The Connections between Attitudes towards Nursing Home Placement, Intergenerational Solidarity, and the Conflict between Tradition and Modernity among Three Generations of Arab Muslim Families in Israel

The goal of this study was to examine three generations of Arab Muslims in Israel, to investigate the relationships between their attitudes regarding the placement of an older relative in a nursing home, intergenerational solidarity, and to ultimately proceed with the nursing home placement. The backdrop to this examination was the increasing sociocultural tension between modernization tendencies and the long-established traditions and norms in the Arab Muslim society in Israel. The sample included a total of 126 university students, as well as one parent and one grandparent of each student. All participants completed identical questionnaires examining the attitudes towards the nursing home placement of an elder relative. The findings of the study indicate a strong objection among the youngest generation, whose attitudes were more similar to those of their grandparents than to those of their parents. Psychosocial mechanisms in the Arab Muslim population, such as intergenerational solidarity, has been the subject of increased scrutiny and debate over recent years, given the intensive pace of modern developments, which has called into question the familiar norms, thus constituting a threat to the tradition that has guided the population throughout numerous centuries and generations.

MALAYSIA AND THE ROME STATUTE: THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

The announcement of Malaysia’s accession to the Rome Statute on March 4, 2019 was met with strong objection by the opposition and some stakeholders. One of the main arguments made by those who opposed the Rome Statute was that “it will, in the end, destroy national sovereignty.” Although the argument appears to be political rhetoric, it has already injected confusion among the general public and painted a dark picture that the Rome Statute is a hegemonic law that will rob Malaysia of its sovereignty. The main purpose of the present paper, therefore, is to set the record straight and to prove the simple fact that entering into a treaty is in fact a clear exercise of a State’s sovereignty and not to lose sovereignty. Firstly, the paper reappraises the concept of sovereignty: in its original form and its evolution from 16th century to 21st century, on the basis of State practice, doctrine and judicial pronouncements. Secondly, arguments against the Rome Statute made by some powerful States are analysed and rebutted. Thirdly, Malaysia’s situation is objectively evaluated in the light of a comparison between the Rome Statute and other onerous treaties to which Malaysia has already been a party. The paper concludes with the findings that States with their own free will restrict their sovereignty to subject themselves to international law and that Malaysia by no means will lose its sovereignty by acceding to a treaty. Most importantly the Government must prioritize the need to convince the people that it is the right thing to do – it is beneficial to the people of Malaysia or it can achieve the higher aim of protecting humanity.

Synonymy Between Token-Reflexive Expressions

Synonymy, at its most basic, is sameness of meaning. A token-reflexive expression is an expression whose meaning assigns a referent to its tokens by relating each particular token of that particular expression to its referent. The formulation of its meaning accordingly mentions the particular expression whose meaning it is. This seems to entail that no two token-reflexive expressions are synonymous, which would constitute a strong objection against token-reflexive semantics. In this paper, I propose and defend a notion of synonymy for token-reflexive expressions that allows such expressions to be synonymous, while being a fairly conservative extension of the customary notion of synonymy.

A Response to Jürgen Moltmann’s ‘Blessing of Hope’

This article responds from a ‘Full Gospel’ perspective to Moltmann's critical-constructive dialogue with the ‘Full Gospel Theology’ of Dr Yonggi Cho. Moltmann's emphasis on the resurrection of Christ as the inexhaustible source of the Gospel, his eschatological orientation, as well as the wide horizon of his theological reflection—including individual and communal dimensions of humanity, nature and universe, and all dimensions of time—are affirmed, while some distinct differences are uplifted concerning pneumatology and the understanding of time and hope. An especially strong objection is raised to the element of universalism in Moltmann’s perspective.

Fatalism and Deliberation

Fatalism is a doctrine about which philosophers have by and large been in complete agreement. Even the arguments they have used to dispose of it have been remarkably constant. Yet some of these arguments are surprisingly inadequate. The purpose of this discussion is to point out a set of fallacies which are especially common in recent discussions of fatalism. Their common feature is an emphasis on the relation between fatalism and deliberation. The claim they make is that if fatalism is true, any deliberation over one's future actions is pointless. If this is not quite a refutation of fatalism by itself, it is at least a strong objection, especially when advanced ad hominem. Yet I think that it is wholly false. In the following discussion I will show how every argument intended to establish this incompatibility between fatalism and deliberation involves some fallacy.

Parental Consent for Immunization

To the Editor.— The New York Pediatric Society, a 50-year-old professional organization of practicing and academic physicians dedicated to the study and welfare of children, is submitting this letter, previously sent to the Academy offices, in the interest of stimulating further discussion of the question of parental consent for routine immunizations. We have reviewed the March 1983 report on DTP (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus), DT, and TD immunizations provided by the American Academy of Pediatrics, and wish to register our strong objection to the formal request/consent forms favored, or at least publicized by the Academy.

A Defense of Pacifism

The title of this paper is misleading. I do not intend to defend pacifism against those who would contend that it is false. In point of fact, I agree that pacifism is false, and profoundly so, if any moral belief is. Yet pacifism’s critics sometimes believe it is false for inadequate reasons, and it is important to make the inadequacy of these reasons apparent whenever possible. Otherwise pacifism’s apologists are apt to suppose that they have overcome their critic’s strongest objections, when, in fact, in exposing the inadequacy of the grounds of certain objections, they have succeeded only in meeting the weaker ones. What I intend to defend, then, is not the truth of pacifism, but the very different claim that pacifism is not necessarily false. This objection to pacifism, which, if sound, would silence the debate over its possible merits, and which, therefore, if sound, would be a strong objection indeed, is set forth by Jan Narveson in his paper on pacifism. I hope to show that this objection is unfounded, and I shall, accordingly, direct my argument principally against Narveson’s. And yet it is with a certain degree of reluctance that I do so, since Narveson, himself, suggests that “most people” whose opinion he has solicited would agree with me that pacifism, although false, is not necessarily so. One runs a risk, in such a situation, of pouring old wine into new bottles.