Casting Conference Calls

We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long–short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month or almost 18% per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Brand Equity, Earnings Management, and Financial Reporting Irregularities

Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals, announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42) Received September 28, 2019; editorial decision May 27, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

Capturing differences in conservatism following earnings restatements: further evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange

PurposeThe present study seeks to shed further light on the effectiveness of Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts' (2009) differential timeliness metrics in detecting predictable differences in conservatism following corrections of restated earnings.Design/methodology/approachUsing cross-sectional and time-series analyses for companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2013, the results indicate lower conservatism for restating firms as compared to their counterparts during prerestatement period.FindingsUsing cross-sectional and time-series analyses for companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2013, the results indicate lower conservatism for restating firms as compared to their counterparts during prerestatement period. In contrast, our findings are indicative of higher conservatism among these restating firms during the years of restatements. Moreover, the time-series approach captures a higher conservatism for the restating firms during restatement years than prerestatement periods. Overall, these results provide insight into the usefulness of the metrics used in the restatement setting.Originality/valueSimilar to recent papers, the present study seeks to shed further light on the ability of Basu-based coupled with Khan–Watts-based measures of conservatism to detect situations in which companies' earnings are known to be significantly restated.

An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Discretionary Accrual Models: Evidence from Earnings Restatements

Using a sample of firms that restated earnings, this study seeks to evaluate the performance of alternative discretionary accrual models along two dimensions: earnings management detection and accuracy (the ability to accurately estimate the magnitude of managed earnings). The findings of this study are important for three reasons. First, discretionary accrual models play a prominent role in several streams of accounting research, especially in earnings management research. Thus, the ability of discretionary accrual models to isolate the discretionary component from the non-discretionary component of total accruals is critical. Second, there is concern about earnings management inferences drawn from discretionary accrual estimates generated by existing discretionary accrual models. One major concern is that extant discretionary accrual models are mis-specified, which results in misleading inferences about earnings management behavior. Finally, there is lack of consensus in the literature on the relative performance of discretionary accrual models. Using earnings restatements data, I investigate the relative performance of four extant discretionary accrual models and a Modified Forward-Looking Model. The findings indicate that the Modified Forward-Looking Model is better specified and outperforms the other models both in terms of detecting earnings management and in estimating the magnitude of managed earnings.

Earnings Comparability, Accounting Similarities, and Stock Returns: Evidence From Peer Firms’ Earnings Restatements

Using a sample of earnings restatements, we provide evidence that an empirical measure of the comparability in two firms’ earnings (“earnings comparability”) captures the extent to which a firm’s accounting choices and estimates are similar to those of its restating peer firm. We then document that investors appear to underreact to the implications of this earnings comparability signal. Additional analyses reveal that large traders and short sellers react in a timely manner, and their trades trigger an immediate negative price reaction to earnings comparability. Small traders appear to behave inattentively, and their herding-driven delayed trades contribute to a negative drift in prices.