CLIMATE CRISIS: TIME TO RETHINK ECONOMIC PLANNING BY DEMYSTIFYING CAPITALISM AND ITS MARKET(S)

The purpose of the article is to open up epistemological space for revitalising the idea of democratic economic planning as a viable alternative vision. It argues that a proper development of the idea must be preceded by a comprehensive critical interrogation of a hegemonic multidimensional ideological mystification of capitalism and its markets. By utilizing Marxist and eco-socialist insights the article identifies and analyses several central ideological mystifications that enact an epistemic closure. These range from the obfuscation of capitalism’s role in creating the climate crisis as an inherently unsustainable system, to the mystification of its non-evolutionary origins, to the obfuscation of the role economic planning plays in contemporary capitalism, to the mystification of markets as ideal spaces of freedom and innovation obfuscating the ever present market-related oppression, exploitation and environmental devastation, and to silencing concrete historical examples of democratic economic planning such as project Cybersyn that should serve as an inspiration for imagining an alternative order. Keywords: climate change, ideological mystification, democratic economic planning, capitalism, neoliberalism

Inference

This chapter introduces the Buddhist theory of inference. It begins with the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” and argues that what is of primary importance in epistemology is the category of “inference for oneself.” The chapter then lays out the standard features of the Buddhist account of inferential knowledge, including Dignāga’s appeal to “the three characteristics” of good evidence and Dharmakīrti’s account of three different types of evidence. The chapter concludes with a section on the topic of epistemic closure principles and how such principles might apply to Buddhist accounts of inferential knowledge.

Knowledge is closed under analytic content

I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.

Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism

May (2013) argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an issue for the moral skeptic; she has an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Thus, we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis.

Plato’s Theory of the Arts in the Gorgias and in the Republic

This paper examines Socrates’ theory of the arts in the Gorgias and in the Republic. It shows how that theory changes, as the discussion takes focus first in relation to moderation, then to justice, where it is tied to the idea of a techne of rule, to notions of virtuous work and civic health, and to five levels of ‘art’ represented in the cave. It argues that both Socrates’ vision of a scientific and benevolent political art and Thrasymachus’ sophistic theory of tyrannical rule are undercut in the dialogue, the former by doubts concerning the epistemic closure it seems based on, the latter by the tyrant’s character, which impels him toward self-destructive government.

Minority Report

Black men are an integral part of the American pornographic industry, but their participation requires confronting and navigating a variety of simplified categorizations and assumptions that favor their sexuality over their humanity. Utilizing interviews with twelve prominent heterosexual black male figures (also known as “talent”) currently active in the industry, this article seeks to offer insight into the realities that the men face while participating in an industry viewed as taboo by mainstream society. Among the issues explored are their reasons for joining the industry, interracialism and racism, and moral and ethical dilemmas. Also employed are Lewis Gordon's concept of “epistemic closure,” or the cessation of inquiry, and Frantz Fanon's concept of the “phobogenic object,” or “stimulus to anxiety.”