Brand Equity, Earnings Management, and Financial Reporting Irregularities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ghada M Ismail ◽  
Fariz Huseynov ◽  
Pankaj K Jain ◽  
Thomas H McInish
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Brand Equity ◽  
Durable Goods ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Earnings Restatements ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

Abstract Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals, announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42) Received September 28, 2019; editorial decision May 27, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

scholarly journals Determination of earnings management: An application in BISTKazanç yönetiminin tespiti: BIST’de bir uygulama

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 6080
Author(s):  
Meral Gündüz
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Accounting System ◽  
Reporting Process ◽  
Management Application ◽  
Jones Model

Companies, by use of the flexibility of alternative applications in accounting system, apply profit management by organizing the financial tables unequal to the real situations. Profit management is to interfere external financial reporting process in order to gain special profits. With profit management, the main aim is to affect decisions and plans of the investors and the other financial information usersEarnings management is a kind of management which uses accounting techniques to meet the executives needs for earnings; it is a widely debated topic, hence it is worth looking at. Experts and professionals in this area found many approaches to detect the earnings management; within these approaches are the accrual-based models which include the modified Jones model, which currently is a favourite model to many researchers. In the study is aim to determine the earnings management application the data of 81 companies which were in business in Istanbul stock market (BIST-100) manufacturing industry between the years 2013-2015 is used. In this study regression analysis was made by using Modified Jones model and investigated whether their earnings management application or not , has also targeted to determine the companies applying for earnings management.The distribution of the average of discretionary accruals calculated for years as each company is analyzed; average of discretionary accruals shows a normal distribution, in this situation, It was concluded that there was no impact on the economic development of total accruals, depending on the establisded regression model. It can be expressed that the companies were in tendency to increase revenues for 2014 year and to decrease in revenue for 2013 and 2015 years.  In addition, companies which tend to manipulation in this study were identified. Özetİşletmeler, muhasebe sistemindeki alternatif uygulamaların sağladığı esneklikten yararlanarak, finansal tabloları gerçekte olduğundan farklı gösterecek şekilde düzenlemek suretiyle kazanç yönetimi uygularlar. Kazanç yönetimi, özel kazançlar elde etmeye yönelik dışsal finansal raporlama sürecine bu amaçlara uygun olarak müdahale etmektir. Kazanç yönetimi ile yatırımcıların ve diğer finansal bilgi kullanıcılarının karar ve düşüncelerini etkilemek amaçlanmaktadır.Kazanç yönetimi, yöneticilerin kazanç ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak amacıyla kullandıkları çok tartışılan bu yüzden araştırılmaya değer bir yöntemdir. Bu alanda uzman ve profesyoneller kazanç yönetimini tespit etmek için birçok yaklaşımı bulmuşlardır ki bu yaklaşımlar arasında birçok araştırmacı tarafından favori model kabul edilen tahakkuk esaslı Düzeltilmiş Jones Modelidir.Kazanç yönetimi uygulamalarının belirlenmesini amaçlayan bu çalışmada, BİST 100 endeksindeki 81 şirketin 2013-2015 yılları arasındaki verilerinden faydalanılmıştır. Araştırmada literatürde yer alan Düzeltilmiş Jones Modeli kullanılarak regresyon analizi yapılmış ve bu yöntemle şirketlerin kazanç yönetimi uygulaması yapıp yapmadığı araştırılmış, ayrıca kazanç yönetimi uygulayan şirketlerin belirlenmesine yönelik çalışma hedeflenmiştir. Yıllar itibariyle her bir şirket için hesaplanan ihtiyari tahakkukların ortalamalarının dağılımı incelendiğinde; ihtiyari tahakkukların ortalamalarının normal dağılım gösterdiği, bu durumunda kurulan regresyon modeline bağlı olarak toplam tahakkuklar üzerinde ekonomik gelişmelerin bir etkisinin olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır.  Analiz sonucuna göre şirketlerin 2013 ve 2015 yıllarında gelir azaltıcı ve 2014 yılında gelir artırıcı bir manipülasyon eğiliminde oldukları ifade edilebilir. Ayrıca bu çalışmada kazanç yönetimi eğiliminde olan şirketler belirlenmiştir.

UKURAN KANTOR AKUNTAN PUBLIK, DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS DAN OPINI AUDIT GOING CONCERN

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Ravaela Amba Masiku ◽  
Christine Novita Dewi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Positive Effect

The purpose of this study is to examine auditor’s concervatism in term of their reaction to client’s earnings management behavior and their limitations to issue the going concern opinions (GCO). The population of this study consists of 672 observations from 69 companies are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during 2012-2017. The author used the modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management. The results of this study indicate that size of audit firm has a positive effect to discretionary accrual. Companies that have been audited by the Big4 tend to apply discretionary accrual in their financial reporting than companies audited by Non-Big4. Further, to strenghten the first hypothesis, we examine the effect of discretionary accruals and going concern opinion on companies that audited by audit firms Big4 lower than companies that audited by audit firms Non-Big4. We found that the result is consistent with the first hypothesis. Keywords : auditor reputation, discretionary accruals, going concern opinion, audit firm  ABSTRAK Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji konservatisme auditor dalam hal reaksi auditor terhadap akrual diskresioner yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan dan keterbatasan auditor untuk menerbitkan opini Going Concern (GC). Populasi penelitian terdiri dari 672 pengamatan dari 69 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama tahun 2012-2017. Penulis menggunakan model modifikasi Jones untuk mengukur akrual diskresioner sebagai proksi manajemen laba. Hasil dari penelitian ini menjelaskan bahwa ukuran kantor akuntan publik berpengaruh positif terhadap akrual diskresioner, hal tersebut diperkuat dengan pengaruh akrual diskresioner dan opini audit going concern yang diaudit oleh kantor akuntan publik Big4 lebih rendah dari perusahaan yang tidak diaudit oleh kantor akuntan publik Non-Big4. Kata kunci : reputasi auditor, akrual diskresioner, opini audit going concern, kantor akuntan publik

scholarly journals CEO Characteristics and Real Earnings Management in Jordan

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abedalrahman Alhmood ◽  
Hasnah Shaari ◽  
Redhwan Al-dhamari
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

The Chief Executive Officer (CEOs) tends to be the most influential member of a corporation as they exert control over corporate decisions such as financial disclosure, board structure, and company performance in ensuring enhanced corporate performance and earnings. The issue of earnings management (EM) that has captured the attention of researchers may be among the most critical factors that are linked to financial statement manipulation. Therefore, the current study explored the effects of the personal characteristics of CEOs on real earnings management (REM) practices in Jordan. Data of 58 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for six years from 2013 to 2018 were utilised to achieve this study’s objectives. The results of this study revealed that CEOs’ experience had a significantly positive association with REM. Meanwhile, CEOs’ tenure had no impact on REM among Jordanian firms. Also, the results exposed the presence of a significantly negative association between CEO duality and REM. Finally, CEOs’ political connection was found to have a significantly positive association with REM. This study offers empirical evidence on the effect of CEO characteristics on REM and how such characteristics can lead to exploitation, which brings an impact on the financial reporting quality.

scholarly journals Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Korean Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoon ◽  
Kim ◽  
Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Large Family ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Sample Analysis ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Weak Support ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive ◽  
Korean Market

Socially responsible firms are believed to behave in a responsible manner to restrict earnings management and thus deliver more reliable and transparent financial information to investors. We test this hypothesis by predicting a higher quality of financial reporting for socially responsible firms in the Korean market. The entire sample analysis provides evidence for the hypothesis in the use of discretionary accruals as proxy variables for the quality of financial reporting. However, our sub-sample analysis indicates that such weak support is driven by a group of environmentally sensitive firms and the affiliates of large family-owned conglomerates, or chaebol. Socially responsible firms are less likely to be involved with earnings management in the group of non-environmentally sensitive industries and non-chaebol affiliates. These firms provide a better quality of financial reporting in terms of both the use of discretionary accruals and real activity manipulations. In line with recent studies, our findings suggest that ethical concerns in producing high-quality financial reports rely significantly on firm characteristics.

scholarly journals The impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on earnings management and conservatism

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-24
Author(s):  
Nan Hu ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Xu Li ◽  
Ling Liu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Good News ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Research ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Existing literature in experimental accounting research suggests that accounting professionals and people with accounting backgrounds tend to have a lower level of moral reasoning and ethical development. Motivated by these findings, this paper aims to examine whether chief executive officers (CEOs) with accounting backgrounds have an impact on firms’ earnings management behavior and the level of accounting conservatism. Design/methodology/approach The authors classify CEOs into those with and without accounting backgrounds using BoardEx data. Using discretionary accruals from several different models, they do not find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals. However, the authors find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of conservatism, proxied by C-scores and T-scores (Basu, 1997). This finding suggests that CEOs with accounting backgrounds recognize bad news more quickly than good news, consistent with the accounting principle of “anticipating all losses but anticipating no gains”. Findings The authors show that firms whose CEOs have accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of accounting conservatism. However, these firms do not exhibit higher levels of income-increasing discretionary accruals. This study documents the impact of CEOs’ educational backgrounds on firms’ accounting choices and confirms prior findings in experimental accounting research using large sample archival data. Originality/value This paper is the first study that investigates the impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on firms’ financial reporting policy. The findings may have some policy implications. If accounting backgrounds of CEOs can make a significant difference on firms’ behavior, it is reasonable to make CEOs accountable for the quality of financial reporting. This paper is one of the first to empirically test inferences drawn by experimental accounting research. There has been a gap between archival and experimental accounting studies. The authors propose that interesting research questions can be addressed by filling in such a gap.

scholarly journals Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murya Habbash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

scholarly journals Comprehensive Income Reporting and Earnings Management

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Runita Arum Kanti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Reporting Standards ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Financial Reporting Standards ◽  
Comprehensive Income ◽  
Income Reporting

<p>Purpose. This paper aims to identify the association between comprehensive income reporting and earnings management. More specifically, this study examines whether the implementation of comprehensive income reporting regulations, namely SFAS 130 and ASU 2011-05 is associated with a decrease in earnings management.<br />Design/ methodology. Data for all variables is retrieved from Compustat Global for a nine-year sample of 7962 US firms reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that provide all the necessary data to conduct the study. The Modified Jones Model is used as a proxy to measure earnings management. Comprehensive income figures are retrieved from Compustat. Recalculated (as-if) numbers are used for firm years prior to the implementation of SFAS 130. While as-reported amounts are used for the years where SFAS 130 has been implemented and also the years during the implementation of ASU 2011-05.<br />Findings. Comprehensive income is found to be significantly negatively associated with earnings management through discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the interaction effects indicate that, after the implementation of SFAS 130 and ASU 2011-05, comprehensive income becomesmore negatively associated with discretionary accruals.<br />Relevance. Other than contributing to the growing literature regarding the usefulness of comprehensive income reporting, this research has implications for the FASB in assessing whether they achieved the target of better comprehensive income reporting.</p><p><br />Key words: Comprehensive Income, Earnings management, Interaction effect, Reporting Regulations, SFAS 130, ASU 2011-05.</p>

scholarly journals Asset revaluations and earnings management: Evidence from Australian companies

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1287-1296
Author(s):  
Fang Hu ◽  
Majella Percy ◽  
Daifei Yao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Accounting Choice ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour

This paper examines the association between asset revaluations and discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) using a sample of the largest 300 Australian companies. The results from this study indicate that the revaluation of non-current assets is positively associated with discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with the argument that revaluation of assets reflects higher agency problems in the form of increased earnings management. Additional findings are that discretionary accruals are higher for firms reporting their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors, than those of firms that use external appraisers. As well, the choice of auditors and the strength of corporate governance can constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers in the accounting choice to revalue non-current assets.

(Un)intended Consequences of a Mandatory Dividend Payout Regulation for Earnings Management: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Welker ◽  
Kangtao Ye ◽  
Ning Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Sales Growth ◽  
Policy Feedback ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
The Past

We examine the (un)intended consequences of a mandatory dividend payout regulation for firms’ financial reporting choices using a natural experiment in China. Beginning in October 2008, China required firms desiring to raise new equity capital to maintain a cumulative dividend payout ratio of at least 30% over the past 3 years. We find that firms with a cumulative payout ratio from the prior year very close to but slightly lower than the mandated dividend threshold report lower discretionary accruals but do not increase dividends. In addition, this pattern is more pronounced in firms with greater cash flow deficits, firms with faster sales growth, and firms located in regions with lower bank development. We also find that the negative discretionary accruals are concentrated in firms with return on equity well in excess of another regulatory benchmark. In contrast, the only firms that increase dividends in response to the regulation are firms with a positive cumulative payout ratio far below the mandated threshold. Because dividend payout regulations have been suggested as a possible solution to agency problems, our results provide important policy feedback about the effectiveness of such regulations.

scholarly journals The Impact of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 on Earnings Management around Mergers and Acquisitions

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Michael Yipake Banseh ◽  
Ehsan Khansalar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Pearson Correlation ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

<p>Several studies revealed earnings management (EM) around mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;As) by both acquirers and target firms. Rosa et al. (2003) suggest that a systematic EM is associated with the use of stock as payment in takeovers. This and other corporate malpractices have prompted authorities to tighten regulations by passing the United Kingdom (UK) Corporate Governance (CG) Code to guide companies in the UK in their corporate management and financial reporting.</p><p>This study is to investigate the impact of the UK CG Code on accruals EM around M&amp;As in the UK. The study applied the Modified Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and the Pearson Product Moment Correlation in analysing a sample data from 66 companies listed on the LSE that have undertaken M&amp;As within the period of January 2007 to December 2014. The results produced by the modified Jones model indicate some level of income increasing discretionary accruals in the pre-CG period but showed an opposite situation in the post-CG period. A test for significance indicates the means of pre-CG discretionary accruals and post-CG discretionary accruals were different and significant. The hypothesis that “the level of earnings management around mergers and acquisitions in the UK has significantly reduced after the enactment of the UK Corporate Governance code 2010” was therefore accepted.</p>Results from the Pearson Correlation Coefficient were inconclusive on EM but indicate some changes in the level of activities in the earnings between the two periods. This may also points to some effect of CG Code on the reported earnings of these companies. The results from this study is consistent with existing studies that evince the effectiveness of CG in controlling EM as Hsu and Koh (2005); Osma (2008) suggest that best corporate governance practices minimise EM and reduce fraud drastically.

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