Metaphysical Rationalism

Limited Scope

This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195335828.013.011 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Martin Lin

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Reason ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Principle Of Sufficient Reason

This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0026 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Bruce L. Gordon

Keyword(s):

Recent Work ◽

Quantum Physics ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Divine Action ◽

Ontic Structural Realism ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Adequate Understanding ◽

Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

Being and Reason

10.1093/oso/9780198834151.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Martin Lin

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Reason ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Existence And Nonexistence ◽

New Interpretation ◽

Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s003441250300684x ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 40 (2) ◽

pp. 165-179 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

Keyword(s):

Ad Hoc ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Quantum Mechanical ◽

Cosmological Argument ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Restricted Version ◽

Van Inwagen ◽

Peter Van Inwagen ◽

Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

God

Being and Reason ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198834151.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 53-73

Author(s):

Martin Lin

Keyword(s):

Lessons Learned ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Existence Of God ◽

The Third ◽

Definition Of ◽

The Way

This chapter offers reconstructions of Spinoza’s four arguments for the existence of God. Among the lessons learned from these reconstructions is that, although Spinoza’s first argument is often described as ontological, it relies on many substantive premises that go beyond the definition of God and it is not vulnerable to standard objections to ontological arguments. Additionally, the second argument introduces Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, and seeing how Spinoza applies it to the existence of God sheds light on how he understands both the PSR and causation and explanation more generally. The chapter concludes by arguing that the third and fourth arguments pave the way for Spinoza’s claim that, besides God, no substance can be or be conceived and consideration of them shows why Spinoza’s argument for monism does not beg the question against the orthodox Cartesian.

Leibniz's Method and the Basis of His Metaphysics

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819100037748 ◽

1960 ◽

Vol 35 (132) ◽

pp. 51-61

Author(s):

A. H. Johnson

Keyword(s):

Predicate Logic ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Bertrand Russell ◽

Deductive Logic ◽

The Subject

The monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell reaffirms his contention that “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic”. He welcomes the support provided in Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz. Russell remarks “No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz’s metaphysic was derived by him from the subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper ‘Primae Veritates’ where all the main doctrines of the Monadology are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; ‘Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent’.” Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” and “The Identity of Indiscernibles” are “expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions”. In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz (i) used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and (2) employed “models” drawn from logic to construct his “picture of reality”, i.e. his metaphysics.

The Relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Studia Leibnitiana ◽

10.25162/sl-2017-0005 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 49 (1) ◽

pp. 96

Author(s):

Leonardo Ruiz-Gómez

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Reason ◽

The Relationship

The Correspondence with Clarke

Leibniz's Key Philosophical Writings ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198844983.003.0011 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 228-249

Author(s):

Gregory Brown

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Reason ◽

Space And Time ◽

The World

The correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke—mediated by Leibniz’s erstwhile friend and disciple at the electoral court in Hanover, Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach, princess of Wales—is arguably the most famous and influential of philosophical correspondences. In this chapter, I begin by tracing the background of the correspondence and the role that Caroline played in its inception and development. I then turn to a discussion of the main themes of the correspondence, paying particular attention to the importance of Caroline’s presence in shaping the themes of the debate: the principle of sufficient reason, the identity of indiscernibles, God’s choice in creating this world, space and time, God’s presence and activity in the world, miracles, and gravity.

A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412501005923 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 38 (1) ◽

pp. 89-99 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

RICHARD M. GALE ◽

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Reason ◽

True Proposition ◽

Cosmological Argument ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Entailment Relation ◽

Strong Principle

Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p, if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p. Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, and constitutes no improvement on the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR) which claims that every true proposition in fact has an explanation. The criticism is predicated on the fact that it can be shown that the W-PSR entails the S-PSR. We argue that the W-PSR's plausibility remains despite the criticisms. From this it can be seen to follow that the entailment relation between the W-PSR and the S-PSR gives one reason to believe the S-PSR.

Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber

10.1093/oso/9780190096748.001.0001 ◽

2020 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Abraham Anderson

Keyword(s):

David Hume ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Pure Reason ◽

Empirical Knowledge ◽

Existence Of God ◽

The Enlightenment ◽

New View

Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber offers an interpretation of Kant’s “confession,” in the Prolegomena, that “it was the objection of David Hume that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber.” It argues that Hume roused Kant not, as has often been thought, by challenging the principle “every event has a cause” that governs experience, but by attacking the principle of sufficient reason, the basis of rationalist metaphysics and of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. This proposal makes it possible to reconcile Kant’s declaration about Hume with his later assertion that it was the Antinomy of pure reason that first woke him from dogmatic slumber, because the Antinomy, like Hume’s challenge, is directed against the dogmatic use of the principle of sufficient reason. The proposal put forward here also makes it possible to understand why Kant speaks of “the objection of David Hume” after mentioning Hume’s attack on metaphysics; for the “objection” that Kant has in mind, it is argued here, is a challenge to metaphysics, rather than to the foundations of empirical knowledge. This work also leads to a new view of Hume himself—as primarily interested not in the foundations of experience but in the problem of metaphysics. It thereby lets us see both Kant and Hume as champions of the Enlightenment in its struggle with superstition.