Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-59
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Mental Structure ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Externalist Approach

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

The New Evil Devil Problem and Deontological Internalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-109
Author(s):  
Mikhail G. Khort ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
The Social ◽  
Introductory Part ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

The article defends an internalist version of the virtue epistemology. This point contradicts many contemporary theories of epistemic virtues, as they are mostly externalistic. This is partly due to the fact that externalism is more consistent with cognitive science, situationism and the social epistemology. Another reason is that it was the externalists who revived interest in the aretic approach within the framework of modern epistemology. Nevertheless, the author shows that it is internalism that offers the best answer to the question about the essence of epistemic virtues. In the introductory part of the article, the classical definitions of internalism and externalism are given. It is explained that the author use an extended definition of internalism, which is characterized by the inclusion epistemic virtues in the structure of justification. The second part is devoted to critic of externalism. The New Evil Demon Problem is the instrument of analysis. The author shows that there are scenarios in which the function of justification as a reliable “guide” to truth cannot serve as a criterion for epistemic evaluation. Situations are possible in which the subject has a false but justified belief. Externalism cannot explain such scenarios, which motivates to abandon this approach. The third part of the article discusses internalism as a possible response to The New Evil Demon Problem. The author believes that justification should be considered as a deontological concept. The condition of reliability, which is an important element of externalism, must be replaced by the condition of correct motivation and epistemic debt. This means that the assessment of beliefs and subjects should be based on what motives they have and how they manifest them in cognition.

Autonomous Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
New Class ◽  
And Performance

A central conclusion developed and defended throughout the book is that epistemic autonomy is necessary for knowledge (both knowledge-that and knowledge-how) and in ways that epistemologists have not yet fully appreciated. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 motivates (using a series of twists on Lehrer’s TrueTemp case) the claim that propositional knowledge requires autonomous belief. Chapters 2 and 3 flesh out this proposal in two ways, by defending a specific form of history-sensitive externalism with respect to propositional knowledge-apt autonomous belief (Chapter 2) and by showing how the idea that knowledge requires autonomous belief—understood along the externalist lines proposed—corresponds with an entirely new class of knowledge defeaters (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 extends the proposal to (both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist) knowledge-how and performance enhancement, and in a way that combines insights from virtue epistemology with research on freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. Chapter 5 concludes with a new twist on the Value of Knowledge debate, by vindicating the value of epistemically autonomous knowledge over that which falls short, including (mere) heteronomous but otherwise epistemically impeccable justified true belief.

Epistemic Autonomy and Knowledge Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 60-82
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
The Subject

Chapter 3 highlights an important epistemological implication of the view developed so far—which is that the inclusion of an autonomous belief condition on propositional knowledge implies that knowledge can be defeated in ways other than via the standard modes of rebutting and undercutting defeat. An account of two types of what I call ‘heteronomous defeat’ for propositional knowledge is developed and defended: one on which propositional knowledge is defeated when the subject acquires a belief that either indicates the target belief is epistemically heteronymous (i.e. Type 1) or calls into doubt the reliability of the subject’s belief-forming process as one that would (reliably enough) result in an epistemically autonomous belief (i.e. Type 2). Recognizing heteronomous defeat as a genuine form of knowledge defeat fits snugly with the wider idea that knowledge defeaters, as such, are indicators of ignorance.

Sophie Laws, with Caroline Harper and Rachel Marcus. Research for Development: A Practical Guide. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. 2003. xiii+475 pages. Paperback. Indian Rupees 450.00.

2003 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-172
Author(s):  
Mir Annice Mahmood
Keyword(s):  
Policy Research ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Economic Point ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Is Research ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Development Workers

To implement any successful policy, research about the subject-matter is essential. Lack of knowledge would result in failure and, from an economic point of view, it would lead to a waste of scarce resources. The book under review is essentially a manual which highlights the use of research for development. The book is divided into two parts. Part One informs the reader about concepts and some theory, and Part Two deals with the issue of undertaking research for development. Both parts have 11 chapters each. Chapter 1 asks the basic question: Is research important in development work? The answer is that it is. Research has many dimensions: from the basic asking of questions to the more sophisticated broad-based analysis of policy issues. The chapter, in short, stresses the usefulness of research which development workers ignore at their own peril.

Lessons in Failure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi Hardt
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Research Design ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Institutional Memory ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Observed Behavior

Chapter 1 introduces the subject of institutional memory of strategic errors, discusses why it matters for international organizations (IOs) that engage in crisis management and reviews the book’s argument, competing explanations and methodological approach. One strategic error in the mandate or planning of an operation can increase the likelihood of casualties on the battlefield. Knowledge of past errors can help prevent future ones. The chapter explores an empirical puzzle; there remain key differences between how one expects IOs to learn and observed behavior. Moreover, scholars have largely treated institutional memory as a given without explaining how it develops. From relevant scholarship, the chapter identifies limitations of three potential explanations. The chapter then introduces a new argument for how IOs develop institutional memory. Subsequent sections describe research design and explain why NATO is selected as the domain of study. Last, the chapter identifies major contributions to literature and describes the book’s structure.

scholarly journals Integrative and Complementary Health Practices Building a New Health Paradigm

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  
T Gemeli ◽  
H Silva ◽  
M Kato
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Universal Access ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Elderly ◽  
Professional Service ◽  
Health It ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject ◽  
New Perspective

Abstract This work arose from the need to broaden the therapeutic approach and offer a differentiated health intervention proposal based on the understanding that the illness process has repercussions on all integrated systems of Being. Since 2019, the Health Center for the Elderly in Blumenau (SC-Brasil), specialized multi-professional service, offering support for biopsychoenergetic transformation with the practice of Yoga and Meditation, through a holistic and comprehensive view of health. It begins with the Multidimensional Assessment of the Elderly, with a guideline in welcoming and qualified listening, which considers the subject and all subjectivity. From there, the expanded diagnosis and the Singular Therapeutic Project are built and the consultations with the team and the 'Re-Conhecer group' begin. The activity is weekly, aimed at the elderly and their family, takes place in an appropriate place and lasts two hours. Welcoming, pranayama, mantras, kriyas and meditation are made, as well as reflections on free themes. The professionals who conduct the practice are the dentist, trained in yoga, and the social worker, the welcoming process continues individually after the activity. Due to subjectivity, results are routinely collected in a qualitative way from the participants' report. There is a perception on the part of the participants, therapists and members of the multidisciplinary team that this work provides improvement in cognitive abilities, self-care, well-being, self-confidence, creativity, improved sleep, autonomy, balance, strengthening bonds, joy, vitality. Key messages This initiative builds new models of health care, transcending the traditional biomedical model, according to the operational guideline for comprehensiveness, universal access and equity. Provokes reflections and builds a new perspective of life with quality and participation of the elderly as subjects of their health.

scholarly journals JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Miller ◽  
Isaac Record
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Modes Of Operation ◽  
Internet Technologies ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Justificatory Status

AbstractPeople increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered internet sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users' reliance on internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, action and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject's particular decision-taking circumstances, and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject's beliefs that are formed based on internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs.

scholarly journals The constitutional view

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
The Subject

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p165 This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higherorder cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view”. In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject.

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