Aristotle on Intelligent Perception

Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers allow us to develop a reflective understanding of the knowledge we acquire by purely perceptual means—a reflective understanding that can then affect what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals.

Modernity as a Process of De-Limitations

This article presents some outlines of a new theory of modernity. As distinct from the theories of modernity of the Enlightenment (Habermas) and their critique in the form of theories of power (Foucault, post-colonial philosophies), modernity is described as a complex process of various “de-limitations”, which is set in motion in Renaissance philosophy. Since in antiquity cosmology as well as the geography of the ecumene were each tied to anthropological, ethical and political conceptions respectively, the de-limitation of the cosmos (Cusanus, Copernicus) and the de-limitation of the ecumene by the European naval powers trigger scientific, political and cultural transformations reaching from the upvaluation of insatiable curiosity to the anthropological idea of experimental self-creation (Montaigne) up to the idea of limitless economic growth (Locke). Since rational, power-related and cultural ideas are amalgamated in the different de-limitations, this theory opens up a new perspective on the ambivalences of modernity.

INTEGRAL CLOSURE OF STRONGLY GOLOD IDEALS

We prove that the integral closure of a strongly Golod ideal in a polynomial ring over a field of characteristic zero is strongly Golod, positively answering a question of Huneke. More generally, the rational power $I_{\unicode[STIX]{x1D6FC}}$ of an arbitrary homogeneous ideal is strongly Golod for $\unicode[STIX]{x1D6FC}\geqslant 2$ and, if $I$ is strongly Golod, then $I_{\unicode[STIX]{x1D6FC}}$ is strongly Golod for $\unicode[STIX]{x1D6FC}\geqslant 1$ . We also show that all the coefficient ideals of a strongly Golod ideal are strongly Golod.

RATIONAL POWER SUPPLY OF ENERGY-DEFICIENT REGIONS

The questions of supplying power to the region with remote consumers are considered. The model of integrated power supply is proposed. Mathematical dependences that allow accounting volumes of certain types energy resources consumption and forming rational energy balance of the region are formulated.

On Determinism and Unambiguity of Weighted Two-Way Automata

This paper deals with one-way and two-way weighted automata. When the semiring of weights is commutative, we prove that unambiguous one-way automata, unambiguous two-way automata and deterministic two-way automata realize the same (rational) power series. If the semiring of weights is not commutative, unambiguous one-way automata and deterministic two-way automata realize the same rational power series, but unambiguous two-way automata may realize non rational power series.

Animals Are from Venus, Human Beings from Mars: Averroës's Aristotle and the Rationality of Emotion in Guido Cavalcanti's “Donna me prega”

This essay provides a revisionary interpretation of one of the most important treatments of emotion (and its relation to reason) in the early period of modern European vernacular literature, Guido Cavalcanti's “Donna me prega” (“A Lady Asks Me”). According to the prevailing interpretation, the poem denigrates love as an animal power, a subhuman force that destroys our properly human rationality. Reading the poem's treatment of love in the light of Averroës's views, especially as presented in his Long Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, reveals that Cavalcanti celebrates love as paradigmatic of human reason, part and parcel of one's leading a rational and therefore human life. Love, the operation of a rational power that is mortal (not immortal) and natural (not supernatural), is for human beings the “perfect good,” the full extent of our flourishing and the best for which we can hope.