scholarly journals Ambiguous Platforms and Correlated Preferences: Experimental Evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
JUHA TOLVANEN ◽  
JAMES TREMEWAN ◽  
ALEXANDER K. WAGNER
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Perceived Similarity ◽  
Democratic Representation ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Treatment Variation

This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, a model of electoral competition that allows for platforms where candidates may be ambiguous about which policy they will implement if elected. We argue that uncertainty about the policy preferences of the electorate, combined with perceived similarity of voters and candidates, can lead to the latter running on these ambiguous platforms. By appealing to voters from both ends of the spectrum, such platforms can ensure electoral success for noncentrist candidates in a sufficiently polarized society. Ambiguous platforms pose a threat to democratic representation because winning noncentrists always implement policies in favor of a minority and against the preferences of the majority. In our laboratory experiment, ambiguous platforms are chosen frequently by candidates and gain notable support from voters. Our main treatment variation provides causal evidence that ambiguous platforms are more popular among noncentrist voters if one of the candidates is a known centrist.

scholarly journals Self-Governance in Generalized Exchange. A Laboratory Experiment on the Structural Embeddedness of Peer Punishment

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Georg Kanitsar
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Norm Enforcement ◽  
Structural Setting ◽  
Structural Embeddedness ◽  
Generalized Exchange

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.

Voters and Parties

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Wren ◽  
Kenneth M. McElwain
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Educational Attainment ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
The Political ◽  
Organizational Changes ◽  
Media Technology ◽  
Partisan Identification

This article studies voters and parties, beginning with realignment or dealignment in the party-voter nexus. It discusses changes in the policy preferences of voters and even organizational changes to the party-voter linkage. Electoral competition, performance of traditional parties, and organizational change are discussed as well. This article determines that there are two parallel trends in the linkage between parties and voters. The first is that voters are showing weaker partisan identification with political parties, and a widening gap between the policy preferences of voters and the electoral manifestos of parties is apparent. The second trend is that improvements in educational attainment and innovations in media technology are strengthening the political capability of both parties and voters.

Which Parties Can Lead Opinion? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracies

2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (11) ◽  
pp. 1485-1517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Brader ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker ◽  
Dominik Duell
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Ideological Position ◽  
Ideological Clarity ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Opposition Parties

Political parties not only aggregate the policy preferences of their supporters, but also have the ability to shape those preferences. Experimental evidence demonstrates that, when parties stake out positions on policy issues, partisans become more likely to adopt these positions, whether out of blind loyalty or because they infer that party endorsements signal options consistent with their interests or values. It is equally clear, however, that partisans do not always follow their party’s lead. The authors investigate the impact of three party-level traits on partisan cue taking: longevity, incumbency, and ideological clarity. As parties age, voters may become more certain of both the party’s reputation and their own allegiance. Governing parties must take action and respond to events, increasing the likelihood of compromise and failure, and therefore may dilute their reputation and disappoint followers. Incumbency aside, some parties exhibit greater ambiguity in their ideological position than other parties, undermining voter certainty about the meaning of cues. The authors test these hypotheses with experiments conducted in three multiparty democracies (Poland, Hungary, and Great Britain). They find that partisans more strongly follow their party’s lead when that party is older, in the opposition, or has developed a more consistent ideological image. However, the impact of longevity vanishes when the other factors are taken into account. Underscoring the importance of voter (un)certainty, ideologically coherent opposition parties have the greatest capacity to shape the policy views of followers.

Field Centipedes

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1619-1635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta ◽  
Oscar Volij
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Previous Evidence ◽  
Chess Players

In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that 69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)

Redistricting and Electoral Competition in American Politics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Substantial Impact ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

Redistricting, or the process of redrawing congressional district boundaries, can be a highly contentious and political affair. Electoral competition within districts is dependent on both of the major American political parties being evenly balanced. Therefore, redistricting can enhance or diminish competition through how it distributes partisans across districts. Indeed, politicians have used this process to manipulate boundaries in their favor for centuries. In fact, the term most commonly used for exploiting the redistricting process for partisan gain—gerrymandering—was coined in 1812 as Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry signed legislation creating a map with heavily distorted districts, one of which resembled a salamander. Thus, the portmanteau “gerry-mander” was born. The misshapen districts produced the intended effect of facilitating greater electoral success for members of the governor’s party. Throughout history, Congress, the US Supreme Court, individual states, the American electorate, and an ever-evolving political environment have all impacted the construction of district maps. Additionally, each of these factors further influences the level of electoral competition within the district. Therefore, this work seeks to outline how redistricting can directly or indirectly influence electoral competition within congressional districts. Directly, different redistricting entities (legislatures, commissions, and courts) possess different motivations and constraints when drawing district lines, which can impact competition. Indirectly, redistricting can influence voting behavior and the incumbency advantage, which can also impact competition. This work also explores the tradeoff between representation and competition, the relationship between redistricting and polarization, what constitutes a gerrymander, and how durable redistricting plans are over time. Each can have a substantial impact on electoral competition, which in turn bears consequences for our understanding of the consequences of redistricting.

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