SOCIAL MEDIA IN INFORMATION WARFARE. ASSAULT WEAPON WITH HIGH RECOIL

Beyond the benefits or risks of individual or institutional communication through social media, we must note that it is the perfect environment for fake news and propaganda because of the speed of information propagation, the unfriendly environment for checking sources, algorithms behind social networks and, last but not least, the extremely low cost. In other words, the Internet and web 2.0 have created the favorable framework for the conduct of the war "for minds and hearts", as it can be called the information war waged through social media. Beyond these considerations, the non-regulation of the online domain - the lack of rules, be they deontological, make social media a powerful weapon of attack in this type of war. At the same time, the use of this space by state actors should be done with caution because it involves risks that could result in the loss of the most important action capacity: credibility. This article aims to analyze social media as a tool in information warfare

Analysis on the Next Generation Assault Rifles and Ammunition Designed for the US Army

In recent years, the US Army began actively looking for a replacement for the 5.56 mm M16/M4 assault rifle, which currently is the standard issue weapon for the infantry. The US Army has selected three potential companies to produce the next generation assault weapon. These are the following companies Sig Sauer, General Dynamics, and Textron systems. All companies have submitted prototypes for the next generation assault rifle that are the subject of the analysis in this paper. In addition, the companies also offer new types of ammunition for the abovementioned systems. The purpose of this paper is to compare the three assault rifle prototypes and the ammunition they use to highlight their potential strengths and weaknesses and to address possible reliability problems. Although many of the specifications of the weapons are the subject to company secret, the paper will provide a comparative analysis of small arms samples that plan to replace the 5.56 mm M16/M4 assault rifle, according to available information from various sources.

Are States under a Prospective Duty to Create and Maintain Militaries?

Suppose it is foreseeable that you will soon encounter a drowning child, whom you will only be able to rescue if you learn to swim. In this scenario we might think that you have a “prospective duty” to take swimming lessons given that this will be necessary to perform the future rescue. Cécile Fabre argues that, by parity of reasoning, states have a prospective duty to build and maintain military establishments. My argument in this essay pulls in the opposite direction. First, I emphasize that learning to swim is only a prospective duty under very specific circumstances. Normally there is no such duty; hence, we do not normally think that people deserve moral censure for choosing to forego swimming lessons. I then argue that, similarly, while a prospective duty to build a military can arise under some conceivable circumstances, these are not the circumstances that most states today find themselves in. I then suggest a more fitting domestic analogy to guide our thinking about this issue: Maintaining a standing army is less like learning to swim and more like keeping an assault weapon in the home “just in case.” This analogy supports a defeasible presumption against militarization.

Examining the Arsenal of Juvenile Gunslingers: Trends and Policy Implications

Using the National Institute of Justice body armor threat-level scale, this study classified 1,055 firearms confiscated by police officers from juveniles in St. Louis, Missouri, from 1992 to 1999. The authors found that for this city, the lethal capacity of juveniles’ firearms has remained relatively constant over time. Examination of the different types of firearms recovered also found that the sophistication of firearms used by juveniles did not increase throughout the 1990s. By disaggregating firearm types, the authors were able to demonstrate that the police are likely to confiscate relatively unsophisticated firearms from juveniles, such as Saturday night specials, .22 caliber and nonpowder weapons. In St. Louis, juveniles were very unlikely to have an assault weapon confiscated. More troubling, however, were the relatively high numbers of illegally sawed-off rifles and shotguns recovered from youths.