Engaging with Public Opinion at the Micro-Level: Citizen Dialogue and Participation in German Foreign Policy

This article analyzes how and why foreign policy (FP)-makers use dialogue and participation processes (DPPs) with (groups of) individual citizens as a source of public opinion. Taking Germany as a case study and drawing on DPP initiatives by the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) since 2014, we analyze the officials’ motivation for establishing such processes and find four different sets of motivation: (1) image campaigning, (2) educating citizens, (3) listening to citizens, and (4) changing the citizens’ role in FP. Our article makes three contributions. First, we provide a novel typology of the sources of public opinion upon which FP-makers can draw. Second, our study points to the importance of, and provides a framework for, analyzing how officials engage with public opinion at the micro-level, which has so far been understudied in FP analysis. Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that both carefully assessing and influencing public opinion feature prominently in motivation, whereas PR purposes are of minor importance. Recasting the citizens’ role in FP gains in importance over time and may mirror the increased need to legitimize FP in Western democracies vis-à-vis their publics.

Mission Impossible: Karl Neufeld’s Holy War Propaganda Trip to Medina (1915)

This article deals with Karl Neufeld’s trip to Medina, undertaken in the framework of German efforts to incite insurrections with the aim of destabilizing British rule in the Muslim world. His specific task was to spread propaganda in the Hijaz and the Sudan; he made it only to Medina, from where he was expelled by the Ottoman government after a stay of six weeks. Neufeld’s diary on which this article is mainly based is the only source about how Holy War propaganda was actually disseminated. Therefore, it goes beyond the existing literature and adds new insight into the discussion of German expeditions organized to counter British influence in the Middle East during the First World War. In contrast to most of the other enterprises, Neufeld accomplished certain goals, which does not, however, change the overall picture that the “jihād made in Germany” was a failure.Materials used include files from the archive of the German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt: pa-aa), the Sudan Archive Durham (Durham University Library: sad), and narrative sources, as well as the pertinent research literature.

Journeying into the Diplomatic Unknown: The Vergesellschaftung of the German Auswärtiges Amt

Summary All branches of modern governments struggle to adapt to social and political changes today, in an age when such changes follow each other with speed, and change the very fabric of society. Foreign ministries are doubly challenged as they not only are confronted with the changes of their domestic environment, but they also have to navigate the international arena which is another stage of frequent upheavals. As a consequence, the German Federal Foreign Office has ventured on a path of continuing reforms that have led to new structures in the organisation, human resources management and the use of new technologies. Compared to former ages, the German foreign ministry has turned into a complex, multifaceted bureaucratic apparatus with fluid borderlines, recognisably more of the same nature as German society as a whole.

Gustav Meissners rolle i den såkaldte nytårskrise 1940-41

Jesper Düring Jørgensen: The role of Gustav Meissner in the so-called New Year crisis The article looks at the role of the German press attaché Gustav Meissner (1910–1995) during the so-called New Year crisis, which unfolded between the German occupying administration and the Danish government from December 1940 to the end of January 1941. The crisis started in autumn 1940 as a reaction to the unsuccessful monetary and customs union negotiations between Germany and Denmark, and as a result of the Danish Nazi party’s failed propaganda offensive. Another factor that contributed to exacerbating the crisis around Christmas 1940 was a protracted attack on Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning, with the intention of removing him from his post as prime minister of Denmark. In addition, conflicts of interest and expectations regarding the occupation of Denmark existed both at the German Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and at the German Embassy in Copenhagen. In Copenhagen, the German ambassador Cecil von Renth-Fink tried to implement a pragmatic policy towards the Danish Government to ensure the greatest possible peace and order in the country for the safety of the German troops, and to safeguard the Danish agricultural and industrial exports to Germany, but in Berlin this policy was subtly opposed by the powerful Under Secretary Martin Luther and by his henchman at the embassy in Copenhagen, Gustav Meissner, who, partly behind Renthe-Fink’s back but with the assistance of Louis von Kohl, initiated several intrigues to topple the prime minister in Copenhagen. However, the demands to replace Stauning met with widespread opposition from the Danish government and the trade unions, and the crisis petered out. Stauning remained at his post, but party leader Hans Hedtoft and H. C. Hansen were forced out of office by the Germans.

Werner Bests fængselsoptegnelser 1945-51. En studie i fortidsmanipulation

John T. Lauridsen: Werner Best’s prison records 1945-51 The article provides a brief account of the content of Field Marshal for Denmark Werner Best’s prison notes with a list of those which are non-literary. Then the notes concerning Danish conditions are presented in greater detail, since they are characterized as primary defence statements with the intention of explaining and defending the politics that he wishes to present as those he conducted during his time as Field Marshal for Denmark 1942-45. There is a development in the content of the notes concerning Denmark from the first ones in 1945 to the later ones in 1948 in line with the fact that he obtained insight into the contemporary records written by himself, which the public prosecutor had managed to collect from him. The development was in the form of an adaptation of previous statements concerning the material presented or explaining the contents of it away, in the sense that a context was presented, which negated the meaning of what he had written, unless he did not openly state instead that what he had written was a lie already at the time of writing. The latter was supposedly in agreement with the Auswärtiges Amt with the common goal of preventing Hitler from intervening in Danish affairs. On the whole, Hitler is introduced in various contexts as an active party, who had exerted fundamental influence on incriminating documents drawn up by Best, while there is no contemporary documentation that Hitler exerted any influence or even had his attention focused on Denmark. This results in Best’s use of “the telephone trick”, which the author has chosen to call it, namely that Best invokes telephone calls from the headquarters of the fuhrer, from Ribbentrop’s ministerial office located there or from the Auswärtiges Amt, which make him act in another manner that justifies his actions for posterity, or ascribes an impact on posterity to himself, which he had not been able to obtain in some other way. The most obvious examples are the initiative for the action against the Jews in 1943, the April Crisis in 1944, the repercussions from the general strike in Copenhagen in the summer of 1944, and the outcome of the discussions concerning whether or not to conduct the final battle in Mürwik on 3 May 1945. An account is given of Best’s attempt to impose a general reading guide for his contemporary documents upon the reader, followed by a representation of and detailed commentary upon selected statements by Best, which illustrate Best’s form of history manipulation in detail, where he also provides guidance on how he wants specific individual documents to be read and understood. It is inspiring reading. Two records are not about his own trial, but about his relationship to DNSAP (the Danish Nazi Party) and the Schalburg Corps (the Nazi anti-sabotage corps in Denmark) and the group of people surrounding them. Here he continues to manipulate his own role, but also shows his ruthlessness towards partners who did not obey orders. This also gave him cause to dismiss the entire German Reich leadership in Denmark as being more or less amateurish.

Anmeldelser

Stig T. Rasmussen anmelder: Tusind og én Nat. Udg. af Ellen Wulff & Kim Witthoff. 2013John Lind anmelder: Den Ryssiske Lov 1649. Oversat og kommenteret af Rasmus Æreboe 1721. Udg. af Lars P. Poulsen-Hansen. 2013Jesper Jakobsen anmelder: Raymond Birn: Royal Censorship of Books in Eighteenth–Century France. 2012Robert Bohn: John T. Lauridsen (udg.): Werner Bests korrespondance med Auswärtiges Amt og andre tyske akter vedrørende besættelsen af Danmark 1942-1945. 2012