Love as Origin of Science

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-472
Author(s):  
Heung Myung Oh
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
General Concept ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Rigorous Model ◽  
Externalist Approach ◽  
Objective Validity ◽  
Ultimate Ground

Summary The approaches to the possibility of theology as science are divided roughly into three types: first, the internalist approach which rejects any attempt to verify the objective validity of revelation under the general concept of science. Second, the externalist approach which demands the verification of objective validity of revelatory truth. Third, the inclusivist approach which seeks the scientificity of theology from a hermeneutic perspective. Outlining the crucial points and limits of these approaches and replacing the question about theology as science with a theological reexamination of the possibility of science in general, this paper tries to suggest an alternative approach by establishing the possibility of scientific knowledge in general from the trinitarian perspective. Under this reformulation of the question, the philosophy of science set forth by Fichte as the most rigorous model of theory of science is critically explored. In conclusion, it is argued that the ultimate ground of all human knowledge and science consists in the eternal divine love and trust in it.

The Theory of Social Relay by M.A. Rozov: Pathway for Understanding

2021 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
Nataliya I. Kuznetsova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
New World ◽  
Social Memory ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Russian Philosopher ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Goals And Objectives

The article analyzes the problems of modern epistemology in the context of pre­senting the views and philosophical heritage of the famous Russian philosopher Mikhail Alexandrovich Rozov. The relevance of the theory of social relay devel­oped by him and the corresponding “wave” ontology, especially in the period of thematic, terminological and substantial transformations of modern epistemo­logy, is shown. The author carry out the idea that without solving the ontological and methodological problems of the empirical analysis of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to correctly investigate knowledge. The article describes in detail the logic of Rozov’s reasoning, and also demonstrates the scale of M.A. Rozov on the reforming of epistemology and philosophy of science, on the formulation of an urgent agenda, problems, goals and objectives of the study of knowledge. The bottom line is that understanding semiotic objects (scientific knowledge) as phenomena of social memory, which are reproduced according to direct or indi­rect (verbalized) patterns, opens a new world of social relay races. The broad ap­plicability of Rozov’s theory in various empirical contexts is demonstrated, which allows discussing both traditional and modern philosophical and method­ological problems of the natural and socio-humanitarian sciences, as well as in epistemology and philosophy of science.

scholarly journals Consideraciones sobre una semiología de la ciencia

1985 ◽  
Vol 17 (51) ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Javier Echeverría
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Logical Atomism

One of the main deficiencies of the twentieth century philosophy of science, in spite of evident achievements in the logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific theories, is the separation between formal sciences and those sciences with empirical contents. This distinction derives from Carnap and it was generally admitted by the Vienna Circle since the publication of “Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft” in Erkenntnis in 1935. Later philosophy of science, in spite of other criticism of the neopositivist programme, has maintained this separation. It can be claimed that Realwissenschaften, physics in particular, have determined the development of later philosophy of science. Analyses of scientific theories most of the time refer to physical theories, and occasionally to biological ones. There is still a lot to be done in the field of mathematics and logic, in order to analyse and reconstruct their theories. But even if this task is undertaken, and some progress has been done lately, there is still a lot of work to do before a general theory of science can be proposed which transcends such a division between formal and empirical sciences, let alone the human or social sciences. This paper is intended as a contribution to supersede the first dichotomy between formal and physical sciences. One of the main problems in order to make some progress along these lines is that since its origins logical positivism had a deficient theory of knowledge, and the same happened with analytical philosophy developed immediately afterwards. This paper thus criticises examples of such a type of theory of knowledge, as expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The core argument is as follows: these theorizations are inadequate for scientific knowledge; this type of knowledge, particularly the notion of ‘sign’ cannot be adapted to the simple scheme proposed in those works. The criticism here undertaken is developed from a rationalist point of view, in a sense which is closer to Leibniz and Saussure, than to recent philosophers fascinated with the word ‘reason’. Some new proposals are put forward, necessarily provisional, which justify the term, which in turn could be perfectly substituted by another, of Semiology of Science.

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

Perceptual Paradigms

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-42
Author(s):  
William Fish
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Visual Science ◽  
Research Programmes

Everyone would agree that contemporary philosophical thinking and theorizing about perception should both be aware of, and consistent with, the findings of visual science. Yet despite this consensus, there is little discussion—and even less agreement—about how this should work in practice. This chapter proposes that we can gain useful insights by bringing some tools from the philosophy of science to bear on this question. Focusing on the disagreement between Burge and McDowell as to whether or not disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception is ‘directly at odds with scientific knowledge’ (Burge 2005, 29), the chapter suggests that interesting insights can be gained by seeing this debate through a Kuhnian lens—as a clash of paradigms (or, more strictly, Lakatosian research programmes)—and then investigate the methodological consequences that flow from this. It contends that looking at this debate through this lens not only sheds light on why it can seem so intractable, but also provides us with reassurance that this might be a good thing.

Ibn Tufayl, Abu Bakr Muhammad (before 1110–85)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shams C. Inati
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Literary Form ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Direct Experience ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Experience Of God ◽  
Religious Truth ◽  
Blank Slate ◽  
The Way

Ibn Tufayl’s thought can be captured in his only extant work, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (The Living Son of the Vigilant), a philosophical treatise in a charming literary form. It relates the story of human knowledge, as it rises from a blank slate to a mystical or direct experience of God after passing through the necessary natural experiences. The focal point of the story is that human reason, unaided by society and its conventions or by religion, can achieve scientific knowledge, preparing the way to the mystical or highest form of human knowledge. The story also seeks to show that, while religious truth is the same as that of philosophy, the former is conveyed through symbols, which are suitable for the understanding of the multitude, and the latter is conveyed in its inner meanings apart from any symbolism. Since people have different capacities of understanding that require the use of different instruments, there is no point in trying to convey the truth to people except through means suitable for their understanding.

Archē

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard McKirahan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Scientific Principles ◽  
Basic Entity

Archē, or ‘principle’, is an ancient Greek philosophical term. Building on earlier uses, Aristotle established it as a technical term with a number of related meanings, including ‘originating source’, ‘cause’, ‘principle of knowledge’ and ‘basic entity’. Accordingly, it acquired importance in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, and also in the particular sciences. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of scientific principles, all sciences and all scientific knowledge are founded on principles (archai) of a limited number of determinate kinds.

Social Organization of Science

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Carrier
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Science Section ◽  
The Social ◽  
Organization Of Science ◽  
Knowledge Claims

The social organization of science as a topic of philosophy of science mostly concerns the question of which kinds of social organization are most beneficial to the epistemic aspirations of science. Section 1 addresses the interaction among scientists for improving epistemic qualities of knowledge claims in contrast to the mere accumulation of contributions from several scientists. Section 2 deals with the principles that are supposed to organize this interaction among scientists such that well-tested and well-confirmed knowledge is produced. Section 3 outlines what is supposed to glue scientific communities together and how society at large is assumed to affect the social organization of these communities. Section 4 attends to social epistemology (i.e., to attempts to explore the influence of social roles and characteristics on the system of scientific knowledge and confirmation practices).

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