Political Forgiveness

The recent protest in Hong Kong since summer 2019 makes political forgiveness an urgent public issue facing the Christian churches. Through a contextual and multidisciplinary dialogue with Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), this study argues for a realistic understanding that political forgiveness is possible as well as desirable, which should be based on a dialectical view of human nature, rather than a naïve and optimistic view of human compassion. This realistic understanding of political forgiveness is grounded on Niebuhr’s thought and relevance to the Hong Kong context.

A politics of forgiveness? Engaging the ontological and the structural in the dialogical theology of John de Gruchy

Forgiveness is a deeply contested theological notion in contemporary South African theology and society. The same could be said for South African theologies of reconciliation, of which forgiveness is considered to be a part. Some claim that these concepts have been weakened, abused, and corrupted. In particular, there are doubts whether forgiveness holds any theological or social value at present. John de Gruchy has devoted a great deal of time and effort to developing a theologically subtle, and politically robust, understanding of forgiveness that links justice and reconciliation. This article will consider how John de Gruchy’s dialogical theology, which takes account of both the ontological and the structural aspects of forgiveness, facilitates an understanding of political forgiveness that can address some of the critiques of this notion in contemporary South African theologies.

Returning to the Source

The idea of forgiveness is omnipresent in the transitional justice literature, yet this body of work, taken as a whole, is marked by conceptual, terminological and argumentative imprecision. Equivocation is common, glossing moral, theological, therapeutic and legal considerations, while arguments proceed from political, apolitical and even antipolitical premises. With forgiveness as a praxis linked to reconciliation processes in at least ten countries, concerns have grown over its negative implications for the relationship between the state and victims of state-authored injustices. Many of these debates reference Hannah Arendt. Drawing from a range of Arendt’s published and unpublished work, this article challenges the academic claim that forgiveness has no place in the politics of reconciliation. Through this ‘returning to the source’, it presents a promising mode of thinking about political forgiveness in contemporary Settler-colonial states.

Forgiveness

There is by now an enormous, and growing, philosophical literature on forgiveness. Since at least Downie 1965 (cited under Forgiveness and Virtue), philosophers have produced articles, monographs, encyclopedia entries, and anthologized collections of essays on the conceptual, normative, phenomenological, and social-political nature of forgiveness. Much of this literature may be categorized as follows: General Overviews, Historical Sources, Emotions of Forgiveness, Acts of Forgiveness, Political Forgiveness, Self-Forgiveness, Feminist Approaches to Forgiveness, Forgiveness in Continental Philosophy, Forgiveness and Punishment, the Normative Status of Forgiveness, Third-Party Forgiveness, Paradoxes of Forgiveness, and God and Forgiveness. While no attempt has been made to canvass all the philosophical literature on the topic, and there is considerable overlap between the sections of this article, the following annotated citations aim to provide a guide to much of that literature.

The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 bce and its Legacy for Greek City-States in the Classical and Hellenistic Ages

This chapter surveys amnesty agreements throughout the Greek world in the Classical and Hellenistic ages and argues that in many the principle of political forgiveness was both important and necessary when reconciling communities in the aftermath of civil conflict. The most successful amnesties were those which made use of the law and prohibited the revisiting of old grievances which led to or stemmed from a period of internal strife. Where and when exceptions were made to this rule they normally had to be spelled out in the terms of a treaty. The methods by which individual cities put this principle into effect varied widely, but the most famous and enduring example, the Athenian amnesty of 403 BCE, illustrates that a community could only successfully reconcile if its citizens were willing to forgo vindictive instincts which otherwise would have destabilised it. Robust procedures were put in place to restrain vengeance and protect the rights of individuals.

Oaths (ὅρκοι), Covenants (συνθῆκαι) and Laws (νόμοι) in the Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC

There has been much discussion in recent years as to whether the Athenian amnesty of 403 BC can be understood in terms of political forgiveness. A number of scholars have denied that it can. Nevertheless, if the oaths, covenants, and laws are properly analysed, it will become clear that, though ancillary to the earliest clauses of the agreement, the promise μὴ μνησικακεῖν was a blanket measure forbidding prosecutions for crimes under the Thirty and before in the courts after 403. The covenants (συνθῆκαι) chiefly laid down conditions for future relations between Athens and Eleusis. The promise not to dredge up the past was just one concern, and should not be confused with the agreement in its entirety. This article re-examines the agreement as a whole in light of recent discussion of the meaning of amnesty in the ancient world, and argues that the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν, sworn subsequently, affirmed just one of the covenants, not, as is sometimes held, every covenant. Other clauses may have been re-affirmed by separate oaths. The legislation (νόμοι) which followed was designed to give clearer legal definition to μὴ μνησικακεῖν, but was distinct and separate from the covenants of amnesty.