Wittgenstein on Scepticism. An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty

<p>The thesis puts forward a new interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and contrasts it with the standard reading of the book, also known in literature as the Framework Reading. The Framework Reading sees hinge propositions, that is our most basic and indubitable beliefs, as framing our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, external to this practice. As such, they are seen as not truth-apt, purely regulative in character and our relation to them as non-epistemic. According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, we should instead see hinges as uncontroversially correct moves in our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, we should see them as obviously true and playing both a regulative and a descriptive role.</p>

Wittgenstein on Scepticism. An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty

<p>The thesis puts forward a new interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and contrasts it with the standard reading of the book, also known in literature as the Framework Reading. The Framework Reading sees hinge propositions, that is our most basic and indubitable beliefs, as framing our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, external to this practice. As such, they are seen as not truth-apt, purely regulative in character and our relation to them as non-epistemic. According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, we should instead see hinges as uncontroversially correct moves in our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, we should see them as obviously true and playing both a regulative and a descriptive role.</p>

In the Darkness of this Time: Wittgenstein and Freud on Uncertainty

Both Wittgenstein and Freud experienced the crisis of humanism resulting from the first and second world wars. Although they were both considered to be influential figures, they hardly investigated the ways in which people could cope with the consequences of these crises. However, Wittgenstein and Freud did suggest ways of understanding uncertainties caused by real life events, as well as by the nature of human thought processes. This article will explore the therapeutic ways of dealing with uncertainties common to both thinkers and the different concepts facilitating their methodologies. The central contention of this article is that both Wittgenstein and Freud developed a complex methodology, acknowledging the constant and unexpected changes humans have deal with, whilst also offering the possibility of defining “hinge propositions” and “language-games” which can stabilize our consciousness.

Sentido e verdade: revisitando o problema dos enunciados existenciais negativos

Este artigo revisita o clássico problema dos nomes próprios vazios, ou ainda, problema dos enunciados existenciais singulares negativos. Partindo de um parentesco deste problema com o problema (ou paradoxo) do falso, o artigo mostra, em um primeiro momento, como Aristóteles introduz uma distinção entre “nome” e “declaração” com o intuito de separar as condições de sentido das condições de verdade de um enunciado, abrindo assim a possibilidade para que um discurso seja falso sem ser, por isso, destituído de sentido. Em seguida, o artigo mostra como a ideia de que o sentido é anterior à verdade é radicalizada no Tractatus de Wittgenstein, radicalização que tem, como uma de suas consequências, a necessidade de se distinguir entre nomes próprios ordinários (que serão tratados como equivalentes a descrições) e nomes próprios logicamente genuínos, para os quais sequer se coloca a questão da existência ou não-existência. Em um terceiro momento, a atenção se volta à obra de Kripke a fim de mostrar como este, ao negar que os nomes próprios da linguagem ordinária sejam equivalentes a descrições, vai chegar, em sua análise dos enunciados existenciais negativos, à recusa daquilo que Aristóteles e Wittgenstein punham como pressuposto, a saber, a anterioridade do sentido de um enunciado em relação à sua verdade ou falsidade. A partir disso, algumas conclusões um tanto quanto paradoxais são extraídas da análise de Kripke para estes enunciados. Por fim, o artigo busca fornecer uma via para entendê-las por meio de uma comparação, ainda que bastante breve, desses enunciados com aquilo que Wittgenstein chama, na sua última obra, de proposições fulcrais (hinge propositions).

Are There Mathematical Hinges?

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy of mathematics.

Against (Neo-Wittgensteinian) Entitlements

Crispin Wright takes his entitlement strategy to be neo-Wittgensteinian. This chapter argues for two conclusions. First, Wright’s entitlement strategy cannot be neo-Wittgensteinian, properly so-called. Wright explicitly characterizes trust in anti-sceptical hypotheses as epistemically rational. However, properly Wittgensteinian approaches place anti-sceptical hypotheses or so-called hinge propositions (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) outside the realm of rational evaluation. Second, Wright-style entitlement is fundamentally flawed because it is unclear what kind of epistemic good it is supposed to be. Since entitlements are non-evidential in nature, they cannot be epistemic goods by virtue of supporting the truth of anti-sceptical hypotheses. They cannot sustain anything worthy of the label “epistemic rationality” either.

The Sceptical Problem Is a Pseudo-Problem. Open Lecture: Does the External World Exist? Part II. The Sceptical Scenario Is Meaningless

Duncan Pritchard’s hinge-disjunctivist approach is not purely therapeutic, it represents a significant step forward. But, within it, the nature of the hinge propositions themselves is not fully disclosed. We interpret the hinge propositions as reality-rooted Wittgenstein rules.This allows us to strengthen the joint interpretation of the sceptical paradox. Finally, we express our doubts about the need for a disjunctivist component to solve/dissolve the sceptical problem. A sceptical scenario is meaningless, because any understanding involves the use of concepts, which, in turn, make sense only if they are rooted in reality. Our point of view is consistent with Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, as well as with Robert Brandom’s position, according to which rationalists and materialistic reductionists share a common false semantic premise about the possibility of a clear separation and independent treatment of semantics and epistemology.

Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism

Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception (to a point), while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism.