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2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 786-799
Author(s):  
Bahram Kazemian ◽  
Shatha Naiyf Qaiwer ◽  
Shafigeh Mohammadian

Drawing upon the recent theoretical framework of Burkean concept of identification (ID), the current study aims at probing the interaction of content and form in two letters penned by Iran’s Supreme Leader and addressed to the Youth on Jan. and Nov. 2015. To this end, the study seeks (i) to determine a role ID takes in the conveyance of intended assumptions to the targeted readers; and (ii) to observe if the writer’s objectives, i.e. to identify himself with the readers and to realize his politically-religiously-infused creeds, result in success or failure; moreover, (iii) it seeks to determine how he achieved his end to attenuate the impacts of blazing inferno of Islamophobia and anti-Islam sentiments in his addressees. The whole corpus (about 3000 words), in light of van Dijk’s Socio-cognitive approach, is critically perused to seek out contextually-coded expressions. The study tries to set out a manner in which political text/talk could be analyzed rhetorically employing ID concept. It was found that ID as a two-way process is a key component for both parties to identify with. It makes the readers align themselves with the writer and helps the writer to associate with the readers and accomplish his goals.


Significance Pyongyang does not publish figures, but data and estimates produced in Seoul show that North Korea’s GDP shrank by 4.5% last year, its worst fall for 23 years, and trade hit a 30-year low. In June, supreme leader Kim Jong-un called the food situation “tense” and in August he dispatched troops to help deal with flooding. Impacts Small signs of fence-mending and lack of weapons tests may imply sufficient desperation for Kim to start, or feign, denuclearisation talks. Kim's choice to halt to all foreign trade is an overreaction to COVID-19; a second wave in China will fuel this paranoia. Kim's explicit rejection of foreign aid will be hard to reverse, but not impossible if he is desperate and a face-saving mechanism is found.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-146
Author(s):  
Javier Mª Ruiz Arévalo

Founded after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, the Corps of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of Iran has evolved far beyond its original foundations as an ideological guardian of the nascent revolutionary regime. Today, it functions as a socio-political-economic conglomerate, whose influence extends to all areas of Iranian life. Its members have articulated a vision of the Islamic Republic that they feel committed to defending, becoming guarantors of the ideological purity of the regime whose supreme leader rests on its support, while increasingly depending on it to survive.


Significance Two-thirds of legislators in the conservative-dominated parliament today called on four of the five conservative candidates to withdraw in favour of frontrunner Ibrahim Raisi, now polling at over 60% of the vote; one has so far done so. The other candidate in the 13th presidential poll since the 1979 revolution is a moderate technocrat, Abdolnasser Hemmati. Impacts The main focus of the new president is likely to be on reviving the ‘resistance’ economy, including high-profile anti-corruption efforts. The new government could potentially bring in constitutional changes, which might involve increased Islamicisation. Concurrent voting in elections to city councils, which deal with issues that impact ordinary Iranians, could be more competitive. After the poll, attention will turn to the contest over succession to the supreme leader.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 146-162
Author(s):  
Sead Bandžović ◽  

With the overthrow of the regime of Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the Iranian revolution ended the existence of the 2,500-year-old Persian Empire and built the Islamic Republic of Iran on its foundations. The revolution was the product of three independent social structures that merged at one point. One was the structure of constitutionalism that grew out of a century-long struggle for democracy supported by modernists; the second was Islamism as a movement to set Sharia law as the primary law supported by rural elements in society in response to Western urban elites and accepted by merchants; and the third is the nationalist structure, driven by rage fueled by Iran's long subordination to European powers. The basic principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, proclaimed by the new constitution from 1979, is the positioning of God as the supreme bearer of people's sovereignty and people who are only marginal representatives of his power on Earth. Ayatollah Homenini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian state, in this regard created a thesis about the Islamic State as a political representation, created on the basis of the people's will, in order to enforce God's laws. In practice, such system meant setting up Sharia (religious) laws as the only source of law in regulating social, legal and other relations within the community. A dichotomy has been created in the management of the state, so there are two groups of authorities. The first, the conciliar, consists of the Supreme leader, the Council of Guardians (Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e assassi), the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari) and the Judgment Council. The task of these councils is to oversee the activities of all levels of government in order to preserve the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the Iranian political system. The conciliar government supervises and advises the republican part of the government, ie. its legislative, executive and judicial aspects. In addition to conciliar government, there is a republican government that creates laws and political decisions in accordance with religious teachings and under the supervision of theocratic political institutions. All laws and court decisions must be based on the principles of the Qur'an, and their proper interpretation requires an understanding of religious principles. On the basis of the constitution, a special High Judicial Council was established, which amended the pre-revolutionary laws (criminal, commercial, civil and procedural), thus creating the so-called “Transitional law”. The biggest changes affected the area of criminal law, where the principle of talion revenge was introduced (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) and the strict punishment of extramarital relations and same-sex relationships. In the domain of marital and family law, a man is given a number of rights, thus putting the woman, as a marital partner, in a more unequal position. Husbands were facilitated in divorce, temporary marriages with more than one woman were allowed, while on the other hand women were allowed the right to divorce only if it was explicitly allowed by her husband during the marriage. The revolution also introduced new sources in the regulation of legal relations. Thus, by an order of the Supreme Judicial Council of 23 August 1982, judges were ordered to use direct authoritative Islamic texts or sources on which to base their judgments in resolving disputes. Judges are required by this Order to address the Council of Guardians of the Constitution if they cannot determine with certainty whether a regulation is in accordance with Sharia law or not. If the judge does not know which law to apply, he must contact the Office of Ayatollah Khomeini for further instructions. In addition to the internal one, the revolution caused radical changes in the foreign policy field, positioning Iran as an important participant in numerous international processes at the regional and global level.


Significance At the same time, the June 18 presidential election campaign is beginning, with top judge Ibrahim Raisi registering as a favoured candidate. Heading a high-profile anti-corruption campaign, Raisi has been a strong advocate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ‘resistance economy’ policy to undermine sanctions by supporting domestic production. Impacts Effective legislation to manage conflicts of interest, including of officials’ family members, will likely remain blocked. Local business interests that would benefit from more global links may have a strong voice even under a conservative government. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps will keep a firm grip on the infrastructure sector.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Hans-Lukas Kieser

Abstract This essay considers Ziya Gökalp, the received “spiritual father of Turkish nationalism”, as an early mastermind of fascism in Greater Europe. During the 1910s, Gökalp acted as a prophet of expansive war and as a mentor of demographic engineering in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, which was a laboratory for new political styles in a crisis-ridden empire. Gökalp’s thinking longed for a supreme leader in an army-like, disciplined and hierarchised society, while it rejected a social contract-based nation and state. An influential inspiration for and beyond the new élites in the capital, Gökalp combined the call for radical modernisation according to “European civilisation” with an assertive essentialism based on völkisch (cultural-racial-ethnic Turkish) and religious (political Islamic) references. He was the chief ideologist of the Young Turk party-state (1913–18) – side by side with Talaat Pasha, its main executive leader – and “the father of my thoughts” for Kemal Atatürk.


2021 ◽  
pp. 144-168
Author(s):  
Justine Firnhaber-Baker

Far from an undirected mob action, the Jacquerie was steered by a hierarchical organization of leaders whose orders were communicated to the ‘rank and file’ at assemblies called for that purpose. While these leaders did employ coercion, they were also subject to it from the movement’s members and the movement was riven by disagreement about the use of violence and the possession of authority. The rebel’s supreme leader Guillaume Calle had a circle of close associates, and on the local level there were village captains, some of whom had their own subordinate assistants. Many of these leaders, including Calle, were men of substantial wealth and education and were often chosen by their communities rather than being imposed upon them. Massive assemblies, like the gathering that initiated the revolt itself, were vital to the movement’s communication and gave to it a grassroots character that sometimes conflicted with leaders’ wishes. The Jacquerie involved significant travel for many rebels, whose actions were coordinated by written messages, as well as non-verbal signals such as flags and bells. They were given food by those frightened of or sympathetic to the revolt, especially townspeople, whose participation in the revolt is further discussed in the next chapter.


Significance On April 4, supreme leader Kim Jong-un called this “the worst-ever situation in which we have to overcome unprecedentedly numerous challenges”. Much hinges on how soon trade with China resumes. If that happens this month, as Chinese businesses near the border expect (though other reports are sceptical), then some North Koreans will experience some relief. However, other sources of discontent are brewing. Impacts Economic failure is inevitable without market reforms, but the regime is moving in the opposite direction. Scapegoating and purging the nomenklatura for economic failures will breed resentment among the elite. North Korea needs China, but that fact is widely resented.


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