The Trolley Problem Revisited. An Exploratory Study

Recent studies by cognitive scientists demonstrate that people’s choices are more complex than the image provided by rational choice theory, and consistency of choice is not a characteristic to be expected in real-life situations. This exploratory paper attempts to isolate three variables in relation to decision making. Working with a sample (N=70) of university students in the U.S, and using the three variants of the Trolley Problem, the subjects’ responses are used to identify the similarities and differences based on the three dimensions. The participants were asked to respond to three hypothetical situations regarding a runaway trolley. Their decision in the first scenario could save a person’s life or let him be run over by the trolley. In the second scenario, their decision could either let one person die and save five lives or save one life and let five people be killed. These two scenarios require pulling a lever to switch the trolley from one track to another. The third scenario requires pushing an obese person in front of the runaway trolley to stop it from killing five persons. The paper presents the findings on the three variables: gender, age, and relational status.

The Impact of Financial Education on Adolescents’ Intertemporal Choices

We study the impact of financial education on intertemporal choice in adolescence. The educational program was randomly assigned among high school students, and choices were measured using an incentivized experiment. Students who participated in the program make more time-consistent choices; are more likely to allocate payments to a single payment date, as opposed to spreading payment across two dates; and display increased consistency of choice with the law of demand. These findings suggest that financial education increases the quality of intertemporal decision-making and decreases narrow bracketing. (JEL C93, D14, D15, I21, J13)

The Evolution–Rationality Connection

There are two related dimensions to the evolution–rationality connection. The first is the evolution of rationality itself, thought of as an actual phenotypic attribute of some organisms; the second is the use of rationality-inspired concepts to describe evolved organisms, as in agential thinking. Rationality may be understood either as consistency of choice or as having good reasons for beliefs/actions; these notions have distinct domains of application. The adaptive significance of rationality over arationality is clear; what is less clear is whether evolution would always favour rationality over irrationality. In a simple model, an evolutionary basis for the norms of Bayesian rationality emerges; however, the model relies on restrictive assumptions. The possibility of an evolutionary naturalization of traditional rationality norms, though philosophically coherent, appears empirically unlikely.

Le comportement et le concept de choix

Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons à une analyse détaillée des choix énigmatiques dont Sen prend argument et affirmons que cet examen mène à remettre en cause la thèse négative, mais d’une manière subtile qui confirme — même renforce — la thèse positive.