Tower of Babel: transcendental linguistics in Friedrich von Hardenberg’s (Novalis) Fichte Studies

Pure Reason ◽

Objective Knowledge ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Unsuccessful Attempt ◽

Tower Of Babel ◽

New Interpretation ◽

Original Insight ◽

This article provides a new interpretation of the linguistic aspects of Friedrich von Hardenberg’s Fichte Studies. It argues that Hardenberg was searching, among other things, for a transcendental language for philosophy. The possibility of such a language was discussed intensely among his contemporaries, such as Maimon, Niethammer, Reinhold, Weißhuhn, and Fichte. Its necessity, however, had become apparent with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Readers had noticed a disturbing discrepancy between the objective knowledge of transcendental philosophy—which, according to Kant, was supposed to be generally communicable—and Kant’s actual failure to communicate it. Hardenberg’s original insight into the inseparable unity of sign and signified, anticipating modern linguistic theories, led him to the assumption of a lawful relationship between both. From his unsuccessful attempt to disclose these laws, he went on to discover language as an independent realm fundamentally opposed to nature. Precisely because language is a necessary illusion, only the ‘presenting I’ (das darstellende Ich) achieves its end, namely absolute freedom. Philosophy, therefore, is pure as long as it remains within the boundaries of language alone, that is a language which does not refer to anything outside itself.

Transcendental Philosophy as a Research Programme

Kantian journal ◽

10.5922/0207-6918-2021-3-4 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 40 (3) ◽

pp. 93-126

Author(s):

Michael Lewin

Keyword(s):

Research Programme ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

The Third ◽

Definite Form ◽

Historical Investigation ◽

Clear Idea ◽

Different Levels ◽

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has undergone a series of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects.

Transzendentalphilosophie als kritische Bestimmung des Standpunkts. Eine wissenschaftstheoretische Annäherung

Kantian journal ◽

10.5922/0207-6918-2021-1-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 40 (1) ◽

pp. 7-50

Author(s):

Rudolf Meer

Keyword(s):

Case Studies ◽

Natural Science ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Transcendental Logic ◽

Philosophical System ◽

Celestial Bodies ◽

Expanded Concept ◽

Constitutive Principles

Both the categories and principles of understanding as well as the ideas and principles of reason build transcendental elements to conceive transcendental philosophy as a philosophical system. Accordingly, in addition to the “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant develops in the “Transcendental Dialectic” an expanded concept of the transcendental. The transcendental ideas do not denote object-constitutive principles but, in a weaker sense, conditions of the possibility of experience. The relation between Division One and Division Two of the “Doctrine of Elements” can be demonstrated exemplarily with regard to Kant’s references to astronomy. Based on the constitutive principles of understanding, which are directed towards the field of possible experience and provide a connection of cognition through reasons and consequences, as well as the regulative principles of reason, which form maxims of research, astronomy is a proper and rational natural science. The analysis of the case studies of astronomy shows that Kant uses the term transcendental within the framework of the “Transcendental Logic” of the Critique of Pure Reason to denote conditions that are constitutive for the possibility of an object in general and for describing necessary regulative conditions of experience. With these reflections, Kant places his transcendental philosophy in a long tradition of philosophical thought in which the celestial bodies are the preferred subject.

Immanuel Kants transzendentaler Kritizismus und die Frage nach Gott

10.5771/9783828878006 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Roland Mugerauer

Keyword(s):

German Idealism ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Rational Theology ◽

The Subject ◽

Modern Thinking

For those who are interested, the study of Kant's relevant writings is facilitated here, especially that of the ´Critique of Pure Reason´. Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy and criticism of reason has left a lasting mark on modern thinking. The author gives an overview of Kant´s criticism. The focus is on Kant's philosophical treatment of the subject of God and his criticism of affirmative rational theology. If one wants to understand Kant, the God theme is of outstanding importance. Moreover, it is gaining increased philosophical interest nowadays. The author concludes with an outlook on the philosophical theologies in German idealism.

Kant and the Art of Schematism

Kantian Review ◽

10.1017/s1369415414000016 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 181-205 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Samantha Matherne

Keyword(s):

Valuable Insight ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Human Soul ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Judgment ◽

The Third ◽

AbstractIn theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally asKunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the termKunstin theCritique of Judgmentwe gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the thirdCritique.

Gottlob Ernst Schulzes skeptizistische Kant-Kritik in ihrer Relevanz für Arthur Schopenhauers Systemkonstitution

Kant-Studien ◽

10.1515/kant-2018-0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 109 (1) ◽

pp. 124-146

Author(s):

Daniel Elon

Keyword(s):

Positive Answer ◽

Critical Reception ◽

Arthur Schopenhauer ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

The World

Abstract: In 1792, Gottlob E. Schulze published one of the most important treatises in the era of the early critical reception of Kant’s transcendental philosophy: the skeptical treatise Aenesidemus. One of Schulze’s later students was the young Arthur Schopenhauer, whose examination of Kant’s philosophy was significantly influenced by Schulze. In this paper, it shall be established that this influence isn’t limited solely to the details of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian thinking, but rather extends to the systematic unfolding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a whole. In this respect, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation can be understood as a direct, positive answer to the questions left open by Schulze’s debate on the internal problems of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Does Kant Fall into the Myth of the Given?

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis ◽

10.30965/26664275-02400003 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-33

Author(s):

Sophia Maddalena Fazio

Keyword(s):

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Transcendental Deduction ◽

Myth Of The Given ◽

The Given

Abstract According to McDowell, conceptualism necessarily follows from the thesis that Kant falls into Sellars’ myth of the given. However, by comparing Sellars’ and McDowell’s versions of the myth of the given, it emerges that while Sellars introduces the myth of the given as a critique of empirical fundamentalism, McDowell’s critique is directed at minimal empiricism. The aim of this paper is to show that Kant’s theory of cognition does not fall into either of the two variants of the aforementioned myth. It thus argues against a conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It shows this by examining the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Baumgarten, Kant, and the Refutation of Idealism

10.1093/oso/9780198783886.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Paul Guyer

Keyword(s):

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Refutation Of Idealism ◽

Definition Of

This chapter points to the influence of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics on Kant’s transcendental philosophy. By comparing Kant’s refutation of idealism, including modifications to it suggested by notes written after the Critique of Pure Reason, with passages in the Metaphysics, Guyer shows that Kant clearly adopts Baumgarten’s own peculiar definition of idealism and develops the thesis that Baumgarten’s discussion of real interaction suggested to Kant the underlying strategy of his own refutation.

Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique

Kant Yearbook ◽

10.1515/kantyb-2010-020103 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

pp. 53-74 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Karin de Boer

Keyword(s):

A Priori ◽

A Priori Knowledge ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Critical Mode ◽

The Difference ◽

Insight Into ◽

Priori Knowledge

Abstract In this article I aim to clarify the nature of Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science by focusing on his conception of transcendental reflection. The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued, consists primarily in liberating the productive strand of former general metaphysics - its reflection on the a priori elements of all knowledge - from the uncritical application of these elements to all things (within general metaphysics itself) and to things that can only be thought (in special metaphysics). After considering Kant’s conception of metaphysics and his various uses of the term ‘transcendental’ I closely examine his account of logical and transcendental reflection in the section entitled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. Whereas commentators generally attribute the activity called transcendental reflection to Kant alone, I contend, first, that Kant regarded philosophy as such to rely on a mode of transcendental reflection and, second, that the critical mode of transcendental reflection enacted in the Critique itself yields insight into the reason why our a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of possible objects. This is illustrated by outlining the difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’ employment of the concepts of reflection.

The Concepts of “Appearance” and “Phenomenon” in Transcendental Philosophy (Kant, Husserl, Fink)

Kantian journal ◽

10.5922/0207-6918-2020-4-2 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 39 (4) ◽

pp. 29-61

Author(s):

A. N. Krioukov

Keyword(s):

Edmund Husserl ◽

A Priori ◽

Special Kind ◽

Human Being ◽

Natural Attitude ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Open World ◽

Thing In Itself ◽

This study aims, first, to delimit the seemingly synonymous concepts of “phenomenon” and “appearance” and second, to trace the functions of each in Kant’s philosophy and the phenomenological tradition. The analysis is based on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the central works of Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Kant does not explicitly distinguish the two terms and only speaks about phenomena when he deals with the categorial application of reason. With Husserl, appearance is linked with the area of the natural attitude while the phenomenon is absolute. Fink’s position is interesting in that it differs from the views of the main representatives of transcendental philosophy, Kant and Husserl. According to Fink, appearing is the foundation of the fact that what exists is and that appearing is being. Fink takes a different approach to the meanings of appearance as opposing the thing in itself which possesses true but unknowable being (Kant) and appearance as taking place in the “relative” sphere of the natural attitude (Husserl): with Fink, appearance (or, as Fink constantly writes, “appearing”) turns out to be the condition of the existence of objects. Appearance, understood through the prism of the human being which perceives something as Vorschein, implies an inherently open world. Following Fink, I analyse these provisions and examine, first, light as the metaphysical source of cognition, second, the human being as a special kind of being, third, the pre-Socratic treatment of being and, fourth, the formation of a distinct phenomenological idiom. I come to the conclusion that the metaphysical-ontological method of phenomenological analysis of appearance proposed by Fink affords a new insight into the a priori principle and the nature of Kant’s “thing in itself” and proposes a new grounding of Husserl’s thesis which questions Kant’s agnosticism.

Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel

Hegel Bulletin ◽

10.1017/s0263523200000161 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 32 (1-2) ◽

pp. 50-79 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Karin de Boer

Keyword(s):

A Priori ◽

A Priori Knowledge ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Empirical Knowledge ◽

Critique Of Pure Reason ◽

Common View ◽

Synthetic A Priori ◽

The One ◽

Priori Knowledge

Kant's philosophy is generally known as transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism, terms often thought to describe the inquiry into the subjective conditions of empirical knowledge carried out in theCritique of Pure Reason. On this conception of transcendental philosophy Kant is seen to pursue a project very different from both Wolffian metaphysics and Hegelian speculative science. This view is confirmed by scholars who compare Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy to the Scholastics' conception of ‘transcendentals’ such as unity, truth, and perfection. On their account, there remains a puzzling gap between, on the one hand, the scholastic conception of the most general determinations of all beings and, on the other hand, Kant's investigation into the conditions of possibility of experience.In this article I want to challenge this common view of Kant's transcendental philosophy for two reasons. The first reason concerns the question of how theCritique of Pure Reasonitself should be read. I take the view that in the firstCritiqueKant's primary aim is to determine the conditions of synthetic a priori knowledge rather than to identify the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge. Since metaphysics was traditionally considered to be the discipline that possessed a priori knowledge of things, this view makes good sense of Kant's presentation of theCritique of Pure Reasonas a work intended to transform metaphysics into a science. In this article I hope to clarify the nature of this transformation by determining the elements which Kant's transcendental philosophy has in common with Wolff's ontology, as well as the respects in which Kant turns against Wolff. I thus hope to solve some of the riddles posed by Kant's use of the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ in theCritique of Pure Reason.