Monetary Theory: Overview and Liquidity Extensions

The chapter points out some deficiencies of the mainstream model utilized by many central banks. It also reviews the Fiscal Theory of the Price level. Extending the barebones version of the central banks' model presented here to the case in which "land" is endowed with liquidity, the chapter shows, among other things, that if land is subject to Liquidity Crunch, increasing the supply of liquidity by pump-priming high-powered money fails to send land's relative price back to pre-liquidity-shock level. This helps to give a rationale for Quantitative Easing in which the central bank purchases "toxic assets" with high-powered money. The chapter includes extensions to account for banks and liquidity as a factor of production, and it ends with a critique of the new crop of financial crisis models, especially those stressing non-linear constraints.

Systemic Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance-Sheet Effects and Financial Integration

Using a sample of 110 developed and developing countries for the period 1990-2004, the chapter claims that a small supply of tradable goods relative to their domestic absorption, and large foreign-exchange denominated debts towards the domestic banking system, denoted Domestic Liability Dollarization, are key determinants of the probability of Systemic Sudden Stop (3S). Moreover, the larger is financial integration, the larger is likely to be the probability of 3S; however, beyond a critical point the relationship gets a sign reversion.

Liquidity Crunch/Trap: Some Unconventional Output/Employment/Growth Implications1

The chapter shows that a sudden and sufficiently large contraction of bonds' liquidity could generate a fall in output, liquidity trap and price deflation, suggesting that there is no contradiction between Liquidity Crunch and Liquidity Trap, in line with the discussion in Chapter 2. The discussion is based on a simple model in which there are two types of liquid assets: fiat money and liquid bonds (e.g., Asset-Backed securities) under flexible prices. Fiat money is the liquid asset of choice for households, while under normal conditions firms have a preference for bonds. The model is employed to discuss quantitative easing (QE) in exchange for 'toxic' assets, and to show that the loss of bond liquidity could give rise to secular stagnation.

The Liquidity Approach to Financial Crises1

The chapter focuses sharply on liquid assets, and is the heart of the book. It distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic liquidity, centering on the latter. Extrinsic liquidity may break down on the spur of the moment and generate socially costly Liquidity Crunch. A substantive part of the chapter is devoted to discussing relative resilience of liquid assets, and focuses on Keynes's Price Theory of Money, the resilience of the US dollar, the weakness of bonds denominated in that currency, and of currencies of emerging-market economies. The chapter claims that recent financial crises can realistically be modeled as old-fashioned bank runs, and that assets' liquidity may be a function of policy. Special attention is paid to a phenomenon called Liquidity Deflation, which helps to rationalize Liquidity Trap as a consequence of loss of money liquidity rather than on the conventional explanation based on the infinite interest elasticity of money demand.

Nominal Anchoring with Liquid Monetary Policy Assets

The chapter shows that existence of a unique Rational Expectations equilibrium can be ensured even if the Taylor Principle – stating that the policy interest rate increases by more than the increase in the expected rate of inflation – does not hold. This is shown by extending a barebones' central bank monetary model to the case in which liquidity is produced by both money and public bonds. The discussion concludes that liquidity considerations may have a critical impact on the monetary policy implications derived from the mainstream model.

Financial Crises and the Slow Mutation of Conventional Wisdom

This chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book by offering a brief narrative of financial crises since Mexico's Tequila crisis in 1994/5 and including the Great Recession in developed-market economies, which are hard to rationalize in terms of mainstream models. The objective is to highlight factors common to these crises, in particular systemic crisis episodes in which several economies are involved at about the same time. These crises are accompanied by sudden and sharp falls in credit flows with serious consequences on the real economy. In emerging market economies, for example, output bounce-back did not entail an equivalent credit recovery. These episodes of asymmetric bust/recovery are called Phoenix Miracles. The chapter also highlights the efficacy of central banks in preventing a replay of the Great Deflation but it also points out their inability to prevent major recession.

Introduction to Part II

This section offers an introduction to the empirical material covered in Chapters 6 and 7. Moreover, it summarizes research based on Chapter 7 and that develops a methodology for the determination for the optimal level of international reserves, if the authorities' objective is to soften the severe blow caused by Sudden Stop.

Systemic Sudden Stops: Crises and Recoveries in EMs

The chapter presents stylized facts about recession episodes associated with Systemic Sudden Stops (3S), i.e., large and abrupt reversals in capital inflows in which several economies are hit at about the same time. This choice is motivated by the conjecture that 3S are mostly triggered by liquidity malfunction, which is a central topic of the book. The chapter documents that the contraction of economic activity during 3S recession episodes is mostly driven by measured TFP, and is accompanied by a collapse in bank credit, investment, little consumption smoothing, and a large adjustments of real wages and the real exchange rate. The recovery from these episode occurs with a precarious recovery of credit (“Phoenix Miracles”) and displays persistent effects on economic activity, investment, and real wages.