability of benefit. In the field of health economics, the metric commonly used for such comparison, quality adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, has been criticized for failing to respect the equality of all persons’ intrinsic worth, including particularly those with disabilities. A methodology is proposed that interprets ‘full quality of life’ as the best health prospect that is achievable for the particular individual within the relevant budget constraint. This calibration is challenging both conceptually and operationally as it shifts dramatically when technology or budget developments alter what can be achieved for incapacitated individuals. The proposal nevertheless ensures that the maximal achievable satisfaction of one person's preferences can carry no more intrinsic value than that of another. This approach, which can be applied to other domains of social valuation, thus prevents implicit discrimination against the elderly and those with irremediable incapacities.

Scoring from Contests

This article presents a new model for scoring alternatives from “contest” outcomes. The model is a generalization of the method of paired comparison to accommodate comparisons between arbitrarily sized sets of alternatives in which outcomes are any division of a fixed prize. Our approach is also applicable to contests between varying quantities of alternatives. We prove that under a reasonable condition on the comparability of alternatives, there exists a unique collection of scores that produces accurate estimates of the overall performance of each alternative and satisfies a well-known axiom regarding choice probabilities. We apply the method to several problems in which varying choice sets and continuous outcomes may create problems for standard scoring methods. These problems include measuring centrality in network data and the scoring of political candidates via a “feeling thermometer.” In the latter case, we also use the method to uncover and solve a potential difficulty with common methods of rescaling thermometer data to account for issues of interpersonal comparability.

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS

According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against all transcendental arguments of a ‘strong’ kind. However, I argue that Davidson's strategy can still achieve results of anti-sceptical significance. If we reformulate Davidson's argument as a ‘modest’ transcendental argument and if we embrace an ‘internal’ account of epistemic justification, it is in fact possible to have at least justified beliefs about how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and about their interpersonal comparability.

What Is Welfare and How Can We Measure It?

This article steps back from the traditional route of discussing the philosophical issues of welfare economics. The problem with that general approach is that the account and problems inherent in seeing welfare in terms of choice-based utility (whether ordinal or cardinal) or experiential utility are discussed prior to discussing other ways of examining human welfare. Problems with welfarism and utilitarianism, then, lead to the discussion of other approaches as though they avoid such problems when, in reality, their proponents rarely even stand them up to the issues. Any welfare economics or political philosophy that does not tell how to address public policy issues is not worth the name, and that means there must be a way of comparing the welfare of different people in some manner in order to make judgments about where to spend public money. All approaches suffer from interpersonal comparability problems.