Comparative Counterinsurgency and the Moros of Jolo

This chapter compares and contrasts direct and indirect approaches to counterinsurgency as personified by Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing, laying out a point-by-point comparison and analyzing the pros and cons of each. It then introduces a third Moro group (in addition to Maranaos and Maguindanaos), the Tausug Moros of Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago. Reacting to Leonard Wood’s aggressive pacification policy, Tausug warriors violently fought back collectively and in individual acts of ritual suicide, or parrang sabbil.

Progressive Counterinsurgency and COIN

This last chapter compares and contrasts the Progressive counterinsurgency strategy implemented by John J. Pershing in the Muslim Philippines with twenty-first-century counterinsurgency (COIN) guidelines as set forth in The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, first published in 2006. It argues that although modern COIN ideas have much to recommend them, American officers engaged in combatting Islamic militants today would be wise to study Pershing’s full-spectrum but more limited approach to counterinsurgency among Philippine Moros in the early twentieth century.

John Pershing and Full-Spectrum Counterinsurgency in Moro Province, 1909–1913

This chapter analyzes the more balanced counterinsurgency strategy employed by Pershing as military governor of Moro Province from 1909 to 1913. The new governor rejected Leonard Wood’s direct approach. But he also had problems with the indirect method adopted by Tasker Bliss, regarding Bliss’s leadership as too passive. He gravitated toward a middle way, both respectful of datus and their power and determined to disarm the Moros. In 1911, it became obvious to him that American military rule of Moro Province could not last much longer. From that point on, he determined to disarm as many Moros as possible, pacify any remaining pockets of resistance, and transfer power to American civilians as quickly as possible. He used Moro insurgents atop Bud Bagsak on Jolo Island as an object lesson. After isolating the insurgents from their noncombatant base, his troops, led by Moro constables and scouts, killed 300–400 Moro fighters in a ferocious five-day battle.

Declaring Victory

This chapter discusses Pershing’s full-spectrum counterinsurgency efforts to hold or stabilize Moro society. These efforts included encouraging the development of a new leadership cadre among Moros, supporting very limited school building and teacher training for secular education, priming the pump for capital investments by sponsoring the Zamboanga Fair, providing limited funding for infrastructure improvements, improving public health, and discouraging Moro identification with the global Islamic umma. When Pershing left Moro Province in late 1913, he knew that his “victory” in countering Moro insurgency was, at best, a limited one. In writing his last annual governor’s report, he revealed what complete victory would mean—an end to polygamy and concubinage (which he had hitherto ignored), an undermining of patriarchal datu control (which he, as a fellow datu, had hitherto supported), and a weakening of Islamic cleric power (which he had hitherto left untouched). Completing the task of governing Moro Province would require that American civilians guarantee personal rights and liberties and promote secular education for Moro girls as well as boys. The American military had done its job of pacification and stabilization. It could declare “victory” and go home.

Learning to Live with Accommodation

This chapter focuses on the time between Gen. Wood’s departure and Gen. Pershing’s return to Moro Province (1906–1909). In these years, Moros and Americans began to confront each other less and to accommodate each other more. Counterinsurgency operations continued as the Philippine Constabulary battled insurgents in dozens of firefights, but the army remained relatively idle. Some 500–600 Moros died in these hostilities, a significant number to be sure, but far from the approximately 4,000 Moros killed in the Wood years. American Moro Province governor Tasker Bliss adopted a policy recommended by Najeeb Saleeby, a former Moro Province school superintendent who advised Americans to respect and work with Moro datus rather than undermine them. A modus vivendi emerged in which Moros went along with a variety of economic, commercial, and infrastructural changes, while Americans refrained from overtly threatening Moro social, religious, educational, and political institutions, with the one exception of slavery.

Hard War in Jolo

This chapter analyzes the murderous war between American troops and the Tausug Moros on Jolo Island, 1903–1906. It begins by discussing Panglima Hassan’s failed efforts to nurture a working relationship with Sulu governor Hugh Lenox Scott. It goes on to list specific do’s and don’ts in fighting small wars. Governor Scott and Gen. Wood committed many of the “don’ts.” They initially failed to consider the centrality of arbitration to the Tausug datu system, how the abolition of debt peonage threatened datus, and how imposition of the cedula tax offended Tausug religious sensibilities. Despite numerous American victories against Hassan and other Tausug Moros, the insurgency grew and spread into a reign of terror. Its horrifying climax came in March 1906 with the massacre of 700–900 Moro men, women, and children on a volcanic peak called Bud (Mt.) Dajo.

Leonard Wood and Counterinsurgency in Lanao and Cotabato

Enter Gen. Leonard Wood, who took over as the Moro Province’s first governor in 1903. He adopted a counter-Pershing approach to fighting small wars, stressing not just military pacification of Moros but social reformation as well. Wood’s arrival inaugurated the most violent period in America’s long conflict with Philippine Muslims, 1903–1906. After providing a brief portrait of the new governor, chapter 4 assesses how he ignited insurgency in Lanao. It then focuses on Cotabato District, where Wood blundered into a savage war that displaced thousands of Maguindanao Moros as he vigorously pursued rebel leader and local hero Datu Ali.

The Mailed Fist of Progressive Counterinsurgency

In late 1902 and early 1903, Capt. Pershing implemented very deliberate, methodical, and unspectacular counterinsurgency tactics in neutralizing Maranao Moro insurgency in Lanao—nothing flashy or especially innovative or brilliant. But when military success is measured by victory after victory achieved without massive loss of life, especially to his own troops, his Lake Lanao campaigns proved remarkably successful and made him into a hero among his countrymen.

Pershing and Early Counterinsurgency among Maranao Moros, 1902

Chapter 1 examines Pershing’s early implementation of counterinsurgency ideas among Maranao Moros in 1902. He stressed the importance of learning about Maranao culture and political divisions and of applying that learning in alliance building to isolate hostile Moros in an ever-diminishing minority. He set the stage for successful military campaigns to follow. But he also made mistakes in his culturally myopic attempt to impose American concepts of justice on Maranao Moro datus (chiefs). By 1903, he had learned from his mistakes enough to attain the high honor of being elected a datu by Maranao leaders.

Introduction

The introduction begins by describing the Battle of Bayang in Lanao, Philippines, in May 1902. It then introduces John J. Pershing, his formative experience commanding Sioux scouts and Tenth Cavalry African American soldiers, and his Progressive Era context. It discusses his time in Zamboanga, Mindanao, and his intimate relationship with the Filipina Joaquina Bondoy Ignacio. It describes the Maranao Moro social-political world in which he immersed himself. And it examines how the bloodbath at Bayang impelled him to begin shaping a more effective and less-lethal way of fighting small wars.