scholarly journals An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Status ◽  
Relative Version ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Manifest Image

The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.

Illuminating the Mind

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Stoltz
Keyword(s):  
Previous Exposure ◽  
Western Tradition ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Buddhist Epistemology ◽  
Testimonial Knowledge ◽  
Buddhist Tradition ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This book provides readers with an introduction to epistemology within the Buddhist intellectual tradition. It is designed to be accessible to those whose primary background is in the “Western” tradition of philosophy and who have little or no previous exposure to Buddhist philosophical writings. The book examines many of the most important topics in the field of epistemology, topics that are central both to contemporary discussions of epistemology and to the classical Buddhist tradition of epistemology in India and Tibet. Among the topics discussed are Buddhist accounts of the nature of knowledge episodes, the defining conditions of perceptual knowledge and of inferential knowledge, the status of testimonial knowledge, and skeptical criticisms of the entire project of epistemology. The book seeks to put the field of Buddhist epistemology in conversation with contemporary debates in philosophy. It shows that many of the arguments and debates occurring within classical Buddhist epistemological treatises coincide with the arguments and disagreements found in contemporary epistemology. The book shows, for example, how Buddhist epistemologists developed an anti-luck epistemology—one that is linked to a sensitivity requirement for knowledge. Likewise, the book explores the question of how the study of Buddhist epistemology can be of relevance to contemporary debates about the value of contributions from experimental epistemology, and to broader debates concerning the use of philosophical intuitions about knowledge.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

Inference

2021 ◽  
pp. 74-98
Author(s):  
Jonathan Stoltz
Keyword(s):  
Good Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Closure Principles

This chapter introduces the Buddhist theory of inference. It begins with the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” and argues that what is of primary importance in epistemology is the category of “inference for oneself.” The chapter then lays out the standard features of the Buddhist account of inferential knowledge, including Dignāga’s appeal to “the three characteristics” of good evidence and Dharmakīrti’s account of three different types of evidence. The chapter concludes with a section on the topic of epistemic closure principles and how such principles might apply to Buddhist accounts of inferential knowledge.

Pramāṇabhūta, *pramāṇa(bhūta)-puruṣa, pratyakṣadharmanandsākṣātkṛtadharmanas epithets of theṛṣi, ācāryaandtathāgatain grammatical, epistemological and Madhyamaka texts

1994 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Seyfort Ruegg
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Precise Meaning ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
Philosophical Texts

The expression pramāṇabhūta is attested in a number of Indian grammaticaland philosophical texts, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, its existence in texts no longer accessible inSanskrit being inferable from their translations in Tibetan where we find its standard equivalenttshad mar gyur pa. But the grammatical correctness and the interpretation of the term have given rise to a good deal of discussion and exegesis. Some commentators have taken up the grammatical question as to why we have the formpramāṇabhūtarather than the at first sight perhaps more normal formpramāṇībhūta. And in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school a problem arises as to the precise meaning of the expressionpramāṇabhūtaemployed as an epithet of a person. For by Dignāga and Dharmakirtipramāṇahas been exhaustively divided intopratyakṣa‘(direct) perceptual knowledge’ andanumāna‘inferential knowledge’, so that in the usage of their school at least a person (puruṣa, pudgala)—as opposed to knowledge or a cognition (jñāna=šespa, ordhi/buddhi=blo)— would not strictly speaking be considered in the first instance as apramāṇa.

scholarly journals Philosophy of the Physical Sciences

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Hoefer ◽  
Chris Smeenk
Keyword(s):  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
The Status ◽  
Naturalized Metaphysics ◽  
Manifest Image ◽  
Modal Notion ◽  
Fundamental Physical ◽  
Physical Modalities ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
Fundamental Physical Theories

The authors survey some debates about the nature and structure of physical theories and about the connections between our physical theories and naturalized metaphysics. The discussion is organized around an “ideal view” of physical theories and criticisms that can be raised against it. This view includes controversial commitments regarding the best analysis of physical modalities and intertheory relations. The authors consider the case in favor of taking laws as the primary modal notion, discussing objections related to alleged violations of the laws, the apparent need to appeal to causality, and the status of probability. The “ideal view” includes a commitment that fundamental physical theories are explanatorily sufficient. The authors discuss several challenges to recovering the manifest image from fundamental physics, along with a distinct challenge to reductionism based on acknowledging the contributions of less fundamental theories in physical explanations.

A REJECTION OF THE EPISTEMIC CLOSURE PRINCIPLE

2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Richard Greene ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Closure Principle

Fallibility for Infallibilists

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Leddington
Keyword(s):  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Intuitive Appeal ◽  
General Lesson ◽  
Level Of Experience ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

Infallibilism is the view that knowledge requires conclusive grounds. Despite its intuitive appeal, most contemporary epistemology rejects Infallibilism; however, there is a strong minority tradition that embraces it. Showing that Infallibilism is viable requires showing that it is compatible with the undeniable fact that we can go wrong in pursuit of perceptual knowledge. In other words, we need an account of fallibility for Infallibilists. By critically examining John McDowell’s recent attempt at such an account, this paper articulates a very important general lesson for Infallibilists. The paper concludes by briefly discussing two ways to do justice to this lesson, and so, two possible approaches to fallibility for Infallibilists: first, at the level of experience; and second, at the level of judgment.

scholarly journals The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-135
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
The Real ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

scholarly journals Introduction: The History of Social Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick F. Schmitt ◽  
Oliver R. Scholz
Keyword(s):  
Social Factors ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Factor ◽  
Sociology Of Science ◽  
Library Science ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Function ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

Social epistemology is a burgeoning branch of contemporary epistemology. Since the 1970s, philosophers have taken an ever-increasing interest in such topics as the epistemic value of testimony, the nature and function of expertise, the proper distribution of cognitive labor and resources among individuals in communities, and the status of group reasoning and knowledge. This trend emerged against the resistance of the widely shared view that social considerations are largely irrelevant to epistemological concerns. The trend was stimulated by diverse approaches to the study of knowledge, in such fields as library science, educational theory, the sociology of science, and economics, and within philosophy itself, in the decades preceding the 1980s. To name only a few influences within philosophy, W. V. Quine promoted a naturalistic approach to knowledge, and many who accepted the relevance of nature to epistemology found it sensible to accept the relevance of social factors as well. Thomas S. Kuhn suggested that social factors precipitate revolutionary conceptual and doctrinal changes in the history of science. And feminist epistemologists uncovered the importance of gender differences in knowledge – a species of social factor.

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