scholarly journals Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-32
Author(s):  
Daniel Herbert
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy

La intención de esta presentación es ofrecer una descripción del sistema filosófico de Hegel como condicionado a una síntesis del naturalismo y la filosofía trascendental, cuyas características generales serán elaboradas. A pesar de su reputación de larga data como sucesor crítico del proyecto idealista de Kant, la comprensión de Hegel de la relación dinámica entre filosofía y ciencia empírica no puede acomodarse fácilmente dentro de los horizontes formalistas del trascendentalismo kantiano. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, Hegel atribuye a la razón filosófica una función sintética que pocos naturalistas contemporáneos reconocerían. Como tal, la metodología de Hegel combina características de las persuasiones filosóficas a menudo consideradas fundamentalmente irreconciliables. Tal síntesis de naturalismo y filosofía trascendental es posible gracias al rechazo de Hegel de cualquier dicotomía kantiana entre una naturaleza animal heterónoma y una libertad racional autónoma, y su propuesta de que la mente o el espíritu se entiendan como la ‘verdad’ o la autorrealización de la naturaleza. en lugar de su antítesis. Para Hegel, entonces, la conformidad de la naturaleza con los principios racionales de unidad sintética no necesita explicarse como necesariamente condicionada a criterios a priori de inteligibilidad que se originan en un sujeto no natural. Más bien, sostiene Hegel, la naturaleza fundamenta la posibilidad ontológica de un Espíritu que fundamenta la posibilidad de la naturaleza, de modo que la naturaleza y el Espíritu se fundamentan mutuamente.

scholarly journals The Tantalus’ Torments of Transcendentalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Sergey Chernov
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Complete System ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Edition ◽  
Opus Postumum ◽  
Corporeal Nature

Kant’s manuscripts of 1796–1803, which the Academic German edition of his works combined in 21–22 volumes of under the invented by H. Vaihinger name ‘Opus postumum’, still attract the attention of researchers. Was there really a significant theoretical “gap” in the system of Kant's “critical”, transcendental philosophy, which built by 1790, needed to be filled, namely, to undertake a conceptual "transition" from the already constructed a priori metaphysics of corporeal nature (metaphysical principles of natural science) to experimental mathematical physics, to the entire scientific empirical investigation of nature? In the last years of his life Kant tried to solve a problem that was really decisive for the fate of transcendentalism, which he had already realized in ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ and concretized in ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’, however he found himself in a hopeless situation, which doomed him to the “Tantalus’ torments”. The problem that he was constantly thinking about necessarily arises in the system of transcendental philosophy, but has no solution in it. ‘Opus postumum’ is an important piece of evidence on the insurmountable difficulties faced by the attempt to “save” philosophy as a perfect and complete system of absolutely reliable, "apodictic" science, based on the idea of universal and necessary conditions for the experience possibility.

scholarly journals Kritische Metaphysik oder Analytische Hermeneutik?

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-131
Author(s):  
Anton Friedrich Koch
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Time And Being ◽  
Hermeneutic Science ◽  
Invasive Intervention

Abstract Kant in his critical metaphysics, as one might call his transcendental philosophy, proceeds from the syncategorematic, subject-sided forms of thinking, which are revealed by general logic qua doctrine of the inferences of reason (i. e. syllogistics), and assigns to them one-to-one categorematic, object-sided forms of thinking: the categories qua pure, non-empirical predicates of things. Kant then shows in his transcendental deduction that the categories are objectively, – i. e. without our invasive intervention – valid of all things in space-time. In the present essay, philosophy is understood not so much as critical metaphysics in a narrow sense of “metaphysics”, but rather as the a priori hermeneutic science; and the transcendental deduction of the categories is replaced by arguments for (1) a readability thesis and (2) a theory of the a priori presuppositions of referencing things in space and time. The readability thesis states that things can be read (1) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of proper names of themselves and also (2) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of elementary propositions about them. The theory of the a priori presuppositions clarifies the conditions of the possibility of subjects orienting themselves in space and time and being able to refer, first, to themselves qua embodied thinkers and then as well to arbitrary individual items.

Kant's Psychologism, Part I

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 41-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Waxman
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Genetic Approach ◽  
Interpretive Approach ◽  
The Face

In this paper, I shall argue that the most moderate and balanced way to view Kant's transcendental philosophy is as a species of psychological investigation analogous to Hume's, but refounded on a doctrine of pure (a priori) sensibility, such as Hume never allowed himself (and may never even have thought of). This might seem to fly in the face of what many interpreters of Kant deem conventional wisdom: that the burden of proof is on one who claims that psychology is essential to transcendental philosophy. On this view, there is to be found in Kant ‘a more austere strictly transcendental philosophy’, which needs to be carefully distinguished from the psychological doctrines in which it is enmeshed; and they would insist on being convinced of the contrary before abandoning a position that, in their eyes, is the most moderate and balanced an interpreter of Kant can adopt. My purpose in this two-part essay is to urge them to think again. For while there can be no question of Kant's opposition to empiricism, it is equally certain that his praise for Hume was never freer or more unreserved than in respect of the latter's psycho-genetic approach to cognition. So, rather than supposing that Kant ipso facto rejected solutions to philosophical problems grounded on psychology when he rejected Hume's empiricism, it seems to me that the more moderate and balanced interpretive approach is to begin by supposing that Kant's transcendental philosophy is a species of philosophical psychology in the same mould as Hume's, differing from it only by virtue of involving a priori syntheses of a manifold of a priori intuition.

Pleasure and Purpose in Kant’s Theory of Taste

Kant-Studien ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Rueger
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Judgment ◽  
New Faculty ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind

Abstract: In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors of these principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty.

Kant and Kitcher on Apriority

Conceptus ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (94) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Ritter
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
General Answer ◽  
Priori Knowledge

SummaryIn this paper, two questions are pursued. First, is Kitcher’s account of a priori knowledge a sensible reconstruction of the Kantian notion? My general answer is: to a large extent, yes. A central problem of justification in transcendental philosophy actually demands a conception of apriority along Kitcher’s lines. Secondly, can a priori knowledge be embedded within a naturalistic framework? To this, there is no answering “yes” or “no”. However, an examination of particular limitations supports the contention that talk of justificatory procedures and beliefs should not be modelled on talk about causes and effects. The “actualistic” grammar of causality should not be allowed to dictate the shape of an epistemological theory.

scholarly journals The Concepts of “Appearance” and “Phenomenon” in Transcendental Philosophy (Kant, Husserl, Fink)

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-61
Author(s):  
A. N. Krioukov
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Open World ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Insight Into

This study aims, first, to delimit the seemingly synonymous concepts of “phenomenon” and “appearance” and second, to trace the functions of each in Kant’s philosophy and the phenomenological tradition. The analy­sis is based on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the central works of Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Kant does not explicitly distinguish the two terms and only speaks about phenomena when he deals with the categorial application of reason. With Husserl, appearance is linked with the area of the natural attitude while the phenomenon is absolute. Fink’s position is interesting in that it differs from the views of the main representatives of transcendental philosophy, Kant and Husserl. According to Fink, appearing is the foundation of the fact that what exists is and that appearing is being. Fink takes a different approach to the meanings of appearance as opposing the thing in itself which possesses true but unknowable being (Kant) and appearance as taking place in the “relative” sphere of the natural attitude (Husserl): with Fink, appearance (or, as Fink constantly writes, “appearing”) turns out to be the condition of the existence of objects. Appearance, understood through the prism of the human being which perceives something as Vorschein, implies an inherently open world. Following Fink, I analyse these provisions and examine, first, light as the metaphysical source of cognition, second, the human being as a special kind of being, third, the pre-Socratic treatment of being and, fourth, the formation of a distinct phenomenological idiom. I come to the conclusion that the metaphysical-ontological method of phenomenological analysis of appearance proposed by Fink affords a new insight into the a priori principle and the nature of Kant’s “thing in itself” and proposes a new grounding of Husserl’s thesis which questions Kant’s agnosticism.

La morale kantienne et la philosophie transcendantale

Dialogue ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marceline Morais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
The Right

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to discuss the transcendental status of Kant's moral philosophy. Despite what is usually thought among scholars, we intend to demonstrate that morality for Kant is not part of transcendental philosophy. We shall at first recall the reasons that have driven Kant to separate morality from the transcendental philosophy. Kant's position seems both firm and clear: morality, although involving a priori concepts such as the moral law, is not a transcendantal knowledge because its major concept, the will, is not pure enough; it refers somehow to experience. On the other hand, after considering the positions of renowned scholars such as Gueroult, Delbos, and Höffe, who claim that Kant's morality became partially or totally transcendantal since the writing of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, we suggest that Kant had then found the right way to establish on a critical basis a future metaphysics of morals.

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