Speculative Trading and Bubbles: Evidence from the Art Market

We argue that extrapolative expectations drive boom–bust cycles in the postwar art market. Price run-ups coincide with increases in demand fundamentals but are followed by predictable busts. Predictable changes account for about half of the variance of five-year price changes. High prices coincide with many attributes of speculative bubbles: trading volume, the share of short-term trades, the share of postwar art, and volatility are all higher during booms. In addition, short-term transactions underperform long-term transactions. Survey evidence further confirms the link between beliefs, prices, and volume dynamics as in models in which extrapolative beliefs fuel speculative bubbles. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

The prohibition of speculation in Islamic finance: fairness and framing

Purpose This paper aims to present a simple behavioural explanation of the prohibition of speculation in Islamic finance. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes a theoretical model that describes how investors from low income strata of the society may be prone to make sub-optimal decisions when they compare their outcome from a speculative trading activity to that of the counterparty to the trade and perceive inequity to exist. Findings When individuals from low income strata of the society compare their current situation with the average income of the society, they perceive themselves to be in a loss. This creates a loss frame within which they then evaluate all future outcomes. When such individuals invest in speculative trading activities and incur a loss, they compare their outcome from the trade to that of the counterparty to the trade. As speculative trades are a zero sum game, the counterparty makes an equivalent gain from the trade. Thus, the comparison leads to a perception of inequity. This perception of inequity is aggravated by the loss frame within which the investor is operating. The aggravated inequity aversion may then motivate the investor to make further sub-optimal decisions like repeated speculative trading activities. The Islamic prohibition on speculative trading activities may serve to protect low income investors from entering into such cycles of sub-optimal decisions. Originality/value This paper offers a unique explanation of why day trading and short selling may be prohibited in Islamic capital markets.

When a Master Dies: Speculation and Asset Float

An artist’s death constitutes a negative shock to his future production; death permanently decreases the artist’s float. We use this shock to test predictions of speculative trading models with short-selling constraints. As predicted in our model, we find that an artist’s premature death leads to a permanent increase in prices and turnover; this effect being larger for more famous artists. We document that premature death increases prices (by 54.7%) and secondary market volume (by 63.2%).

You Can Bluff but You Should Not Spoof

Spoofing is the act of placing orders to buy or sell a financial contract without the intention to have those orders fulfilled in order to create the impression that there is a large demand for that contract at that price. In this article, I deny the view that spoofing in financial markets should be viewed as morally permissible analogously to the way bluffing is permissible in poker. I argue for the pro tanto moral impermissibility of spoofing and make the case that spoofing is disanalogous from bluffing in at least one important regard—speculative trading serves an important economic role, whereas poker does not.

Price Discovery of a Speculative Asset: Evidence from a Bitcoin Exchange

We examine price discovery and liquidity provision in the secondary market for bitcoin—an asset with a high level of speculative trading. Based on BTC-e’s full limit order book over the 2013–2014 period, we find that order informativeness increases with order aggressiveness within the first 10 tiers, but that this pattern reverses in outer tiers. In a high volatility environment, aggressive orders seem to be more attractive to informed agents, but market liquidity migrates outward in response to the information asymmetry. We also find support to the Markovian learning assumption often made in theoretical models of limit order markets.

Learning, Fast or Slow

Rational models claim “trading to learn” explains widespread excessive speculative trading and challenge behavioral explanations of excessive trading. We argue rational learning models do not explain speculative trading by studying day traders in Taiwan. Consistent with previous studies of learning, unprofitable day traders are more likely than profitable traders to quit. Consistent with models of overconfidence and biased learning (but not with rational learning), the aggregate performance of day traders is negative; 74% of day trading volume is generated by traders with a history of losses; and 97% of day traders are likely to lose money in future day trading. Received: March 4, 2019; Editorial decision: May 16, 2019 by Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

A Speculative Trading Model for the Electricity Market: Based on Japan Electric Power Exchange

Renewable energy sources produce less environmental impact and have little marginal cost. Thus, because of these characteristics, it is desirable to disseminate it for the purpose of economic efficiency. Because of the uncertainty in the supply of renewable energy and the special feature of electricity as a good, such as merit order curve, introducing forward markets is an essential factor in a liberalized market. In European countries, which have already established several mechanisms for managing liquidity including markets with several timelines, the market liquidity invites the investor to perform some speculative action. We present a simple electric power market model to analyze the speculative actions of electricity suppliers and the price effect of such actions. Moreover, we found that the speculative action improves the inelasticity of the demand in electricity market.