Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

Love as Origin of Science

Summary The approaches to the possibility of theology as science are divided roughly into three types: first, the internalist approach which rejects any attempt to verify the objective validity of revelation under the general concept of science. Second, the externalist approach which demands the verification of objective validity of revelatory truth. Third, the inclusivist approach which seeks the scientificity of theology from a hermeneutic perspective. Outlining the crucial points and limits of these approaches and replacing the question about theology as science with a theological reexamination of the possibility of science in general, this paper tries to suggest an alternative approach by establishing the possibility of scientific knowledge in general from the trinitarian perspective. Under this reformulation of the question, the philosophy of science set forth by Fichte as the most rigorous model of theory of science is critically explored. In conclusion, it is argued that the ultimate ground of all human knowledge and science consists in the eternal divine love and trust in it.

Between two extremes

Chapter 21 confronts two opposite perspectives on language and the language / dialect pair with roots in the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, it treats generative approaches to linguistic diversity. In general, generative linguists have assumed that dialect-level variation is produced by minor differences in rules, parameters, or constraints and their ordering or ranking, depending on the generative framework which they follow, whereas distinct languages are characterized by major divergences in the same. On the other hand, sociolinguists have focused on linguistic variables rather than systems. As they correlate linguistic phenomena to language-external attributes, their conceptions of the language / dialect distinction tend to be rather hybrid, being shaped by linguistic as well as sociopolitical parameters. This externalist approach has been fiercely criticized by Noam Chomsky. Other linguists have adopted more constructive attitudes, either by supplementing the language / dialect distinction or by supplanting it with an entirely new conception of language.

The Materialist Dialectic in Boris Hessen’s Newton Papers (1927 and 1931)

Boris Hessen’s ‘The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia’ (see https://doi.org./10.1163/1569206X-00002041) is considered a pioneering work in the historiography of the natural sciences. For some, it marks the founding moment of the ‘externalist’ approach to this field of study. Previously, Hessen published another paper on Newton entitled ‘Preface to Articles by A. Einstein and J.J. Thomson’, which, some maintain, bears a stronger resemblance to works in the ‘internalist’ camp of the historiography of the natural sciences. For decades, scholars have puzzled over why Hessen chose to argue for, seemingly, diametrically opposed positions. In this paper, however, I argue that Hessen does not advance two different historiographical methods, but a single, dialectical-materialist approach that accounts for the ‘unity in opposition’ of the external and internal dimensions of natural-scientific theory. I draw from Hessen’s two papers on Newton, his previously untranslated writings, as well as selections from the secondary literature.

El ideal de unificación en biología: el caso de la síntesis evolutiva extendida

In this article I will analyze whether the so-called Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) represents a synthesis and an extension with respect to its predecessor, Modern Synthesis (MS). It will be argued that the MS proposes an externalist approach to evolution while the EES considers it necessary to overcome the internalism/externalism dichotomy by proposing more integrative approaches. It will be concluded that the EES cannot be considered an extension of MS and that the appeal to that extension is related to sociological aspects and the epistemic value of theoretical unification that was always present in biological evolutionary thinking.

Redes de Sociabilidade como estratégia para o ensino de ciências

Resumo Existe uma crença comum entre os estudantes e até mesmo entre professores de que a ciência é uma busca solitária e que as idéias aparecem espontaneamente na mente dos cientistas. Esta é uma percepção estereotipada sobre a natureza da Ciência que procuramos superar mostrando as pesquisas de Albert Calmette (1863 - 1933), em parceria com Camille Guérin (1872 - 1961), sobre o desenvolvimento da vacina BCG utilizando uma Rede de Sociabilidade elaborada por nós, uma vez que a História da Ciência pode contribuir para o entendimento dos processos e mecanismos pelos quais a ciência é elaborada. Organizamos as contribuições de Albert Calmette, no período de 1905 a 1933, para o desenvolvimento da vacina BCG. Para tanto, utilizamos os trabalhos originais publicados por ele. Nestes trabalhos, mostramos controvérsias e diálogos com outros pesquisadores, integrando uma abordagem internalista e externalista da História da Ciência, fazendo uma discussão dos conceitos científicos em seus trabalhos e as influências sociais, econômicas e políticas no respectivo contexto histórico. É possível observar como a interação com outros estudos e ideias do período orientaram as pesquisas de Calmette. A Rede de Sociabilidade pode ajudar os alunos a superar suas visões deformadas da Ciência, como as supracitadas e outras, dentre elas a de que a ciência é uma atividade neutra e que os conhecimentos científicos são sempre construções lineares.Palavras-chave: Rede de Sociabilidade, História da Ciência, Ensino de Ciências Abstract There is a common belief among students and even among theachers that science is a solitary pursuit and that ideas appear spontaneously in the minds of scientists. This is a stereotyped perception about the nature of Science that we seek to overcome by presentig the researches of Albert Calmette (1863-1933), in partnership with Camille Guérin (1872-1961), on the development of the BCG vaccine using a Sociability Network developed by us , since the History of Science can contribute to the understanding of the processes and mechanisms by which science is elaborated. We organized the contributions of Albert Calmette, from 1905 to 1933, for the development of the BCG vaccine. For this purpose, we used the original papers published by him. In these papers, we show controversies and dialogues with other researchers, integrating an internalist and externalist approach to the History of Science, by doing a discussion of the scientific concepts within his papers and the social, economical and political influences in the respective Historical context. It is possible to observe how the interaction with other studies and ideas of the period had oriented Calmette's researches. The Sociability Network can help students overcome their deformed views of science, such as those above mentioned, including that science is a neutral activity and that scientific knowledge is always a linear constructs. Keywords: Sociability Network, History of Science, Science teaching

Justification

This chapter articulates a knowledge first theory of doxastic justification—a belief is justified just in case it is relevantly similar to a possible instance of knowledge. In the terminology of the chapter, justification is “potential knowledge”. Relevant similarity is a matter of a matching of basic evidence and cognitive processing. This needn't be assumed to be a matter of the intrinsic; on the externalist approach to basic evidence given in Chapter 3, for one's belief to be justified is for there to be a possible knower who shares the same basic evidence—including factive perceptual states—and cognitive processing. The Appendix to Chapter 4 considers how the view extends to justified beliefs in necessarily false contents.