Rational Rules

Moral systems, like normative systems more broadly, involve complex mental representations. Rational Rules offers an account of the acquisition of key aspects of normative systems in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. In particular, it offers statistical learning accounts of: (1) how people come to think that a rule is act-based, that is, the rule prohibits producing certain consequences but not allowing such consequences to occur or persist; (2) how people come to expect that a new rule will also be act-based; (3) how people come to believe a principle of liberty, according to which whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted; and (4) how people come to think that some normative claims hold universally while others hold only relative to some group. This provides an empiricist theory of a key part of moral acquisition, since the learning procedures are domain general. It also entails that crucial parts of our moral system enjoy rational credentials since the learning procedures are forms of rational inference. There is another sense in which rules can be rational—they can be effective for achieving our ends, given our ecological settings. Rational Rules argues that at least some central components of our moral systems are indeed ecologically rational: they are good at helping us attain common goals. In addition, the book argues that a basic form of rule representation brings motivation along automatically. Thus, part of the explanation for why we follow moral rules is that we are built to follow rules quite generally.

Themistius on Concept Formation

This paper reconstructs the account of concept formation developed in the 4th Century A.D. by Themistius in the most ancient extant commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Themistius’ account can be contrasted with two widespread modern interpretations of Aristotle. Unlike psychological empiricists, Themistius ascribes an active role in concept formation to our innate capacity of understanding (νοῦς). Unlike intuitionists, he would not be satisfied by saying that νοῦς “intuits” or “spots” concepts. Rather, the question is what makes our νοῦς capable of “finding” and “recognizing” concepts in experience, and this can only be an understanding prior to all experience. Themistius seems to be responding here to Platonist arguments against Aristotle’s epistemology: postulating a “potential νοῦς” is not enough, for one can apply Meno’s dilemma to it and ask how it can recognize that it has found what it was looking for. But, contrary to the judgment of some modern scholars, Themistius never embraced the theory of recollection either (he rejects it decisively). He argued that both empiricism and Platonist innatism are wrong and developed a middle path marked by a strong interdependence between the perceptive and the rational capacity. This holds for all rational learning, and concept formation is its first stage: to form a concept means to learn something genuinely new, but also to recognize it as falling, e. g., under one of the ten categories. While being presented as a mere “paraphrasis” of Aristotle’s words, Themistius’ account is a well-advised and original response to the epistemological debates of his time.

A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks

We analyze boundedly rational learning in social networks within binary action environments. We establish how learning outcomes depend on the environment (i.e., informational structure, utility function), the axioms imposed on the updating behavior, and the network structure. In particular, we provide a normative foundation for quasi‐Bayesian updating, where a quasi‐Bayesian agent treats others' actions as if they were based only on their private signal. Quasi‐Bayesian updating induces learning (i.e., convergence to the optimal action for every agent in every connected network) only in highly asymmetric environments. In all other environments, learning fails in networks with a diameter larger than 4. Finally, we consider a richer class of updating behavior that allows for nonstationarity and differential treatment of neighbors' actions depending on their position in the network. We show that within this class there exist updating systems that induce learning for most networks.

Learning, Fast or Slow

Rational models claim “trading to learn” explains widespread excessive speculative trading and challenge behavioral explanations of excessive trading. We argue rational learning models do not explain speculative trading by studying day traders in Taiwan. Consistent with previous studies of learning, unprofitable day traders are more likely than profitable traders to quit. Consistent with models of overconfidence and biased learning (but not with rational learning), the aggregate performance of day traders is negative; 74% of day trading volume is generated by traders with a history of losses; and 97% of day traders are likely to lose money in future day trading. Received: March 4, 2019; Editorial decision: May 16, 2019 by Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Use of Analogy in the Development of Intercultural Competence

Analogy is defined in many different ways. In this paper it is understood as a process in which the familiar structure of a direct experience in one situation is used to make conclusions regarding an expected experience within another structure. This process is based on the perceived similarity of the structures, not on rational, theoretical analysis of the relations between their components and the mechanisms of their interactions. The use of analogy relies on the engagement of intuitive recognition of the structural similarity between different instances of experience. The engagement of intuition does not preclude rational study and the development of strategies for using analogy, as part of this work focuses on rational learning about our own experience. Analogy plays two very different roles in this paper; as the main subject of this study, which focuses on the development of intercultural competence, and as a methodological instrument for carrying out and sharing the results of this study.

Horizontal and vertical spillovers in wage bargaining: A theoretical framework and experimental evidence

Conflict in wage bargaining is affected by information about other bargaining units and information about the past of the bargaining unit. We develop a theoretical framework for such spillovers and detail four distinct mechanisms. Rational learning and social comparisons are reviewed as mechanisms for the influence of information about other bargaining units, and reputation and expectation effects are reviewed as mechanisms for the influence of information about the past of the bargaining unit. Building upon a previous experimental study, we implement an unstructured, time-limited, two-person bargaining game with asymmetric information and investigate the impact of reputation and expectation effects. The experimental treatments vary with respect to spillover-inducing information available to the participants. The results suggest that reputation effects decrease conflict, whereas expectation effects tend to increase conflict. Moreover, reputation effects diminish the influence of social comparisons but can augment the effects of rational learning.

Communicative Approach in Teaching Students of Mining Specialties to Foreign Language Reading

This article is devoted to teaching foreign-language reading intended for students studying at the mining specialties of the higher mining school. The authors share with their practical and theoretical experience as well as innovative ideas for the development and construction of a level classification of testing task forms, in order to use them effectively in mining. It is well known that the achievement of the goals and objectives of the curriculum as well as rational learning by mining students and their interest in acquiring and using mining knowledge depend on properly selected test tasks. The main component of communicative competence is considered to be a textual competence, under which is understood as a set of mining knowledge and skills. The selection of testing tasks is based on the methodological principle from simple to complex. Testing tasks at different text levels help to overcome the difficulties taking place in the course of decoding mining information.