Books and Their Method

2021 ◽  
pp. 479-542
Author(s):  
Frank Griffel
Keyword(s):  
Twelfth Century ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter deals with the method of philosophical books during the sixth/twelfth century. It begins with an analysis of Abu l-Barakat al-Baghdadi’s method of i’tibar (careful consideration) and highlights its departure from al-Farabi’s and Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina’s) demonstrative method as the ideal of philosophical inquiry. The chapter looks at how Fakhr al-Din al-Razi describes his own method in his philosophical books and it analyzes the method of “probing and dividing” (sabr wa-taqsim) used therein. Finally, the chapter zooms in on the methodical differences between Fakhr al-Din’s philosophical books and his books of kalam and focuses on the principle of sufficient reason. This philosophical principle requires that every event must have a rational explanation of its cause(s). The principle is universally valid in al-Razi’s philosophical books, yet in his books on kalam only insofar as God’s will is excluded from this requirement. This difference has far-reaching effects on the teachings put forward in these two genres of books.

Dwa bieguny europejskiej kultury: Karpiński i Leibniz. Próby badań nad dociekaniami filozoficznymi Franciszka Karpińskiego w odniesieniu do filozofii Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 44-67
Author(s):  
Jarosław Jarszak
Keyword(s):  
Life Experiences ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The World

The author seeks an answer to the following question: can we relate the work of Franciszek Karpiński to the philosophical achievements of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz? The article proposes to treat Karpiński’s work as a philosophical inquiry and notices in it a clearly defined metaphysical and axiological principle, which can be treated as an independently constructed version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. The notes in the diary confirm the assumption that painful life experiences did not stop the poet’s efforts to build a vision of the world that we have reasons to call the “philosophy of optimism”.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

The Provenance of Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Vision
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Material Base ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Fundamental Particles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Unlike brute ‘entities’, if conscious states (c-states) are brute, it will be a consequence of their primitive—viz., not admitting further elaboration—connection to their material base, what is commonly known as emergence. One might suppose the chief challenge to emergence comes from various materialist counter-proposals. However, given the distinctive character of c-states, a class of critics describe even materialist reductions as objectionable forms of emergentism. Instead, their fallback position is a reinvigorated panpsychism: consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the most fundamental particles. In this chapter the author examines that form of panpsychism, tracing its roots to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and to suggestions aired in Bertrand Russell’s struggles with the issue. He concludes that this panpsychism fails, leaving the field to materialism and emergentist dualism.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

God’s Devils: Pragmatic Theodicy in Christian Responses to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s Conquest of Jerusalem in 1187

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-164
Author(s):  
Keagan Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Twelfth Century ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face

Abstract This paper considers Christian responses to the problem of evil following Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s conquest of Jerusalem. Among Catholics, Audita Tremendi offered the orthodox response that God was punishing Christian sin. However, the logical conclusion of this view is that the Muslims were agents of God despite being “evil” for having captured Jerusalem from Christians. Twelfth-century theologians believed that God could use demons in the service of good. In response to 1187, while many Christians portrayed the Muslims as evil, some expressed that they were divine agents. Meanwhile, others murmured that Muslim gods (including, to some, Muḥammad) were superior to Christian ones; that the Christian god was apathetic, violent, or wicked; that the crusade of 1189–92 was against God’s will; and that crusaders were murderers. Thought-terminating clichés centring on the divine mysteries permitted the continuance of Christianity in the face of this profound theodical controversy.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

scholarly journals Metaphysical Rationalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 164-181
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Limited Scope

This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.

scholarly journals Something, nothing and Leibniz’s question. negation in logic and metaphysics

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-190
Author(s):  
Jan Woleński
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Status

Abstract This paper discusses the concept of nothing (nothingness) from the point of logic and ontology (metaphysics). It is argued that the category of nothing as a denial of being is subjected to various interpretations. In particular, this thesis concerns the concept of negation as used in metaphysics. Since the Leibniz question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and the principle of sufficient reason is frequently connected with the status of nothing, their analysis is important for the problem in question. Appendix contains a short critical analysis of Heidegger’s famous statement Das Nichts nichtet.

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