Wages and wage bargaining institutions are foundational components of comparative capitalism research. Supply-side comparative capitalism research has often assumed that wage moderation—facilitated through highly coordinated wage-setting institutions—produces beneficial growth outcomes. This supposition stems from the logic that restrained unit labor cost growth causes firms to increase employment and output. However, through its demand-side perspective, new growth model literature questions the virtues of wage moderation, because the restraint of wages can be detrimental to growth via its suppression of domestic consumption. This chapter empirically tests under what conditions will wage moderation produce economic growth. Using a first-difference, distributive lag panel analysis of eighteen OECD countries from 1970 to 2015, its findings largely resonate with predictions within the growth model literature. In the presence of wage restraint, countries with larger export shares and highly coordinated wage-setting institutions realize higher growth and lower unemployment than countries with smaller export shares and uncoordinated wage-setting institutions. In contrast, wage inflation produces better growth outcomes for countries with uncoordinated wage-setting, relative to those with highly coordinated wage-setting institutions. These results suggest that wage restraint is not a winning strategy for all growth models. Rather, wage moderation is associated with better growth (and unemployment) outcomes only for countries with export-led growth strategies.