A Reference Architecture for Blockchain-Based Crowdsourcing Platforms

Companies increasingly tender knowledge-intensive tasks using crowdsourcing platforms to gain access to scarce knowledge and skills otherwise out of reach, and in this way, gaining competitive advantage. Despite its potential, existing crowdsourcing platforms encounter several challenges, including (1) fragmentation of expertise, as there are many platforms, (2) distrust between task providers and crowdsourcing participants, as identity and past performance are often not known, and (3) inability to learn from experience due to a lack of openness. A reference architecture for blockchain-based knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing platforms to mediate transactions between demand and supply of knowledge is designed in this paper to overcome these challenges. A design science research method is followed to develop the architecture. The reference architecture shows how blockchain and smart contract components can be integrated to support and coordinate knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing activities. By removing traditional e-commerce intermediaries, blockchain reduces search friction, knowledge transfer costs, and cheating by task providers or crowdsourcing participants.

Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance

We analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase insurance premiums (enough to transfer 13.2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers—approximately $34.4 billion in 1997); and increase insurance turnover (by 64 percent for the average policy). This rent transfer harms consumers and—when combined with heightened turnover—reduces incentives to invest in future health. We also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search friction induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts. (JEL D83 G22, I18)

Searching, Matching, And Unemployment Compensation In Search Equilibrium

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 34.8pt 0pt 37.05pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">In search equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates and characterizes the properties of steady state equilibrium of wage, unemployment compensation, entry fee, and taxes. Our research is based on the behavior of a job seeking, unemployed worker with the probability of contact rate of both sides, which may affect the entry of unfilled vacancies and the level of unemployment (U). The steady-state shows that </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">a reduction in the severity of search friction, m₀</span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;">&shy;</span></span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">, raises the equilibrium values of </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">the probability of contact rates(</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">&mu;*and </span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;">h</span></span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">* ) and lower the level of unemployment (U) and the number of vacancies(V). An increase in either in the level of output, Y, or decrease in </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">unemployment compensation, entry fee, and tax rate, increase in the number of unfilled vacancies, V*, makes it easier for workers to find jobs (&mu;* rises and U falls) and more difficult for vacancies to find workers(</span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-char-type: symbol; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;">h</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">* falls). </span></span></p>