scholarly journals Transformation of the State and Law in Iran after the Iranian Revolutionin 1979

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 146-162
Author(s):  
Sead Bandžović ◽  

With the overthrow of the regime of Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the Iranian revolution ended the existence of the 2,500-year-old Persian Empire and built the Islamic Republic of Iran on its foundations. The revolution was the product of three independent social structures that merged at one point. One was the structure of constitutionalism that grew out of a century-long struggle for democracy supported by modernists; the second was Islamism as a movement to set Sharia law as the primary law supported by rural elements in society in response to Western urban elites and accepted by merchants; and the third is the nationalist structure, driven by rage fueled by Iran's long subordination to European powers. The basic principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, proclaimed by the new constitution from 1979, is the positioning of God as the supreme bearer of people's sovereignty and people who are only marginal representatives of his power on Earth. Ayatollah Homenini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian state, in this regard created a thesis about the Islamic State as a political representation, created on the basis of the people's will, in order to enforce God's laws. In practice, such system meant setting up Sharia (religious) laws as the only source of law in regulating social, legal and other relations within the community. A dichotomy has been created in the management of the state, so there are two groups of authorities. The first, the conciliar, consists of the Supreme leader, the Council of Guardians (Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e assassi), the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari) and the Judgment Council. The task of these councils is to oversee the activities of all levels of government in order to preserve the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the Iranian political system. The conciliar government supervises and advises the republican part of the government, ie. its legislative, executive and judicial aspects. In addition to conciliar government, there is a republican government that creates laws and political decisions in accordance with religious teachings and under the supervision of theocratic political institutions. All laws and court decisions must be based on the principles of the Qur'an, and their proper interpretation requires an understanding of religious principles. On the basis of the constitution, a special High Judicial Council was established, which amended the pre-revolutionary laws (criminal, commercial, civil and procedural), thus creating the so-called “Transitional law”. The biggest changes affected the area of criminal law, where the principle of talion revenge was introduced (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) and the strict punishment of extramarital relations and same-sex relationships. In the domain of marital and family law, a man is given a number of rights, thus putting the woman, as a marital partner, in a more unequal position. Husbands were facilitated in divorce, temporary marriages with more than one woman were allowed, while on the other hand women were allowed the right to divorce only if it was explicitly allowed by her husband during the marriage. The revolution also introduced new sources in the regulation of legal relations. Thus, by an order of the Supreme Judicial Council of 23 August 1982, judges were ordered to use direct authoritative Islamic texts or sources on which to base their judgments in resolving disputes. Judges are required by this Order to address the Council of Guardians of the Constitution if they cannot determine with certainty whether a regulation is in accordance with Sharia law or not. If the judge does not know which law to apply, he must contact the Office of Ayatollah Khomeini for further instructions. In addition to the internal one, the revolution caused radical changes in the foreign policy field, positioning Iran as an important participant in numerous international processes at the regional and global level.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Idil Akbar

Khilafah concept became one of the discussions that stick out lately, not least in Indonesia. But how is this concept, especially that  applied in the Islamic state? This article presents a comparison of Islamic governmentbased concepts with two different traditions, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The purpose of this paper is to show the differences between the two concepts as well as to discuss how the implementation carried out in the two countries that use Islam as the basis of the state. Conceptually Saudi Arabia and Iran have differences in the application of the state system and its government. Saudi Arabia with the monarchy concept and Iran with the concept of republic. But the similarity between the two is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a state that ideally reflects the Khilafah state as established in the state system of the era of Khulafaur Rashidin.Keyword: : Khilafah; Imamah, Saudi Arabia, Iran, State and Islamic Government


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Bahram Moradi ◽  
Mehrdad Azimi ◽  
Javad Moradi

Domestic and global revolution of its major milestones and goals, pillars of the clerical or managerial and leadership of the revolution. For this purpose, in a historical-descriptive study library method to this important work And then the most influential factors in this study and given the position of supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the supreme leader of strategic management in guiding the revolution and the Islamic Republic Of Iran's military effectiveness and studied Finally, in analyzing the measures taken About the position and dimensions and consequences strategies and suggestions for improving the expression of the divine youth.


1997 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sussan Siavoshi

The evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the dynamics of the relationship between the Iranian state and society can be explored by examining the postrevolutionary regime's policies toward intellectuals, particularly as expressed in its regulation of cinema and book publication. This relationship—at least in the period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s—was complex and nuanced. Factionalism within the regime provided an opportunity for intellectuals to engage the state in a process of negotiation and protest, cooperation and defiance, in pushing the boundaries of permitted self-expression. The degree of their success depended in part on which faction controlled the government and its regulatory agencies during particular phases in the evolution of the postrevolutionary regime.


Author(s):  
Milad Dokhanchi

Problematizing Asef Bayat’s notion of “post-Islamism,” this article proposes an alternative definition for the concept, having in mind the case of Iran. The current conception of the term “post-Islamism” may be challenged via a survey of post-revolutionary Islamist movements that resisted the state and as well as Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s concession to the concept maslahat (expediency), through which state expressed preference for modern reason over sharia law. The case of Islamists contesting state power questions the monolithic image of Islamism drawn by Bayat as movements longing to create a state based on the doctrine of velāyat-e faqih. Also Khomeini’s concession to maslahat indicates that the Islamic state must be seen as one of the participants in “post”-Islamist secularizing trends in Iran. Hence, Bayat’s post-Islamism was more of an inevitable political phenomenon adopted by the state itself than a conscious project adopted by Muslim secularist intellectual figures seeking to put an end to Islamism. Unlike Bayat’s post-Islamism, which celebrates the end or a “break” from an Islamist paradigm, this article then invites readers to expose Islamism to post-modern critique, the result of which would not be a negation but rather a revival of Islamism that takes into account the contingencies of the post-modern condition. Similar to post-Marxism and post-anarchism, post-Islamism maintains the ethos of the traditional canon, Islamism in this case, while rejecting its authoritarian and universalist tendencies. A post-Islamist politics has yet to emerge, yet its introductory philosophical foundations have been already developed in the 1990s by figures such as Abdolkarism Soroush and Morteza Avini. Soroush’s post-Islamism, however, ultimately landed in a modernist liberal episteme, hence remained Islamist, while Avini, despite his support for the state, offered a much more radical critique of Islamism while remaining faithful to its ethos.


2021 ◽  
pp. 121-165
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Shams

This chapter explores the enduring symbiosis between the village motif, social justice, and populist politics in Iran during the first three decades after the revolution. At first, it briefly highlights the evolution of the allegorical village in classical and contemporary Persian poetry. The focus will later be shifted towards the representation of the village in revolutionary poetry. We will see that it has remained a recurring motif in Persian poetry of the post-revolutionary period, employed by a variety of writers and state institutions for a range of means. As a symbol, it has been a conduit into which any ideology can be poured; the village allegory can be manipulated to both condemn and support the official politics of the state. The chapter examines the key socio-political influences behind the evolution of rural themes, the work of official poets, and the impact of the village on the cultural doctrine of the Islamic Republic.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Fathalian ◽  
Dr. Rajab Akbarzadeh ◽  
Dr. Ahmad Hosein Falahi

<p>Governmental commands are commands which the ruler of the society prescribes according to the predicted legal terms and the general well beings of the Muslims to protect the safety of the society and resolve the deadlocks. Guardian jurist's (Vilayat-e Faghih's) and supreme ruler's range of authorizations are complete and full so that Imam Khomeini announced that guardianship should include all issues for which the prophet of Islam and Shia Imams have a responsibility towards it. This study made an attempt to investigate the juristic principles of governmental commands in civil code of the Islamic Republic of Iran.The basis and evidence of the subject were referred to from Quran, narrations, Islamic jurists' and scholar's opinions and the intuition viewpoint. In the civil law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there are some clauses like 56, 77, 79, 81, 171, 1029, and 1130 which are representative of the influence of governmental command by the supreme leader.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 230
Author(s):  
Akbar Ghafoori

Given that the geography of modern times was one of the most important factors affecting the relations between Iran and Iraq, in this article we have tried to examine the influence of Iraq's new political geography variable factors on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this purpose, regardless of the security implications of Iraq's geopolitical constant factors, with placing three variable factors in the political geography means population, natural resources and socio-political institutions in the form of five security variables for Lee Norji. Martin, meaning the political legitimacy, civil rights and ethnic and minorities, military strength, the strength of economic management and natural resources, fifteen areas will be formed (in the annexes, these fifteen areas are in the table). The question that arises here is that what is the impact of Iraq's new political geography on the national security of Iran? The hypothesis that we are looking to review it is that changes in some areas of geopolitical of Iraq, after the United States invaded Iraq, made threats to the national security of Iran. The main objective of this paper is to study Iranian security changes in the first ten areas and to present solutions. Since the Iraq has not achieved stability yet, next five areas need further research and in this article do not occur<strong>.</strong>


1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 51-65
Author(s):  
Mehrdad Valibeigi

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iranian banking system and practices have changed significantly. Shortly after the revolution, according to a decree by the Revolutionary Council, banks and insurance companies were nationalized. In 1980 and 1982 legislation was passed to convert all banking practices to Islamic interest-free banking. Despite such significant developments in the Iranian banking system, this area of research has not been given its due attention by the scholars in the field. It is the purpose of this study to describe the process of post-revolutionary change in the Iranian banking system and outline the new trends in credit rationing practices after the revolution.It will be argued here that the Islamization of the banking system did not result in the so-called abolition of interest from the financial system; in practice the banking system continues to pay interest—now called “profit“—to savings account depositors, and standard interest-bearing financial contracts continue to be utilized by the banks under new Islamic terms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (Winter) ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
Kate Hashemi C.

While gender-based scholarship on the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is largely centred on a woman’s right to unveil, those adopting an LGBT+ framework tend to focus on human rights violations against homosexual males. This paper provides a more inclusive study in its assessment of the state’s oxymoronic approach to trans persons in Iran and the use of gender affirming surgery to reposition its subjects in line with hegemonic notions of “healthy” sexualities. In this context, the Iranian woman, bound by a particular conception of Islamic femininity, and the Iranian man, embodied by the hyper-masculine martyr figure, are promoted as the only genderisms acceptable to the state. This binary of hetero-Muslim male/female excludes all other expressions of gender. Ignoring the country’s historic array of masculinities and sexualities, the IRI criminalises gender “passing” in its limited notion of gender performativity. Furthermore, it utilises gender affirming surgery as a tool for repositioning divergent identities and sexualities within the state-sanctioned paradigm. While the state appropriates trans bodies to promote the ideal gendered subject, the framework of gender performativity is also adopted by regime critics to promote cis-gendered female agency: popular culture employs “cross-dressing” to contest the policing of heteronormative bodies and sexualities. Undoubtedly such methods are complicit in the continuation of discriminatory practices against trans persons in Iran.


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