THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS IN BIOETHICAL RESEARCH (QUALITY OF LIFE CONCEPTION)

The topic of happiness is one of the oldest in philosophical researches. Now it is the subject of interest, in particular, for bioethicists, scientists who are looking for the principles of proper treatment of human life, health, and death. The concept of happiness acquires special significance in the quality of life bioethical conception. The author of the article outlines the origins of the understanding of happiness adopted by the supporters of this conception, as well as gives examples of its application by them (above all by P. Singer, L. Nordenfelt, and J. McMahan). The quality of life bioethical conception adopted utilitarian vision of happiness, developed mainly by J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. According to it, happiness is identified with benefit or pleasure, which can be measured and maximized. In the XX century utilitarians began to consider autonomy – the ability of a person to manage his or her own life and death – as an important element of happiness. The influence of the preference utilitarianism is also noticeable. In obedience to it they see happiness in the ability of person to realize his or her rational and autonomous desires. The medical conditions that does not allow it are interpreted as lack of happiness. Thus, they justify not only the admissibility of withdrawing treatment that doesn’t give the expected result, but also of euthanasia. Killing a person, in terms of the quality of life conception, may not be a lack of happiness if the other alternative is to continue living in conditions that do not allow a person to realize his or her preferences, or does not coincide with his or her ideas of a decent life. The lives of persons who do not manifest rationality and autonomy are interpreted as inhuman, as wrongful, and the person as deprived of the right to happiness. Critics of the quality of life conception point to the subjectivity of the criteria by which happiness is measured. The second reproach is the reference to the absence of a hierarchy of values. That is why they give pleasure and absence of suffering too much importance.

Sensitizing Reasons by Emulating Exemplars

The fostering of rationality has long been endorsed as an educational ideal by some philosophers; in recent years, whereas some have argued for this ideal, others have challenged it, particularly within debates relevant to the study of critical thinking. Harvey Siegel, who has spelled out the philosophical theory of educating for rationality, not only has defended his view from such challenges but also has been deepening his thoughts regarding how rationality can be fostered. This paper centers on the cultivating of sensitivity to reasons in the fostering of rationality by critically examining and extending Siegel’s arguments concerning the notion of what he calls “felt reasons.” By clarifying the notion of felt reasons, I will argue for two ideas: first, teachers, parents, and fictional characters in media such as novels and films can be seen as exemplars that manifest rationality; second, the emotion of admiring exemplars may act as a motivating force for children—including small children who are still not sensitive to reasons and thus are not moved by reasons—to be critical thinkers.

A Dialectical Tier Within Reason

The first part of this essay argues that the specification of rationality operating in Manifest Rationality does not allow for the inclusion of the dialectical tier as a necessary component of a rational product. It next considers Perelman's conception of "reasonableness" as an alternative to Johnson's structural sense of rationality. Adopting a contextually rich conception of rationality, like that of Perelman, allows Johnson to insist that a rational product must consist of both an illative core and a dialectical tier.

Rawls, Brandt, and the Definition of Rational Desires

Philosophers, psychiatrists, and social scientists would welcome clarification of the distinction between rational and irrational desires. It may be proper to say that rational desires are those which manifest rationality (or which at least do not conflict with its manifestations). But since this seems a rather unilluminating characterization, philosophers sometimes offer definitions of what constitute such manifestations of rationality. I shall consider definitions provided by John Rawls and Richard Brandt. Their definitions are unsatisfactory mainly because they include subjunctive conditionals. An alternative approach, which avoids conditionals, is attractive. But it encounters so many additional problems that I shall conclude that we are not now in a position to define rationality in this area and must treat it as a state or disposition which to date has only been partially characterized. Thus, if we want a definition of the difference between rational and irrational desires, we must at present settle for the rather unexciting one mentioned above.